University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1997

NATO and the future of European security.
Sean, Kay
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1

Recommended Citation
Kay, Sean,, "NATO and the future of European security." (1997). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February
2014. 1964.
https://doi.org/10.7275/8460-4w27 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1964

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

NATO AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

A Dissertation Presented
by
SEAN

I

.

KAY

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
May 1997

Department of Political Science

Copyright by Sean Imrie Kay 1997
All Rights Reserved

NATO AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

A Dissertation Presented
by
SEAN

I.

Approved as to style and content

KAY

by:

A

Eric Einhorn, Chair

~0

^

«

Peter Haas, Member

Stephen Pelz, Member

Eric Einhorn, Department Head
Department of Political Science

DEDICATION
This project is dedicated to several people who have

provided me essential support, encouragement, and
perspective throughout my ongoing educational career.

To my

parents, David and Jennifer Kay, my deepest thanks and

gratitude go beyond what words can express.

Simply put,

this effort would not been possible without your confidence

and insights.
Madigan,

I

To my father and mother-in-law, Matt and Anna

thank you for opening my eyes to your vision of

the world and a special place in Europe.

Indeed,

I

am

especially honored to dedicate this dissertation to the
living memory of Matt Madigan.

Most importantly,

thank you

to my lovely wife Anna and our beautiful daughter Cria Anne.

You are the light of my life and my inspiration.
for your love, wisdom,

insight and support.

many adventures that lie ahead.

Thank you

Here's to the

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Many individuals in Europe and the US have been
extremely supportive of this dissertation project.

While it

is impossible to name them all and while in some
cases for

the purposes of confidentiality

I

can not,

these people know

who they are and know the extent of my gratitude.

would

I

thus name a few individuals who have been most central to
the evolution of my academic and professional career toward

the completion of the Ph.D. and this dissertation.

and foremost,
Eric

thank you to my dissertation committee.

Einhorn, Dr. Peter M. Haas,

S.

First
Dr.

and Dr. Stephen Pelz

have each played crucial roles throughout the project.

I

could not have asked for a better working relationship in

dissertation committee and

I

a

am sincerely grateful for their

individual and collective time and effort.

Second,

like to pay special tribute to two mentors to whom

I

I

would
owe the

deepest gratitude for engaging me in NATO issues and the
deepest respect for their own contributions making Europe

more secure place
Shea.

Dr.

-

Lawrence

S.

Kaplan and Dr. Jamie

a
P.

While no graduate student could sufficiently list all

of the professors who have impacted their studies,

I

would

like to especially thank Dr. Robert W. Clawson for planting
the seed of academic interest in the world of international

affairs.

Finally,

I

would acknowledge the steadfast support

and patient encouragement of my dear friend Dr. Mark Rubin.
To all of those who provided information and support for
this project, my most sincere thanks.
V

ABSTRACT

NATO AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY
MAY 19 9 7

SEAN

KAY,

I.

B.A.,

KENT STATE UNIVERSITY

M.A. KENT STATE UNIVERSITY

NLA.

FREE UNIVERSITY OF BRUSSELS

Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Directed by:

Professor Eric.

S.

Einhorn

This dissertation examines the general proposition that
formal international institution promote national security
in Europe.

Analytically,

the features of international

institutions are the independent variables and the degree of
security is the dependent variable.

The North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO) is the primary focus of the
analysis.

The project draws from realist and

institutionalist approaches to the study of international
relations to assess what institutional characteristics of

NATO have developed over time which may contribute to
national security into the 21st century.
is organized into seven chapters.

The dissertation

The empirical research is

based on primary and secondary sources including personal
interviews conducted with senior policy makers and academic
sources in Europe and the US ongoing since 1991.

The

dissertation is divided into seven chapters including
theoretical and methodological overview;
NATO;

NATO during the Cold War;

vi

a

the origins of

NATO's post-Cold War

institutional adaptation (including the Partnership for
Peace and the Balkan crisis);

NATO enlargement;

and NATO's

internal transformation and the future of the transatlantic

relationship.

This dissertation moves the debate over the

relationship between international institutions and security
in international relations theory.

The general conclusion

is that variations in institutional form can have a dramatic

impact on the degree of security, positive or negative, in
the European context and that a major test of that claim is

coming in the next several decades
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CHAPTER

I

NATO AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

NATO does not need an enemy to exist. The Alliance
remains as relevant today as it ever has. NATO's members
work together in the Alliance because they can bring their
combined energy to bear in shaping European security
NATO's key strategic objective is to help create political
conditions which make crises and conflicts less and less
likely.
This is what we mean when we speak about building a
new European security architecture: building a set of
political relationships where each state feels secure and at
ease
-NATO Secretary General
Javier Solana, Lisbon, Portugal
2 5 November 1996.

Since the end of the Cold War, formal international

institutions including the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO)

,

the Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
(WEU)

,

the United Nations

,

the Western European Union

and the European Union

(UN)

(EU)

have been tasked by their member states to help them map a

course through the general uncertainty, and at times

dangerous instability, of contemporary Europe.
institutions,

Among these

increasing pressure has fallen on NATO to

enhance national security in Europe into the 21st century.

While NATO has received increasing theoretical and policy
analysis,

little attention has been given to what

institutional characteristics of NATO contribute to national
security.

NATO was established in 1949 as an institutional

arrangement incorporating balance of power alliance

characteristics while promoting reassurance and community
among its member states.

However,

l

there is little evidence

of NATO's institutional functions acting independently to

cause peace and security.

Cold War,

As NATO neared the end of the

it was fundamentally a military alliance with

institutional attributes that facilitated the exertion of

American power balanced against the Soviet Union.

These

constraints of alliance make adapting NATO's institutional
form after the Cold War a formidable challenge.

However,

this dissertation shows that for NATO to increase security
in the future it must be carefully, but dramatically,

transformed
So long as there is no major threat to its members'

interests,

the degree to which NATO can contribute to

security in the future will be dependent on its

institutional form.

In examining that proposition,

this

project seeks to answer five main questions about
institutions and security in Europe:
*What are the sources of national security in Europe?
*What is the relationship between international
institutions and national security?
*To what extent do variations in institutional form
affect the degree of security in Europe?

*What institutional attributes of NATO have enhanced
security over time?

^Through what institutional form is NATO most likely to
increase security in the future?
Analytically, this project uses contemporary realism to test

NATO's institutional relevance independently enhancing

security in Europe.

Many institutionalist scholars and

that
senior policymakers in NATO capitals have concluded

NATO can contribute to security by aiding information

exchange among the member states, promoting transparency
in
national security planning, enhancing reassurance among
states,

and socializing national decision-makers toward more

peaceful national security policies.

Alternatively,

realists are skeptical of the role that NATO can play after
the Cold War.

Realism predicts that, as an alliance, NATO

will sooner or later dissolve in the absence of an immediate

and credible threat.

The US will return home and Europe,

led by Germany, will seek a more independent role promoting
its own security interests.

Realists warn that a reliance

on institutions for national security promotes a dangerous

false promise of peace.

This dissertation draws from insights provided by

realist and neoliberal institutional analysis to offer

propositions about NATO and the future of European security.
The central argument is that NATO can enhance European

security by enlarging to include Poland and the Czech

Republic and creating a hedge between Germany and Russia

-

two major powers with a long history of security competition

over this region.

For enlargement to succeed, NATO's

institutional architecture will have to be adapted so that
its primary task is to preserve the existing general peace
in Europe and that it should not be viewed as a threat to

the security or stability of any state

Russia

-

particularly

To understand the relationship between NATO's

institutional attributes and the degree of security in
Europe,

this dissertation surveys NATO's history and post-

Cold War development.

Analytically the different features

of international institutions are the independent variables

and the degree of security is the dependent variable.

The

project shows that, to the extent that NATO did promote
security in the past, its institutional form was

a dependent

variable adapted in response to external events and member
state demands.

In the absence of the Soviet threat,

NATO

members have sought to adapt its institutional form by

expanding its mission and tasks with mixed results.
date,

To

NATO has not been sufficiently adapted to the

requirements of post-Cold War European security to justify

optimism for its playing

a strong role enhancing European

security in the absence of a threat

Chapter II demonstrates the salience of realism and

institutionalism as analytical tools for understanding the
sources of national security in Europe.

It shows that there

are major differences within the realist and

institutionalist schools about the potential for
institutions to affect security and over what institutional
form is likely to promote security in Europe.

This chapter

establishes the framework for an institutional analysis of
the
NATO carefully tested against realist propositions about

sources of national security.

4

Chapter III provides a study of NATO's formative
period.

This chapter shows that the creation of NATO was

the culmination of momentum toward institutionalized

security cooperation after World War II between the US and
its wartime allies.

The chapter demonstrates that NATO was

intended to be an institutional mechanism to promote

reassurance and self-help in Western Europe in conjunction

with its primary function as a collective defense alliance

organized against the Soviet Union.

constructed NATO were building upon

The actors who
a

broadening

intellectual understanding of how to promote national

security in Europe.

An analysis of the negotiations leading

up to the NATO treaty demonstrates the value that its

founders placed on its institutional characteristics.
particular,

In

the founders articulated a priority of using

NATO to promote burdensharing and self-help among the West

European countries and an expansion of shared western
values

Chapter IV shows how the Cold War forced an adaptation
of NATO into its classic institutional form.

There was

considerable institutional activity in NATO during the Cold
War,

NATO.

and it was during this period that the "0" was put in

This chapter shows that NATO's institutionalization

had value as a means toward the exercise of power and

deterrence but that the institution did not act
independently.

The key determinants of its institutional

system and the
form were the structure of the international

demands of collective defense.

In each of three cases,

collective defense, burdensharing

,

and enlargement, NATO

institutional activity was dependent upon other variables

-

primarily the distribution of power in the international
system.

Chapter V examines variations in NATO's institutional

adaptation after the Cold War beginning with efforts to
build interlocking institutions via the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE

December 1994)
(NACC)

,

,

-

renamed OSCE in

the North Atlantic Cooperation Council

and the Partnership for Peace (PFP) to promote

stability in Central and Eastern Europe during a period of
dramatic change.

It demonstrates the false promise of

institutions to address the early period of the Balkan war
in spite of the fact that institutions were identified by

member states as the primary means for resolving the
conflict.

However,

it also shows that despite these

failures, NATO did eventually play a major role promoting

peace in Bosnia in late 1995 and that some of its

institutional characteristics had
little had actually changed

-

a

decisive impact.

Yet

NATO only functioned when the

US led it in its traditional alliance functions.

Chapter VI surveys NATO planning for post-Cold War

enlargement to include new members from Central and Eastern
Europe.

This chapter traces the development of the policy

for
and summarizes realist and institutionalist arguments
It shows that there is

and against NATO enlargement.
6

considerable disagreement among analysts making for some
unique cross paradigm policy advocates on both sides of the
issue.

The chapter concludes that the best premise for NATO

enlargement is to create a hedge, via the expansion of

American political reassurance, between Russia and Germany.
If the

primary objective is to enlarge the western community

of nations,

there are other institutions better suited for

this activity

-

including NATO's own Partnership for Peace.

Chapter VII examines NATO's internal adaptation after
the Cold War.

Attaining an operational burdensharing

arrangement is necessary to keep the American commitment to
Europe politically sustainable in the absence of an

immediate threat to vital US national interests.

The

chapter traces the failure of Europe to assume greater

responsibility for its own security through an independent
European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and explains
the objective of restructuring NATO's operational functions

via Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF)
that,

once operational,

.

Chapter VII shows

the CJTF can serve as the basis for

an institutional framework for crisis management promoting

European security into the 21st century.

Organizing for

such missions and providing facilities for multilateral

consultation would become the primary peacetime activity of
NATO.

The movement of France back toward NATO integrated

military planning demonstrates that trends favor such
development.

However,

Chapter VII also shows that any

successful burdensharing arrangement in NATO faces
7

a

considerable constraints and must be based on a

reinvigorated transatlantic relationship.
Chapter VIII provides general conclusions about NATO
and the future of European security and establishes a

framework for a broader research agenda.

This chapter

advances the importance of testing institutional form
against realist concerns about the ability of institutions
to create security.

The general conclusion of the project

is that NATO faces considerable constraints in its post-Cold

War adaptation and, to date, NATO has not been sufficiently

transformed to justify optimism about its relevance for the
future.

Failure to adapt may cause its member states

to,

over time,

increasingly question its value to their

security.

NATO can have an important role to play in the

future of Europe.

However,

considerable work remains to be

done to move from theory to practice in European security.

8

CHAPTER II

NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY:

A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

European Security after the Cold War
This dissertation addresses the proposition that formal

international institutions promote national security in
Europe. Analytically the features of international

institutions are the independent variables and the degree of
security is the dependent variable.

The North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO) is the primary focus of the
analysis.

The project draws from realist and

institutionalist approaches to the study of international
relations to assess what institutional characteristics of
NATO have developed over time which may contribute to

national security into the 21st century.

After the Cold War, European security has become

a

multi-dimensional concept that includes military, political,
economic,

societal,

and environmental issues.

1

Nevertheless, national security remains the primary factor

1

.

The complex

task of defining security

is

surveyed by Barry Buzan who lists over a dozen
Barry Buzan, People States and Fear: An

attempts to give a specific definition to security.

(Boulder, CO:
Agenda for International Security Studies in the post-C old War Era, 2nd edition.
Thomas,
C.
Daniel
and
Klare
T.
Michael
16-17.
Also
see
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991)
Press,
1991);
Martin's
York:
St.
(New
End
Century's
World Security: Trends & Challenges at
1995).
Press,
University
Columbia
York:
(New
and Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ed.. On Security

European context see Barry
For specific attempts to conceptualize and redefine security in the
post-Cold War Era
the
for
Scenarios
Recast:
Buzan et al The European Security Order
(Princeton University
Europe
Securing,
Ullman,
(London: Pinter Publishers, 1990); Richard H.
rit y (Princeton,
Secu
International
and
Conflict
Press 1991)- Michael E. Brown, ed.. Ethnic
and Ethnic
Nationalism
Griffiths,
NJ- Princeton University Press, 1993); Stephen [wan
and Simon Duke,
SIPR1,
1993);
Sweden:
Conflict: Threats to European Security (Stockholm,
1994).
Press,
Martin's
The New European Security Disorder (New York: St.

motivating states in the international environment.

What is

new about today's quest for national security are formal

international institutions which are an important element of
the environment in which states assess their national

concerns and implement national security strategies.
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council

Partnership for Peace (PFP)

,

(NACC)

,

NATO,

the

the Organization for Security

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
the Western European Union (WEU)

,

,

the European Union (EU)

,

the Commonwealth of

Independent States (CIS) and the United Nations

(UN)

have

all been promoted by states as mechanisms to reduce the

potential for conflict in post-Cold War Europe.

Among these

institutions, NATO has emerged as the core of a future

institutional security arrangement in Europe.

However, NATO

is a military alliance whose successful Cold War

institutional characteristics were dependent on the alliance

function of collective defense.

If NATO is to survive as an

institution in the absence of a threat, it will have to be
adapted fundamentally to meet the new challenges to national
security that states face after the Cold War.

European security has become interdependent to the
extent that events which affect the national security of one
state can have profound impact on others.

For example,

the

Balkan crises of the early 1990s were not an immediate
threat to general security in Europe.

However,

if the war

countries
had spread it had the potential to draw in larger

general
and decrease security in Europe at a much more

level.

Because of this complexity of the new European

security environment, a state pursuing its own security may
cause regional instability

-

which can lead to security

competition, possibly draw in large states, and lead to war.

Thus national security is more than territorial defense or

promotion of key interests.
part of states

It

includes confidence on the

(and their leaders)

of relative safety within

an uncertain international environment.

Confidence is

enhanced when a state is reassured that events occurring in
one state or region will not have an adverse effect on it.

National security in Europe is challenged by the need
to manage the collapse of the last great 20th century empire
-

the Soviet Union.

Russia could become a resurgent

nationalist military power seeking to restore order and

dominance in the former Soviet Union and thereby protect

22

million ethnic Russians scattered throughout its near
abroad.

Alternatively, Russia and its neighbors could

collapse internally
weapons.

-

a Balkan analogy but with nuclear

Central and Eastern European states are challenged

by existing and potential crisis which could have spill-over

effects for the entire Continent.

The fragility of new

democracies and post -Communist economic transformations
combines with ongoing territorial and ethnic tensions,

refugee movements, the potential for the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, and

environmental crisis to make Central and Eastern Europe
insecure
11

Western Europe, the United States, Canada, and the
institutions which link them, are especially challenged to

promote security and stability in the new Europe.

Yet the

West is internally confronted by the possibility that the US

could leave the Continent in a resurgence of its dominant

historical pattern of isolationism from Europe.

A continued

disproportionate operational burden on the US role in
European security could accelerate an American withdrawal.
Such a move could revive the security dilemma that the US
and NATO helped eliminate between France and Germany and

possibly prompt Germany to obtain nuclear weapons, pursue
offensive-based national security arrangements, and
establish unilateral alliances with its neighbors to the
East.

2

Such a move would be viewed as provocative in both
It is within this international

Russia and the West.

environment that NATO's institutional form must be adapted
if it is to have continued relevance.

have not occurred.

To date,

such changes

At the core of this institutional

challenge is a need to use international relations theory to

clarify what NATO as an institution can, and can not do, to
enhance national security.

be Better," Adelphi Paper
See Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May
Journal of
Millennium:
171 (Autumn 1981); Kenneth N. Waltz, "The New World Order,"
in
Restored,"
"Disorder
International Studies 22:2 (1993) 187-195; John J. Mearsheimer,

Graham

War

to

Security: Beyond Co ld
Allison and Gregory F. Treverton, eds., Rethinking America's
Co., 1992) 213-237;
Order (New York and London: W.W. Norton

&

New World

Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar

Illusion:

Why New

Security 17:4 (Spring 1993).
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Great Powers Will Rise," Internationa,

Realism and Institutionalism as Analytical Tnnls
Realists assert that institutions do not have

a

positive impact on national security because they do not
cause peace.

Power is the primary source of national

security and explains how and under what circumstances
states cooperate.

3

Realists remind scholars and

practitioners of national security that material power and
national interest remain primary concerns for states.
States are the key actors in an international system of

anarchy and their primary objective is survival and

advancing the means to that end.
best,

Realism assumes that, at

international institutions are an intervening variable

in security.

4

At their worst,

institutions can cloud and

confuse the balance of power in the international system and

promote a false promise of security.
The realist view of institutions is essential to

testing an institutional perspective to national security in
Europe.

For example, when institutionalist claims are made

Power (anything which

aids in the control of

man

over man) can be measured

in terms of

capacity to use force, the ability to use authority or influence to attain voluntary or involuntary
cooperation from another. Power includes both "hard" (military/capabilities) and "soft" (socio-

economic/the ability to use institutions
statement of contemporary

to

promote national

interest) forms.

realism in international relations see

Hans

J.

For the formative

Morganthau,

Politics

Also see Robert G. Gilpin, "The
Among Nations 3rd ed., (New York:
Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its
Robert
0.
in
Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,"
David Baldwin, Paradoxes of
304-305:
York: Columbia University Press 1986)

Knoph, 1978) 5-12.

,

Critics

(New

Power (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989); and Joseph
American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990).
For a classic

realist critique

of institutions see George

F.

S.

Nye

Jr.,

The Changing Nature of

Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-

This analysis of institutions
1950 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1951) 95-103.
International Institutions," in
has been revived by John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of
Realism and
Michael E. Brown (et al), eds.. The Perils of A narchy: Contemporary
International Security (Cambridge,

MA: MIT
13

Press, 1995) 332-376.

supporting the enlargement of NATO into Central and Eastern
Europe based on the positive impact that NATO's

institutional structures had on managing relations between

Greece and Turkey, a realist counterf actual exposes this

claim as both untrue and a dangerous premise for NATO
enlargement.

The pessimistic nature of realism helps

policymakers and scholars know what to avoid when using
institutions to promote security and what can go wrong

if

they fail to do what is expected of them.

There is empirical justification for the realist view
of institutions given that three efforts to create formal

security architectures in Europe based on collective

security institutions (in which states organize military

power to manage crisis on the principle of all against one)
have been attempted and each failed to prevent war or end
conflict.

The Concert of Europe, which formed the basis of

19th century European security, had some nascent

institutional functions.

However,

it was a system of great

power management that only worked well while there was

a

general agreement among the five major actors and the
Once interests diverged, the

individuals representing them.

institution could not adapt and the elite participants lost
their common goal of great power system management.

5

The

"Security Regimes," in
For analysis of the Concert of Europe as an institution see Robert Jervis,
Cornell University Press. 1981);
Stephen D Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca. NY:

1988-1989); Charles A.

(Winter
John Meuller. "A New Concert of Europe." Foreign Policy 77
Future of Europe,"
the
and
Security,
Collective
and Clifford A. Kupchan. "Concerts,
"Balance, Concert,
Hoffmann,
Stanley
114-161;
International Security 16:1 (Summer 1991)
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League of Nations was a hierarchical security architecture

which sought to redefine national security as

a

collective

good through legal mechanisms mandating a commitment to
intervene on the principle of all against one when

institutional norms and principles were violated.

However,

the League of Nations was neither collective nor secure and

was an institutional shell under which anarchy ruled in

spite of some minor successes.

6

From 1991 through 1994

Europe embarked on a concerted effort to build

a new

amalgamated form of collective security based on
"interlocking institutions".

While there was considerable

institutional activity during this time, over 200,000 people
were killed in the Balkan wars.

Realism

is,

nevertheless, limited as an analytical tool

if it assumes that an institutional analysis intrinsically

means a belief that collective security is attainable.
fact,

In

there are three institutional approaches with

relevance to understanding the sources of national security.

Anarchy, or None of the Above,"

(New York: Council on Foreign

in

Relations Press,

and Security Prospects in Europe"

in

The Shane of
1992); Patrick M. Morgan,

Gregory R. Treverton,

John G. Ruggie,

ed.,

the

New

Europe

"Multilateralism

ed.. Multilateralism Matters:

The Theory

University Press, 1993) 327-364;

Institutional Form (New York: Columbia
Richard Rosecrance, "Trading States in a New Concert of Europe," in Helga Haftendorn and
Christian Tuschhoff, eds., America and Europe in an Era of Change (Boulder, Co: Westview
Endurance of
Press, 1993) 127-146; and William H. Daugherty, "System Management and the

and Praxis of an

the Concert of Europe," in Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis,

Coping with Complexity

in the

System (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993).
League of
For analysis of the League of Nations see C.K. Webster and Sydney Herbert, The
E.H. Carr, T_he
Nations in Theory and Practice (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1933);

International

Claude Jr.,
Twenty Years Crisis. 1919-1939 (London: Macmillan Press, 1940); and Inis L.
4th edition
Organization,
ional
Internat
of
Progress
and
Problems
Swords Into Plowshares: The

(New York: Random House,

1984).
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The first is neoliberal which stresses national
interest and
gains that states might make by cooperating within

institutions.

Neoliberal institutionalism recognizes the

predominance of states and the importance of power but
maintains that some institutional arrangements can help
states better understand each other's aims and thereby

reduce uncertainty in the international environment.

The

second school includes advocates of collective security who

would establish a hierarchical security architecture for
Europe attempting to make up for the failings of the Concert
of Europe and the League of Nations.

A third is

constructivist and focuses on security communities and the

possibility that institutions can promote the evolution of

a

community in which there is virtually no possibility of war
among a group of states
This project utilizes a neoliberal approach to

understanding international institutions and their
relationship to European security by testing the claim that
institutions, properly designed and adapted by their members

when necessary, can enhance national security in Europe.
While this school is the closest to realism among the three

institutional approaches to understanding European security,
there remain clear differences between the two.

These two

traditions of international relations therefore provide

a

rich analytical testing ground for adapting NATO's

institutional form as Europe moves into the 21st century.
As E.H. Carr writes:
16

...pure realism can offer nothinq but a
naked struggle for power which mikes
any
kind of international society
impossible .. .The human will continue to
seek and escape from the logical
consequences of realism in the vision
an international order which, as soon of
as
it crystallizes itself into concrete
political form, becomes tainted with
self-interest and hypocracy and must
once more be attacked with the
instruments of realism.

There is no harder case for the role of institutions than
security.

8

Looking at institutions in terms of what they

should do rather than what they can do is not only

inapplicable to meeting challenges to European security

-

it

may be dangerous

Realism

Among realist scholars, Kenneth

N.

Waltz and John

J.

Mearsheimer provide the most unyielding application of
realism to international security.

To Waltz,

international system is one of anarchy

".

.

the

.taken to mean not

just the absence of government, but also the presence of
9
disorder and chaos

Edward H.

Carr,

The anarchical nature of international

The Twenty Years

Crisis,

1919-1939 2nd ed., (London:
,

Macniillan, 1969)

93.

A

hard case for die success of institutions

is

one

in

which

the interests in defection

from an

institution are greater than those of cooperation, but cooperation occurs nevertheless.

See Oran

Young, "The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables," in
James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., Governance Without Government: Order and
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 160-194.
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing
Company, 1978) 14. To Waltz all states are similar actors within the international system and

Change

in

World

Politics

1

domestic identity
Waltz,

Man

is

not relevant to the primary objective of

the State and

Press, 1959).

War:

A

Theoretical Analysis

all states -

survival.

(New York: Columbia

See Kenneth
University

For additional analysis of the role of anarchy in international relations see Hedley
A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia

Bull, The Anarchical Society:

17

relations forces states to pursue self-help and avoid

relying on the good nature of other states because "in an

unorganized realm each unit's incentive is to put itself in
a

position to be able to take care of itself since no one

else can be counted on to do so." 10
In the absence of a balance of power,

interdependence

and relative gains competition among states are causes of

instability and thus states pursue self-help by increasing

power for a minimum of survival or a maximum of hegemonic
dominance.

As Waltz writes:

"Interdependent states whose

relations remain unregulated must experience conflict and
will occasionally fall into violence

... If

interdependence

grows at a pace that exceeds the development of central
control,

war."

11

then interdependence hastens the occasion for
To Mearsheimer,

states recoil from interdependence

which can infringe on sovereignty and even survival
Interdependence may lead to conflict because states will
"The

struggle to escape the vulnerability that it creates.

greater the military advantage one state has over other
states,

the more secure it is," Mearsheimer concludes.

12

Interdependence is likely to decrease as the number of great
powers diminishes and two is the lowest possible number.

13

Little. The Logic of
University Press, 1977) 23-27 and Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard
Press. 1993) lUniversity
Columbia
York:
(New
Realism
Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural

79.

Waltz Theory

Waltz Theory

,

107.

.

138.

Mearsheimer "The False Promise...", 338-339.
Waltz Theory

.

145.
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Waltz concludes,
stable for:

for example,

that a bipolar Europe is most

"Although we would prefer that East Europeans

freely choose their governors, we may nevertheless

understand that the Soviet Union's managing a traditionally
volatile part of the world has its good points... in Eastern
Europe and elsewhere, a division of managerial labor is more

readily arranged in bipolar than multipolar worlds." 14
To realists, balance of power systems are the most

stable and peaceful.

Absent a balance of power, actual or

perceived shifts in relative power in one state can cause
fears in another thereby prompting security competition or

conflict.

15

another,

this can produce a security dilemma.

If one state makes gains at the expense of

Jervis writes,

As Robert

"many of the means by which a state tries to

16
increase its security decreases the security of others."

Waltz suggests that when considering security cooperation
states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be

divided

-

not "will both of us gain?" but "who will gain

Waltz Theory 208-209.
.

The

theoretical debate over relative gains has evolved so that the general concern

is

not whether

they matter, but under what circumstances. Relative gains are likely to matter most when
security is at stake or when gains in capabilities can be easily transformed into military
capabilities.

However,

it is

possible that

when

concerns will be lowered because coalitions are
capabilities.

For discussion of the degree

to

number of actors increases, relative gains
more easily formed in response to a shift in

the

which

relative gains matter in security see Charles

Robert Powell,
Lipson, "International Cooperation in Security and Economic Affairs," and
Neorealism
Baldwin,
David
in
Theory,"
Relations
"Absolute and Relative Gains in International
University Press, 1993)
and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia
60-84 and 209-233.
Robert Art and Robert Jervis,
Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," in
and Decision Making, 2nd ed,
International Politics: Anarchv. Force. Polit ical Economy,

(Glenview, IL:

Scott,

Foresman and Company, 1984)

19

88.

more?"

17

Similarly Robert Gilpin maintains that political

change is not the static distribution of power in the system
(bipolar or multipolar) but the dynamics of power

relationships over time.

It is the differential or uneven

growth of power among states in

a

system that encourages

efforts by certain states to change the system in order to

enhance their own interests or to make more secure those
interests threatened by multipolar security competition.
Changes in relative power among the principal actors in the

system are precursors of international political change

-

which can include systemic war. 18
Even the perception that any state is making relative
gains at the expense of another can prompt

a state to

maximize its own national security and possibly lead to
instability or conflict.

19

As Mearsheimer writes:

"Another

state may be reliably benign, but it is impossible to be

certain of that judgment because intentions are impossible
to divine with 100 percent certainty."

20

Even states that

are currently allies may become competitors or enemies in
the future.

17

21

Waltz Theory

.

18'

Robert Gilpin,
19

20
21*

105.

War & Chance

in

World

Politics

(New York: Cambridge

University Press,

1981) 93.
Politics (Princeton, NJ:
See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misnerception in Inte rnational
O. Keohane, "Achieving
Princeton University Press, 1976) and Robert Axelrod and Robert
85-1 15.
Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," in Baldwin

Mearsheimer "The False Promise...", 337.
Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits

ot Cooperation:

Liberal Institutionalism," in Baldwin 128-129.
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A

Realist Critique of the

Newest

Realism and NATO
Without the Soviet threat to unite the West in NATO,

contemporary realism predicts that the US will eventually
leave Europe and the Continent will enter a state of anarchy
-

with a strong and united Germany exerting more influence

over European security.

22

For example, Mearsheimer writes

that

NATO provides a good example of
realist thinking about institutions.
NATO is an institution, and it certainly
played a role in preventing World War
III and in helping the West win the Cold
War.
Nevertheless, NATO was basically a
manifestation of the bipolar
distribution of power in Europe during
the Cold War, and it was that balance of
power, not NATO per se, that provided
the key to maintaining security on the
continent.
NATO was essentially a tool
for managing power in the face of a
Soviet threat. Now with the collapse of
the Soviet Union, realists argue that
NATO must either disappear or
reconstitute itself on the basis of the
new distribution of power in Europe.

Mearsheimer concedes that:
as a night watchman,

"With the United States serving

fears about relative gains among the

Western European states were mitigated, and furthermore,
those states were willing to allow their economies to become

tightly interdependent."
as Waltz concludes,

24

Yet realist analysis suggests,

that after the Cold War:

See Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future:

Instability in

Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds.. The Cold
(Cambridge, MA: MIT

"NATO's days

Europe After the Cold War,"

War and

After:

in

Sean M.

Prospects for Pea ce

Press, 1993) 188.

Mearsheimer "The False Promise...", 340-341.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss
1990).

21

the

Cold War," The Atlantic 266:2 (August

are not numbered, but its years are." 25

most pertinent question is:

To realists,

the

"How can an alliance endure in

the absence of a worthy opponent?" 26

Some realists acknowledge that, because of its

institutional qualities, a non- traditional alliance such as

NATO may survive for a time on bureaucratic inertia and
familiarity.

However, NATO will eventually become a hollow

shell due to an inevitable decline in the American political

and military role in Europe.

Realists do not necessarily

discount institutional shells for, once created, it is
easier to maintain an existing institutional arrangement
than to create a new one.

As Richard K. Betts writes:

"Shells are far from useless

-

they can maintain the base

from which re-mobilization and coordination can be

accomplished in a shorter time than if they had to be
accomplished from scratch

-

but they do not provide the

animation or originality that revolutionary political
changes seem to mandate."

27

Though historically alliances dissolve in the absence
of a threat,

institutionalized patterns of behavior can be

adapted to changed realities in the international system.

28

While the power foundations of an alliance may recede, its

25
.

Kenneth N. Waltz. "The Emerging Structure of International

Politics," in

Brown

(et al).

The

Anarchy 74.
Kenneth N. Waltz "The Emerging...", 73.
Anns Control, and
Richard K. Betts, "Systems of Peace as Causes of War? Collective Security,

Perils of

26
.

New Europe," in Snyder and Jervis 272.
Neoliheral Institutionalism, and the
See Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism,
3-43.
Future of NATO," Security Studies 3 (Autumn 1993)

the
28
.

22

institutional characteristics can give it life beyond its
original purpose.

As Steven Walt has shown,

an alliance can

have appeal not just because of actual capabilities a threat

may possess, but also the perceived danger or the
aggressiveness of a particular states' intentions. 29

Thus

while a threat may not be immediate, perception (based

largely on historical experience of interested states) can
give value to an alliance as an institution surviving in the

absence of a major threat.

Fear of instability and the

unknown can be as much a unifying factor as a clear and
present danger.

In this sense,

important element of self-help.

cooperation may be an
Thus Charles

S.

Glaser

notes that a policy is thought to provide a state with gains

when it increases what the state values, not when it
increases the instruments the state has available or
employs.

30

A state will primarily value security and

if

it

views institutions as helping to achieve that goal, then

participating in international institutions can be an
important part of self-help.

29

31

Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," International Security
NY: Cornell
9:4 (Spring 1985) and Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca,
in Alliance
Dilemma
Security
"The
Snyder,
University Press, 1987). Also see Glenn H.

Steven

M.

World Politics 36 (July 1984) 461-495 and Eric
Bandwagon?" Security Studies 3 (Spring 1992) 383-416.

Politics,"

30

J.

Labs,

"Do Weak

States

in Brown
Charles S. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-help,"

(et al)

The

Anarchy 400-405.
which stresses the
an important element of the concept of "cooperative security"
that the security of one state
complexity and inter-related challenges of international security so
the security of another state (or states). This
is intrinsically linked to, and dependent on,
increase their security by utilizing
interdependence of security challenges motivates states to
Perry, and
formal institutions. See Ashton B. Carter, William J.
Perils of

31

This

is

forums including
(Washington D.C.: The
John D. Steinbruner, A New Concept of Cooperative Security
multilateral

23

The strongest realist argument for maintaining NATO is
to expand the Alliance into Central and Eastern Europe.

Alliance-based NATO enlargement would help the West
consolidate the new status quo after the Cold War, fill

a

security vacuum in the region, reassure Germany's neighbors
of its growing power in the heart of Europe,

and increase

the West's deterrence capacity against an inevitable rise of
a new Russian challenge.

premises of NATO

-

In this realist view,

its alliance functions

-

the basic

will not be

sustainable unless those functions are expanded by

purposefully drawing new lines to the East reflecting the
balance of power.
threat,

Even if Russia does not pose an immediate

NATO enlargement would contain the zone of

instability in the post-Soviet region while at the same time
adding considerable assets to the power of the West,

particularly through the inclusion of Poland and its
sizeable armed forces.

Alliance enlargement as the solution to NATO's

uncertain role after the Cold War is not shared by all
realists.

Some realists warn that enlargement is a relative

gain by the West at Russia's expense and that it

unnecessarily risks

a

provocative security dilemma and

confrontation between NATO and Russia while undermining pro-

Western politicians in Moscow.

Moreover,

it is an

overextension of American security commitments promoting

a

Cooperation and
and Jamie E. Nolan, ed.. Global Engagement:
1994).
Institution.
Security^ the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings

Brookings

Institutions, 1992)

24

dangerous false promise of security when the trend in

European geopolitics is toward a decreasing US role and

a

rising influence of a German dominated European Union.
Indeed,

an alternative conclusion drawn from realist

propositions about power and balancing is not that NATO
should enlarge based on a potential Russian threat but,
rather,

on furthering the American-led internal containment

of Germany by increasing US influence in the countries to

Germany

1

s

East

Realism is limited in its overall explanatory power
because its conclusions are not based on detailed analysis
of institutions and their potential for enhancing national

security.

To realists, all that mattered in NATO was the

Soviet threat

-

without that threat NATO is unlikely to

survive and its institutional attributes will have little
relevance.

32

Realism is successful in explaining NATO's

institutional form during the Cold War, but then loses its

primacy as it alone can not explain why NATO appears to be
transforming into a new institutional form with the
potential to play a major role increasing security in Europe
in the 21st century acting in conjunction with power

realities.

However, while institutional approaches to the

study of NATO have provided good descriptions of its

institutional activity, institutionalism has yet to offer

International
See John Gerard Ruggie, "Realism, Institutions, and U.S. World Order Policy,"
Order:
World
New
the
and
America
Security (Summer 1995) and John Gerard Ruggie,"

Multilateralism after the Cold

War (New

York: Columbia University Press, 1996) 33-34.
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rigorous proof that such activity actually increases
security.

Because the risks of insecurity can be

extraordinarily high, the pessimism inherent in realism must
therefore be a core aspect of testing what NATO can, and
not,

do for the future of European security.

cai

This is

especially true after the Cold War because as Jack Snyder
warns:

"...institution building will do great damage if it

is attempted,

but doesn't work... It will damage the West by

embroiling it deeply in the possibly insoluble problems of
the East

" 33
.

Inst i tut ional ism

International institutions are persistent and connected
sets of rules that prescribe behavior roles,

constrain

activity, and shape expectations through international

regimes and organizations.
by the principles, norms,

Institutions are characterized
rules,

and decision-making

procedures around which state expectations converge in
given issue area.

34

a

The study of international institutions

can be divided into rational approaches which stress formal

regimes and organization, and reflectivist which emphasize

Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy

in the

New

Europe,"

in

Brown

(et al)

The Cold War and

After,

139.

Westview
See Robert 0. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, CO:
Consequences:
Regime
and
Causes
"Structural
Krasner,
D.
3-5
Stephen
and
Press, 1989)
Regimes as Intervening Variables," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca,

NY:

Cornell University Press, 1983) 1-5.
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values, norms,

and practices that vary across cultures and

can affect the nature of institutions.

35

This project assesses the relevance of NATO as a formal

organization enhancing security by drawing from

a

neoliberal

institutional perspective tested against realism.

Neoliberal institutionalism places a priority on explaining
the conditions under which states may use institutions to

their advantage and for mutual gain.

The approach does not

explicitly reject realist propositions about institutions
and national security.

Indeed,

neoliberal institutionalists

do not claim that all institutions,

have a major impact on outcomes.

in all circumstances,

Most importantly,

neoliberal institutional analysis departs from the

hierarchical approaches of collective security or the
constructivist approaches of security community analysis.
As Robert 0. Keohane maintains:

"Neoliberal

institutionalists accept a version of liberal principles
that eschews determinism and that emphasizes the pervasive

significance of international institutions without

denigrating the role of state power."

Axelrod and Robert
their regimes:
sense,

0.

36

Similarly, Robert

Keohane assert that institutions and

"...do not enforce rules in a hierarchical

but they do change patterns of transaction costs and

See Keohane International Institutions

Keohane
Polities:

Critics

.

166-179.

Also see Robert 0. Keohane, "Theory of World
Neorealism and
Structural Realism and Beyond." In Robert 0. Keohane, ed..

International Institutions

(New York: Columbia

.

1

1

.

University Press, 1986) 195.
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its

provide information to participants, so that uncertainty is
reduced

1,37
.

Unlike realism, neoliberal institutionalism is

cautiously optimistic about the impact that international
institutions can have on outcomes promoting security and

lowering the prospects for war.

Institutions are relevant

to security because they can make international cooperation

promoting security in an uncertain environment easier to
attain than in their absence.
for,

This is especially important

as Alexrod and Keohane suggest,

the shadow of the

future and the uncertainty of anarchy in the international

system allow for an environment in which international

institutions both embody and affect state expectations. 38
As institutions gain permanence in the international system,

they can become important factors that states use to assess

their national security objectives and requirements.

Neoliberal institutionalists claim to have more explanatory

power than realism because the approach sees institutions as
fundamentally rooted in the realities of power and
As Robert 0. Keohane and Lisa Martin write:

interests.

"Liberal institutionalists

...

do not argue that NATO could

have maintained stability under any imaginable

conditions

..

.What we argue is that institutions make a

Axelrod and Keohane,

in

Baldwin,

Axelrod and Keohane,

in

Baldwin, 94.

1

10.
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significant difference in conjunction with power

realities

1,39
.

Since the end of the Cold War scholars and policymakers
have increasingly asserted that institutions can apply to
security.

For example, Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph

S.

Nye

suggest that some types of security institutions aid the

exercise of influence, constrain bargaining strategies,

balance or replace other institutions, signal governments'
intentions by providing others with information and making

policies more predictable, specifying obligations, and
impacting both the interests and preferences of states. 40
Charles A. Kupchan maintains that institutions are relevant
to security because they:

increase the level of information

available to all parties by enhancing transparency;
the costs of defection;

defection,

raise

and define what constitutes

increase the likelihood of issue linkage, and

advance interstate socialization by promoting the concept of
an international community.

Regarding Europe, Robert

0.

"If the theories of institutions have

Keohane asserts that:
any validity,

41

the rich tapestry of institutions should both

constrain states, through the operation of rules, and
provide them with opportunities without positing the threats

39
.

Robert 0. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of
Security 20:

40

1

(Summer 1995)

Theory," international

42.

Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann, eds.. After the Cold War:
MA: Harvard
International Institutions and State Strategies in Eurone. 1989-1991 (Cambridge.

.

Robert O. Keohane, Joseph

.

University Press, 1994) 2-3.
Charles A. Kupchan, "The Case for Collective Security,"
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Institutionalist

Security after the Cold

S.

War (Ann

Arbor, MI:

29

in

George W. Downs,

ed.. Collective

University of Michigan Press, 1994) 50-51.

to other states that are so characteristic of realistic

anarchy

.

Institutionalism and NATO

Addressing NATO, John Gerard Ruggie notes that among
the options that the US had in establishing its post-World

War II security ties, the US adopted an explicitly

institutional approach via NATO. 43

Thus institutions,

adapted to reflect fluctuations in the international power
structure, have been an important element of NATO since its

founding.

Steven Weber observes that as the alliance

developed over time, NATO facilitated communication through
a

network of permanent and intermittently meeting bodies as

well as ad-hoc groups set up at the request of member
states.

4

Explaining NATO's post-Cold War adaptation John

Duf field asserts that "...NATO's institutional character has

probably contributed to the alliance's
persistence

...

(NATO

'

s)

supranational bodies and the

individuals who head them have almost certainly helped the

alliance to adapt to changing external circumstances by

Robert 0. Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War."

in

Baldwin 272.
Ruggie "Realism...", 4-5. These options included unilateral US security guarantees to one.
alliances with
several, or an organization of European states; one or more US bilateral
alliances. The
European
and
American
North
linking
model
European states; or a "dumbbell"
security
US, Ruggie maintains, chose the model which most closely approximated collective
commitments.
The Future of
Steve Weber, "Does NATO Have a Future?" in Beverly Crawford, ed..
University of
Studies,
European
European Security (Berkeley, CA: Center for German and

California

at

Also see Helga Haftendorn. NATO and the
Press, 1996).
Crisis of Credibility. 1966-1967 (Oxford: Clarendon

Berkeley. 1992) 369-370, 381.

Nuclear Revolution:

A
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defining new tasks,

identifying ways to achieve them,

forging compromises, and otherwise providing leadership." 45
A similar analysis has been forwarded by Robert McCalla who

explains NATO's persistence after the Cold War in neoliberal

institutional terms but without assessing whether or not

institutional activity is relevant to security. 46

In fact,

despite the growing institutional analysis of NATO and other
formal institutions with security functions, little detailed

consideration has been given to the basic challenge raised
by realism

do institutions affect the degree of national

-

security and,

if so,

how?

There is an increasing tendency among inst itut ionalist

theorists to assume that NATO had independent institutional
functions relevant to security beyond its traditional

alliance activity during the Cold War.

For example, many

advocates of post -Cold War NATO enlargement assume that NATO
as an institution had an independent affect on

John Duffield, "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Alliance Theory," in Ngaire
Woods, ed.. Explaining International relations Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1996) 343-345. In a previous study, Duffield assessed NATO's role in helping to clarify
boundaries for state behavior in Cold War Europe, reinforcing the US commitment to European
security, and influencing military planning and capabilities. John S. Duffield, "Explaining the
Long Peace in Europe: The Contributions of Regional Security Regimes," Review of
International Studies 20:4 (October 1994) 369-388.

In a

more

detailed analysis, Duffield has

conventional force posture was affected independently by the
shown that
reinforced via rational incentives for compliance, which in
institution,
norms and rules of the
affecting the views and calculations of decision-makers.
states
within
turn reinforced a process
of NATO's Conventi onal Force Posture
Evolution
The
Duffield, Power Rules:

NATO's Cold War

See John

(Stanford,

C A:

Robert McCalla,

Stanford University Press, 1995) 251-257.

"NATO's

Persistence after the Cold War," International Organization 50:3

Theories of
Also see Fred Chernoff, After Binolaritv: The Vanishing Threat,
University
of
The
MI:
Arbor,
Cooperation, and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance (Ann

(Summer

1996).

Michigan Press, 1995).
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democratization in Greece, Turkey, Germany, and Spain.
Moreover, NATO's institutional characteristics are
often

assumed to have had an independent impact constraining
Greece and Turkey from waging war against each other and

grounding Germany into the West.

Some high-level NATO

oriented policymakers tend to view the institution as

a

"club" of democracies expanding a zone of peace and

stability.

47

Wanting to accelerate NATO toward enlargement

in late 1994,

a senior Clinton Administration official

opined that the (existing) Partnership for Peace "...is like

getting guest privileges at the club
once in a while.

.

-

you can play golf

.Now we want to send the bylaws and ask,

"do you want to pay the dues?

1

1,48

Such comments demonstrate allow Utopian wishes to

overcome practical understanding of just what NATO is and

whether it has adapted sufficiently to the post-Cold War
security environment to justify claims of institutional
relevance.

Certainly NATO is not a club.

It is a military

alliance that performs military functions in the heart of

a

Continent that has witnessed the repeated horrors of

millions of dead through war and aggression in the 20th
century.

Moreover, NATO is neither exclusively a collective

Analytically,

Thomas Risse-Kappen

functions were

has attempted to demonstrate that

explicitly reflective of the identity of

primarily democracies.

its

members and

NATO's

institutional

the fact that they were

Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among De mocracies: The

European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
"US Wants to Expedite Entry of Eastern Nations into Alliance", The New York Times, 27
October 1994, A5.
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security architecture or a security community.

Traces of

each are present but neither have been decisive in

establishing what institutional characteristics of NATO have
been relevant to security during its history or in the

contemporary context
At its founding, NATO was endowed with a positive view
of the world and given internal functions of consultation

should the actions of one member raise security concerns in

relation to another.

Like the League of Nations and the UN,

NATO was endowed by its members with substantial

organizational attributes.

However, NATO's institutional

architecture was created to facilitate a state-dominated
atmosphere with few, if any,

independent characteristics.

Common practices and daily interaction in a multinational
setting,

especially military planning and exercises, helped

increase the level of trust and transparency among the

member states.

However,

these institutional consequences of

NATO were secondary to maintaining collective defense and

alliance cohesion in times of Cold War tension and detente.
Thus,

while NATO did provide for consultation, NATO was

collective defense institution

-

a

not collective security.

49

to internal
In collective security states are organized for multilateral military responses
their military
organize
states
defense,
challenges within a grouping of states and in collective
collective
between
differences
the
of
efforts against an external threat. For a classic assessment

Wolfers, "Collective Defense
defense and collective security in relation to NATO, see Arnold
in the Cold War
Policy
Alliance
versus Collective Security," in Arnold Wolfers, ed..
For a contemporary
49-74.
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959)
see Charles A. and
attributes
security
analysis based on assumptions that NATO had collective
International Security 20:1
Clifford A. Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security."

(Summer 1995)

52-61.
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The primary difference being that NATO's institutional

attributes as developed during the Cold War were dependent

upon the international system and the demands of its member
states whereas,

in collective security,

the institution

should have shown clear indications that its form was an

independent variable affecting the degree of security.
Somewhat less obvious, but equally problematic, are

statements that NATO embodies a security community

-

or more

specifically, a pluralistic security community as described
by Karl Deutsch.

A security community is a region in which

there is virtually no prospect for war among a group of
states.

Deutsch described such a community as a group of

people which has become integrated within a territory based
on a sense of community and institutions and practices

strong enough and widespread enough to assure for durable
and dependable expectations of peaceful change among its

population.

50

Deutsch established the concept of

"pluralistic security communities" which retain the legal

independence of separated governments but comprise

relationships among a group of states which share
commonalities between the process of domestic security

on die part of individuals in a group that they
can
have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and
resolution of social
be resolved by processes of 'peaceful change'." Peaceful change is "the
Sense of community

is

defined

as:

"

.

.

.a belief

physical force."
problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale
NJ: Princeton
(Princeton,
Area
Atlantic
North
in
the
Community
Political
Karl Deutsch (et al).

University Press, 1957)

5.
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establishment and that among states in the international
system

51

As NATO developed during the 1950s and 1960s many

integrationist scholars, including Deutch, looked at NATO as
a

means toward a pluralistic security community based on its

apparently integrative trends. 52

However, by the mid-1960s

the dominance of NATO's alliance functions, which reflected

American dominance, combined with the French withdrawal from
NATO to lead integrat ionists away from NATO and toward the

European Community as a case study for regional integration
53

analysis.

The institutional processes in NATO that some

observers saw as promoting a nascent pluralistic security

community had much more to do with neoliberal institutional

activity intended to resolve problems associated with
collective action.

Deutsch

54

When these processes did have

6.

In his analysis of security communities, Deutsch argued that

evolution of a pluralistic security community by developing

make

it

a

"more than a military

interdependence in

NATO

alliance.

"

Deutsch 203.

NATO
its

could contribute to the

economic and

social potential to

For an analysis of trends toward

during the 1960s see Alastair Buchan,

(New York: Praeger, 1963).
focus lost much of its appeal among

NATO

in the 1960's:

The

Implications of Interdependence

Even

the regional integration

1970s.

See Ernst B. Haas,

The Obsolescence of Regional

Institute of International Studies,

revitalized debate about

NATO

UC

Berkeley, 1975).

Theory (Berkeley:

In his analysis of

NATO,

Steven

Weber

community by asserting that NATO has
community. Weber suggests that a security

as a pluralistic security

always been a peculiar mix of alliance and security

community can be

integrationist scholars by the

Integration

institutionalized as equivalence is favored over hierarchy with decisions

transparency and
requiring unanimity and with formal organization existing primarily to enhance
369-372.
Crawford,
in
Weber,
to facilitate the transfer of information among states.
Barnett,
For discussion of nascent security communities, see Emanuel Adler and Michael N.
of
the
Meeting
"Security Communities," Paper prepared for delivery at the 1994 Annual
Barnett
and
Adler
American Political Science Association, September 1-3, 1994, 44-47.

two or more states begin
maintain that a nascent security community exists when governments of
relations in order to increase their mutual
to consider how they might coordinate their security
security.
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positive impact on security beyond NATO's alliance
functions,

it was dependent upon strategic calculations

related to the needs of collective defense.

The period

after the Cold War has shown that NATO has adapted its

institutional form so that it may contribute to the idea of
an emerging pluralistic security community.

However, a more

clearly defined geographic basis for an expanding security

community is more likely to be found in the European
tt

Union

55

Despite the absence of collective security or security
community and the constraints of its predominant
institutional form of allied collective defense, this

project shows that NATO has the potential to promote
security in the future if it is carefully adapted to meet
the evolved security needs of its member states.

NATO can

reduce uncertainty in international security relations by

facilitating the flow of information among its members and
Such information flows

between members and non-members.

also can also lower the transaction costs of identifying

challenges early and responding effectively to crisis.

See Emanuel Adler, European Union:
University of California Press.

1

99

1

).

A

Pluralistic Security

Community

Adler challenges the premise that

(Berkeley.

CA:

NATO can promote a

community after the Cold War. To Adler an enlarged pluralistic security
community in Europe cannot be constituted in the absence of a deepening and enlargement of
European economic and political integration. Efforts by institutions to create or promote a
from below and
security community are likely to fail because a security community must evolve

pluralist security

cannot be imposed from above.

In this view,

it

is

the grass roots, lower level, activity of the

should be the "institutional embryo" of a growing pluralistic
New Security Order:
security community in post-Cold War Europe. Emanuel Adler, "Europe's
A Pluralistic Security Community," in Crawford 287-326.

OSCE, and

not

NATO,

that
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Through multinational military planning NATO can enhance

transparency among members and non-members so that the
danger that mispercept ion of state intentions might lead to
security competition or war can be lowered by contributing
to an institutional culture of trust,

confidence-building,

and reassurance while helping to identify defectors from

international security cooperation.

As a result, NATO can

enhance confidence on the part of states (and their leaders)
of relative safety within an uncertain international

environment.

Moreover, NATO has not yet, but might

contribute to the socialization of states toward more
peaceful state domestic and foreign policies.

Whether the NATO member states will translate this
potential into reality via a major institutional adaptation
remains to be seen.

To date, NATO's members have not

settled on a new form that will ensure the relevance of
these institutional functions to the security of its
members, and non-members,

in the future.

challenge confronting NATO,

To examine the

it is necessary to measure its

variations in institutional form over time and assess what
elements,

if any,

are worth retaining.
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Measuring Variations in Institutional Form
There has been little analytical study of the impact
that variations in institutional form have on security. 56

However,

formal institutions have specific characteristics

which are measurable over time and which can have a direct
impact on the relevance of institutions for enhancing

national security.

To measure institutional form and the

affect of institutions on security this project assesses
four key elements of institutional design including:

organizational capabilities;
procedures;

norms,

and capacity for change.

principles,

tasks;

rules,

and

It examines

variations in NATO's institutional form measured over time
and assesses whether changes in institutional form affected
the degree of national security in Europe.

Tasks
The primary indicators of institutional form are the

particular problems that an institution is designed to
address.

In this sense,

institutional form is dependent

upon the demands that states place on it based on the nature

56

military doctrine
Deborah D. Avant has shown how differences in national institutions can affect
Doctrine:
Military
within states. See Deborah D. Avant, "The Institutional Sources of
Similarly.
Hegemons in Peripheral Wars," International Studies Quarterly 37 (1993) 409-430.
structures
institutional
and the
Peter J. Katzenstein has shown that variations in domestic norms
security.
internal
their
enhance
within states can impact the means through which states seek to

contingent, it is not possible to
Katzenstein concludes that while norms are both contested and
normative context. Peter J.
adequately explain state behavior without an examination of the
Security in Germany and Japan." in
Katzenstein "Coping with Terrorism: Norms and Internal
& Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions,
Judith Goldstein and" Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas
NY: Cornell University Press, 1993) 265-295.

and

Political

Change

(Ithaca,
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of security challenges.

At their inception,

an institutional transformation,
a

or as part of

institutions are a means to

particular end and the nature of the goals and priorities

of the member states will affect institutional form.

tasks are defined,

Once

institutional effectiveness is measured

by the degree to which an institution aids states in meeting

particular goals.

Once tasks are given to an institution,

then the form will depend upon the nature of those tasks.
In this sense,

international institutions are both

constituted by, and constituted of, state actions. 57

Organizational Capabilities
The degree of institutional autonomy and formalism are

important measures of institutional form. 58

Autonomy is the

degree to which an institution has a capacity to act

independent of its member states and enforce compliance with

institutional objectives.

Because of the dangers inherent

in security cooperation and the historical failures of

collective security,

states are not likely to give

institutions a high degree of autonomy to affect national

See Alexander Wendt. "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,"
International Organization 41:3 (Summer 1987) 335-370; Alexander Wendt and Raymond
Duvall, "Institutions and International Order," in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel,
eds.. Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s

(Lexington,
States

Make

MA:
of

It:

Lexington Books, 1989) 51-73; and Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy

The

Social Construction of

Power

is

What

Politics," International Organization 46:2

(Spring 1992) 391-425.

Marc Levy, Oran

R.

Young, and Michael Zurn, "The Study of

Working Paper Prepared
(November 1994) 10.

for the International Institute for

39

International Regimes,"

App lied System

Analysis WP-94-113

security independent from state control.

Therefore,

institutional enforcement mechanisms rest on the willingness
of states to utilize them.

Absent a convergence of

interests based on a shared threat, security institutions
must depend on less reliable secondary compliance methods
such as long-term socialization.

Autonomy is measured by

the degree to which institutional attributes have a

measurable impact on the tasks it is designed to undertake.
Formalism is measured by the physical organizational
structure of an institution and the means through which it

facilitates problem solving.

Principles, Norms, Rules, and Procedures

Institutional principles, norms, rules and procedures,

particularly those affecting membership, can also affect
institutional form.

Principles are the fundamental beliefs

that the members of an institution hold.

Norms are the

standards of behavior established in terms of rights and

obligations that states agree to assume when participating
in a formal institution.

Rules specify the boundaries of

state behavior, and thus help to define and identify
defection,

for members of an institution.

Procedures

facilitate multilateral decision-making and help ease

tension or conflict among institutional members.
Principles, norms,

rules,

and procedures contribute to

institutional legitimacy, the capacity for action, and help

40

measure compliance in an institutional setting. 59

Membership in an institution can be classified as
restricted,

conditionally open, or open.

Restricted

institutions limit membership to a small group of states
that have some particular set of interests in common, or

those which have specified standards of domestic political

structures within states.

Conditionally open institutions

are accessible in principle to states that are willing to

accept a set of prescribed commitments, which not all states

may be able or willing to make.

Open institutions are

universal and accessible to all states with the exception of
those whose policies represent gross violations of specified

institutional norms. 60

Capacity for Change
International institutions are not static entities

-

they can evolve, enlarge or contract, or be realigned and

redesigned if states see value in their maintenance.
Institutional change can result from internal
contradictions, a shift in the underlying structure of
power,

and exogenous forces such as the transformation of

See Robert Axelrod. "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms," American P olitical Science
Review 80:4 (December 1986) 1095-1 11 1; Friedreich V. Kratochwil, Rules. Norms, and
Decisions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 48-57; and Elinor Olstrom,
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge:

Cambridge University

Press, 1990).

Robert O. Keohane, "The Analysis of International Regimes," in Volker Rittberger, ed..
Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) 39. Keohane
institutions as
assesses restricted institutions as promoting cartelization, conditionally open
sharing of opinion.
fostering collaboration, and open institutions as limited to consultation and
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technology.

States learn and adapt to changed

circumstances and if they find that an institution has
benefit for their national security, then a demand for

maintenance and transformation may occur.

Rather than

fundamentally reconceptualizing the nature of an
institution,

states are likely to pursue adaptation of

existing institutions when old challenges disappear and new
This is especially true because it is less

ones arise.

costly to adapt an existing institution than it is to create
a

new one from scratch.

When national security is at stake,

adaptation is the most likely outcome of major institutional
efforts to meet new challenges.

Such adaptation can occur

incrementally or in an ad-hoc manner.

Adaptation is a

process controlled by member states with minimal
63
hierarchical insights provided by the institution itself.

61

Oran R. Young, "Regime Dynamics: The Rise and

Fall of International

Regimes,"

in Krasner

106-110.
62

For discussion of
Power:

institutional adaptation patterns see Ernst B. Haas,

When Knowledge

Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley,

CA:

is

University of

California Press, 1990) 7-15.
63

learning is a process
important to distinguish between adaptation and learning. Institutional
of means, that a new problem has
in which institutions themselves recognize, through a variety
of past institutional form
in international relations requiring a fundamental rethinking

It is

emerged
and change
educating

in state behavior.

members

In this sense, institutions which learn

as to the nature of the

new

challenge.

Learning

become
is

rare

the causal factor

and because

states are

likely, if not desirable, means
most concerned about security, state driven adaptation is the most
policy problematique. See Peter M. Haas
of institutional change when national security is the
Governance." Global
and Ernst B. Haas, "Learning to Learn: Improving International

Governance

1

(1995) 255-285.
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A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

Subsequent chapters are organized around the central
thesis of this project

-

that variations in institutional

form can affect the degree of national security in Europe.
Each chapter begins with a short introduction and overview

relating the case study to the thesis.

Each chapter

concludes with an analysis of the four measures of

institutional form including tasks;
capabilities;

principles, norms,

organizational

rules,

and procedures,-

and capacity for change and assesses their impact on the

degree of security.

More general conclusions about

institutions, NATO, and the future of European security are

made in the final chapter.
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CHAPTER III
BUILDING AN INSTITUTIONAL FORM:
THE FORMATIVE PERIOD OF NATO

Introduction and Overview
This chapter shows that,

in creating the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization, the key actors incorporated

a

sophisticated analysis of security challenges, alliances,
and institutions.

The negotiators created an institutional

form that drew from both realist and inst itut ionalist

considerations about the sources of national security.

The

Soviet threat was the primary factor which caused American
and West European diplomatic elites to consider responses to

enhance their security.

However,

understanding of security emerged

a more complex
-

one that viewed Western

Europe as threatened by instability and a lack of
confidence.
form,

In the negotiations over NATO's institutional

the parties rejected the arguments of the primary

realists involved in the negotiations.

Instead,

they

intentionally shaped NATO's institutional form to withstand
the challenges that realists warned of by making it more

than a traditional alliance.

NATO was established on a

unique blend of realist and institutionalist assessments of
the sources of national security in Europe.

European Security After World War II

After World War
a

number of factors.

II,

European security was challenged by

To the East stood a massive Soviet
44

presence consolidating its gains through the creation of
puppet regimes throughout Eastern Europe. 64

Western Europe

was economically devastated and militarily weak so that it

could not balance the Soviet Union alone.
disaster,

Economic

fragile democracies, and dispirited populations

also made West European states susceptible to internal

Soviet-backed communist influence or destabilizing
nationalism.

The US was dramatically reducing its troop

presence in Europe and those that remained had low combat
potential

65
.

Toward the end of World War

II,

Britain considered such

potential postwar developments and sought to

institutionalize the integrated wartime military cooperation
in the combined US and British staffs.

In September 1943,

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill noted in a speech
at Harvard University that:

"...it would be a most foolish

and improvident act on the part of our two Governments, or

either of them, to break up this smooth- running and

immensely powerful machinery the moment the war is over... we
are bound to keep it working and in running order after the

The Soviet Union maintained approximately 30
and

1 1

divisions in Eastern Europe (including 9 tank

motorized infantry divisions). Western intelligence estimates concluded

that in the

immediate postwar years, the Soviet Union had some 5 million men in the
175 divisions in the western Soviet Union and another 125 divisions in strategic reserve.
Richard Kuglar, Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War (Santa

armed forces with

Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1993) 30-36.
position in Western Europe was especially tenuous because

The US

the

Americans were unable

the
send more than a division anywhere without resorting to partial mobilization. As a result,
component.
nuclear
its
and
power
air
American
on
relied
Europe
entire defense of Western
Press,
Robert Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
to

1962) 29-30.
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war

-

probably for a good many years." 66

On

9

November 1944

the British Chiefs of Staff issued a classified report which

concluded that Britain's security interests lay in the
formation of a West European security group which could
cooperate with the British commonwealth and the US.

Such a

security group would begin with an Anglo-French alliance and
then expand to include closer cooperation with Belgium,
Holland, Denmark, and perhaps Germany.

At Potsdam in 1945,

the British Chiefs of Staff proposed that the US and Britain

have continued machinery for the mutual exchange of

information

67

By early 1946 postwar allied security cooperation took
on a sense of urgency.

On

22

February the top US government

Soviet expert in Moscow, George Kennan, warned that the West
faced a political force committed "fanatically to the belief
that with the US there can be no permanent modus vivendi

,

that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony
of our society be disrupted,

our traditional way of life

destroyed, the international authority of our state broken,
if Soviet

power is to be secured."

68

On

5

March,

Churchill

gave a speech at Fulton, Missouri, warning of an "iron
curtain" descending on Eastern Europe in the form of Soviet

Richard A. Best,

Jr.,

"Cooperation with Like-Minded Peonies":

British Influences

on America n

(New York: Greenwood Press, 1986)28.
Relatio nship
See John Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations. 1939-1980: The Special
UK:
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981); Joseph Smith, ed., The Origins of NATO (Exeter,
Security Policy. 1945-1949

University of Exeter Press, 1990); and John Lewis Gaddis, The Lone Peace:
History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

"The Long Telegram" (Kennan) 22 February 1946.
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FRUS,

1946, 4:706.

Inquiries into the

domination.

Churchill proposed a "fraternal association"

between Britain and the US.

This required:

"...not only

the growing friendship and mutual understanding between our

two vast but kindred systems of society, but the continuance
of the intimate relationship between our military advisers,

leading to common study of potential dangers, the similarity
of weapons and manuals of instruction,

and to the

interchange of officers and cadets at technical colleges." 69
Churchill concluded that:

association of the kind

I

"If there is to be a fraternal

described, with all the extra

strength and security which both our countries can derive
from it, let me make sure that great fact is known to the
world,

and that it plays its part in steadying and

stabilizing the foundations of peace
than cure

"

...

Prevention is better

70

.

American involvement in postwar European security had
become increasingly important for the Europeans because of
the immediate concern over Soviet intentions in the East,
the potential for a renewal of German nationalism, and the

inability of Britain to maintain its traditional stabilizing
influence on the Continental balance of power.
to address the German question,

the Dunkirk Treaty on

4

In an effort

Britain and France signed

March 1947 which committed them to

mutual assistance in the event of German aggression and to

Don Cook,

Forcing the Alliance:

NATO.

1945-1950 (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1989) 52-

53.

Cook

52-53.
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cooperate in their postwar reconstruction efforts. 71
However,

the British dilemma had come to a head in Greece

where London could no longer afford to furnish military and

economic assistance to the western-oriented Greek monarchy
that was engaged in an intense civil war against Soviet

backed communist rebels.

Britain hoped the Americans would

fill the void.

The US responded with the Truman Doctrine announced on
12

March 1947 in a presidential address to Congress.

Truman

announced direct American aid to Greece and Turkey but based
the program on universal principles of freedom, democracy,

and peace.

72

In June the US Secretary of State George

Marshall announced an American program of economic

assistance for Western Europe to prevent a rise of
nationalism, promote democracy, and establish economic

containment of the Soviet Union.

The Marshall Plan

implicitly recognized the growing convergence between
interdependence, stability, and security.

However,

it was

designed to promote independence from, and not dependence
on,

the US.

Plan,

73

With the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall

the US entered into a gradual process of

See John Baylis, "Britain and the Dunkirk Treaty: The Origins of

NATO."

Journal of Strategic

Studies 5 (June 1982) 236-247.
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institutionalized regional commitments to promote security
in areas understood to be key to its national interest.

The Rio Treaty
In December 1947 Congress approved the Rio Treaty which

bound the US to a regional security guarantee in the
Americas.

The accord stressed mutual aid and raised hope

that it might have broader implications for preserving peace

While primarily an institutionalization of the

in Europe.

Monroe Doctrine

-

the Rio Treaty was an important signal to

the world that the US favored regional security institutions
as a basis for its postwar global involvement.

This pact

was justified by Article 51 of the UN Charter which

guaranteed states the "inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence."

74

The Rio Treaty provided for mutual assistance in the
event of an aggressive action against any American state.

Internal procedures were created to promote the peaceful

settlement of regional disputes prior to referring them to
the UN.

Such a regional pact would promote the same

principles institutionalized in the UN charter but, at the
circumvent a Soviet veto over security issues in

same time,

Article 5

1

of the Charter of the United Nations states

that:

"Nothing in the present Charter

an armed

shall

attack occurs against

impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if
has taken measures necessary to
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
in the exercise of this
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members
Security Council under the present
right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the
order to maintain or restore
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in
international peace and security."

49

areas of vital US national interest.
war,

The treaty condemned

and its signatories agreed to resort to the threat or

the use of force only in a manner consistent with that

provided for by the UN.
8

Following passage of the treaty on

December 1947 by a vote of 72-1, the Chairman of the US

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Arthur Vandenberg,

stated that:

"We are building upon mutual trust... This is a

true partnership which represents the greatest advance ever

made in the business of collective peace." 75
On 15 December The New York Times columnist James

Reston noted that some US officials hoped "to negotiate

a

regional alliance within the United Nations for the defense
of those areas of Western and Southern Europe that are

considered by our strategic experts to be essential to our
own security."

He concluded that "...it is gradually

becoming recognized in the Capital that economic security
and political security, like peace, are indivisible, and
that classic diplomatic statements of concern are no answer
to the problem of communist internal power.

7<

Reston, who

had very close ties to senior US officials, was reflecting a

growing understanding that the threat to European security

"Americas' Treaty Ratified, 72-1; Vandenberg Cites Bar to Veto," The

December 1947, Al,4. Vandenberg, from Michigan, was
Relations Committee and a senior

the

member of the Republican

New York

Chairman of

Times, 9

the Senate Foreign

leadership with broad bi-partisan

respect in the Senate.
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more complicated than a direct Soviet invasion.

West

European democracies struggling with economic disaster after
the war needed a sense of reassurance as to their relative

safety and stability to deter the political challenge that
communism,

or nationalism, might pose.

The Brussels Pact

On 15 December 1947 British Foreign Secretary Ernest

Bevin met with US Secretary of State George Marshall in

London following the collapse of four-power dialogue over
the future of Germany.

77

Bevin told Marshall that Europe

and America must increase their commitment to each other.
He suggested that this need not necessarily come through a

formal alliance, but rather an "understanding backed by
power, money and resolute action ... sort of a spiritual

federation of the West." V 8

Summarizing his view of the

Soviet challenge Bevin said:
I am convinced that the Soviet Union will not
deal with the West on any reasonable terms in the
foreseeable future and that the salvation of the
West depends upon the formation of some form of
union, formal or informal in character, in Western
Europe, backed by the United States and the
Dominions - such a mobilization of moral and
material force will inspire confidence and energy
within, and respect elsewhere.

The tour powers

controlling their respective sectors in

Germany were

the

US,

Britain, France,

and the Soviet Union.

"The Charge

FRUS,

in

London (Gallman)

to the Secretary of State,"

London, 22 December 1947.

1948, 3:2.

Quoted By Theodore C. Achilles, "The Omaha Milkman: The Role of the United States in the
Martin's
Negotiations," in Andre de Staercke, ed., NATO's Anxious Birth (New York: St.
Press, 1985) 30.
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Marshall generally supported Bevin's sentiments.

However,

he was adamant that Bevin proceed under the same formula as
the Marshall Plan and that the Europeans should first

institutionalize a defense community in Western Europe.
Marshall advised Bevin that the Europeans should "come
together for their own protection, see what they could do,
and then turn to the United States, and see what we could do
to make up the difference between what the situation

required and what they were able to do by their own
efforts

" 80
.

On 13 January 1948 Bevin informed Washington that,

in

his view, Marshall Plan aid alone would not prevent further

Soviet encroachment on the West.

"Political and indeed

spiritual forces must be mobilized in our defense", Bevin
suggested.

This would be attained by seeking:

"...to form

with the backing of the Americans and the Dominions

a

Western democratic system comprising Scandinavia, the Low
Countries,

France,

Italy, Greece and possibly Portugal

..

.As

soon as circumstances permit we should, of course, wish also
to include Spain and Germany without whom no Western system

can be complete."

81

The American response was positive but

not as specific as Bevin might have liked.

letter to Lord Inverchapel

In a 20 January

(the British Ambassador in

Charles E. Bohlen, Transformation of American Foreign Policy

(New York: W.W. Norton &

Co., 1969) 92-93.

"Summary of a Memorandum Representing Mr.
Union." FRUS, 1948, 3:5.
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Bevin's Views on the Formation of a Western

Washington), Marshall wrote that:

"As in the case of the

recovery program, we heartily welcome European initiative in
this respect and Mr. Bevin may be assured of our

wholehearted sympathy in this undertaking." 82

Contrary to

realist assumptions about maximizing gains, self-help and
power,

the next day John Hickerson (Director of the State

Department's Office of European Affairs) told Inverchapel
that the US hoped to help create "a third force which was
not merely the extension of US influence but a real European

organization strong enough to say

'no'

both to the Soviet

Union and to the United States, if our actions should seem
so to require

On

22

"

83

.

January Bevin informed parliament that he had

instructed British representatives in France and the Benelux
countries to begin negotiations on the creation of a Western
Union.

The rationale for this departure from Britain's

traditional avoidance of Continental security commitments
was placed in the context of West European integration.

Bevin asserted that:

much to unite them

-

"The nations of Western Europe have

common sacrifice in two wars, their

parliamentary democracy, and their striving for economic

"Secretary of State to the British Ambassador," 20 January 1948.

FRUS,

1948, 3:8.

"Memorandum of Conversation, by Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson)."
FRUS, 1948, 3:11. Hickerson had been advising Marshall that a regional security pact should
that: In
be negotiated with Europe based on the Rio Treaty. In a memo to Marshall he wrote
to the
answer
best
is
the
Janeiro
my opinion a European Pact modelled on the treaty of Rio de
States
United
the
effective,
security problem for Western Europe. For such a pact to be really
Affairs
European
of
would have to adhere. " "Memorandum by the Director of the Office

(Hickerson) to the Secretary of State."

FRUS,
53

1948, 3:7.

rights and conceptions of and love for democracy." 84
However,

a Western Union alone would have been inadequate

for the security of Western Europe.

As the Belgian Prime

Minister Paul-Henri Spaak asserted:

"...any defense

arrangement which did not include the United States would be
without practical value." 85

The Western Union was a bold

initiative that risked prompting Soviet aggression taking

advantage of this institutional weakness.

The Western Union

thus became an institution primarily designed to help its

members increase their security via a broader, transatlantic

institution involving an American security guarantee.

American reassurance was

a

primary concern for France.

Because any real defense of Western Europe would require

meeting the Soviet challenge as far East as possible,
Germany would have to be

a part of

Western defense plans

Such a forward defense strategy would require German

rearmament to be credible.

Additionally, the success of the

Marshall Plan and European integration would likely hinge on
economic development in Western Germany.

France promoted

forward defense and hoped to make substantial gains from

Marshall Plan aid and European integration.

However,

France

could not easily forget its adversarial history with Germany
and its recent Nazi occupation.
concluded,

only a Western Union

Parliamentary Dehates

.

Nevertheless, as Kennan
"...holds out any hope of

House of Commons, 1947-1948, 5th

FB1S. 1948, 3:76-78.

54

series.

446, columns 383ff.

restoring the balance of power in Europe without permitting

Germany to become again the dominant power." 86

While Kennan

was correct in this assessment, he failed to understand that
a

successful Western Union, which would ultimately rest on

Franco-German reconciliation, could not emerge in the
absence of direct American reassurance of its commitment to
West European security.
On

28

February Marshall related French fears about the

German question to the continued presence of American
troops
The French are secure against Germany as long
occupation continues. .In view of
Communist integration of a third of Germany and
the likelihood of continuing stringent economic
conditions, a united Germany bereft of Western
occupation force would be an easy prey to
Communist domination. As long as European
Communism threatens US vital interests and
national security we could ill afford to abandon
our military position in Germany ... The logical
conclusion is that three power occupation may be
of unforeseeable and indefinite duration, thus
offering protracted security guarantees and 87
establishing a firm community of interests.

as

(the)

.

This desire to reassure France was shared in London where

Bevin wrote to Prime Minister Clement Atlee on

1

March:

Instead of being bottled up in Central
Europe, we feel the Germans have a great
contribution to make to the world's industrial and
Our aim is to protect
social development.
ourselves against any further aggression by
Germany and at the same time to bring her back
into the community of nations as a united entity
on a democratic basis, with democracy as Western
In this connection
civilization understands it.
We all
of course, you must not forget the French.
Our approach,
talk too much about Germany.
therefore, to a reorganization of economic, social
"Memorandum by
FRUS, 1948. 3:7.
"The Secretary of

the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Secretary of State."

State to the

Embassy

in the

1948, 2:101.
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United Kingdom," 28 February 1948.

FRUS,

and defence weapons is a good neighbourly policy
first with the French and now with Benelux
In
view of the fact that France has been invaded so
many times and paid such a price, we must
therefore arrange our defences and our
responsibilities to give the French the assurance
of her security as far as we humanly can.

Marshall and Bevin had signaled a clear understanding of the
need to alleviate French fears by institutionalizing

policy of reassurance in the form of

a

a

general US commitment

to European security.

After Soviet-backed communists took over Czechoslovakia
in late February and the pro-western Czech Foreign Minister

Masaryk was murdered on 10 March, Western states became
fearful of so called "5th column" Soviet invasions in which

covert activity might be used to rally communist forces in a

fragile democracy and turn that states' policy toward the
Soviet sphere of influence.

Western concerns were

heightened by ongoing civil war in Greece, scheduled
elections in April showing the possibility of a communist

victory in Italy, and Soviet pressure on Finland and Norway
to enter into non-aggression pacts with Moscow.

French

national security concerns were intensified by these

developments as it had recently undergone major work
stoppages and had a large communist presence in its National

Assembly
France had few options for increasing its national
France could not isolate Germany as it had in the

security.

early 1920s for fear that such a policy could push Western
88
.

Quoted

in

Alexander Rendel, "Secret Explorations: the Anglo-American

Staercke 12.
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initiatives," in

de

Germany into the Soviet orbit.

"Going it alone" was no

longer an option as the threat was much greater than the

resources France could marshall.

Establishing bilateral

alliances in Eastern Europe was not possible so long as the
Soviet Union occupied the region and political accommodation

with Moscow was not an option.

France was thus left with

little choice but to seek hard security guarantees from

Britain and the US.

Even the French nationalist General

Charles de Gaulle said on

7

March that:

It is necessary that there be formed among
the free states of Europe an economic, diplomatic,
and strategic grouping, joining their productions,
their moneys, their exterior action, and their
means of defense... It is necessary that the effort
of old Europe and that of America be joined to put
our poor world back on its feet again. Their
support must extend at the same time to the domain
of defense and in a manner as precise and explicit
on the one hand as in the Marshall project in the
matter of credits and imports.

France especially wanted direct military assistance to

rebuild its national security capabilities.

Paris

maintained a deep concern, based on the failure of the
League of Nations to provide for its security before World
War

II,

about reliance on institutions for national

security
Nevertheless, a Western European security institution
was created in Brussels by the United Kingdom, France and
the Benelux countries on 17 March 1948."°

The Western

The
Lansing Warren, "De Gaulle, Asking for French Power, Seeks Our Arms Aid,

Times 8 March 1948, A 1,9.
Formally called "The Treaty of Economic,

New York

,

Self43efense."

Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective

Department of State Bulletin 18:462 (9
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May

1948) 600.

Union,

as it was informally called,

sought to promote

integration and mutual assistance in a range of political,
economic,

and military activities.

The Western Union

established a Consultative Council to "promote the
attainment of a higher standard of living by their peoples
and to develop on corresponding lines the social and other

related services of their countries (Article II)."

The

members agreed to make "every effort in common to lead their
peoples towards a better understanding of the principles

which form the basis of their common civilization and to
promote cultural exchanges by conventions between themselves
or by other means

(Article III)

11
.

Article IV of the Brussels Treaty stated that if any

member should be the object of attack in Europe, the others
will,

"...in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of

the Charter of the United Nations,

afford the party so

attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in
their power."

Article VII specifically mentioned Germany

but had further implications for the emerging Soviet

challenge.

It mandated consultation in the event of

aggression at the request of any member "...in whatever area
this threat should arise;

with regard to the attitude to be

adopted and the steps to be taken in case of a renewal by

Germany of an aggressive policy;

or with regard to any

situation constituting a danger to economic stability."
Additionally,

the treaty established a principle of internal

conflict resolution by requiring member states to resolve
58

internal conflicts according to the rules of the

International Court of Justice (Article VIII)

Worried about a potential isolationist backlash at
home,

the Truman Administration was careful not to associate

publicly with the formation of the Western Union.

However,

privately the Western Union was encouraged by Washington as
a

prerequisite for discussing a transatlantic security

institution.
scratch,

By building a security institution from

the West European countries had made a substantial

step toward coordinating their long-term national security

objectives.

Where collective security had failed in the

League of Nations, an emerging convergence of interests was

growing between the US and Western Europe that an alliance
built upon partnership and community would succeed thirty
years later.

Framing the Transatlantic Community
On the day that the Brussels Treaty was signed,

President Truman delivered a foreign policy speech to a
joint session of Congress.

Truman suggested that national

security must be understood in a broad context.

Western

Europe needed to integrate its economic resources to escape
its history of war and defend itself against the Soviet

Union.

However,

if Western Europe was going to unite

economically it must feel reassured of its security.
said

59

Truman

The free nations of Europe realize that
economic recovery, if it is to succeed, must be
afforded some measure of protection against
internal and external aggression. The movement
toward economic cooperation has been followed by a
movement toward common self -protection in the face
of the growing menace to their freedom. .This
development deserves our full support and I am
confident that the United States will, by
appropriate means, extend to the f ree nations the
support which the situation requires.
.

On 22 March American, Canadian, and British officials began

secretive discussions deep within the Pentagon over the

prospect of creating a formal transatlantic institution to
be based either on the Brussels Pact or the Rio Treaty. 92

The two main Soviet specialists in the US State

Department, Kennan and Charles Bohlen, opposed a formal

treaty on realist grounds

-

arguing that it was an

inappropriate security commitment for the US to make and
that it might foreclose on a political settlement with

Moscow.

93

While taken into account, Kennan'

s

and Bohlen'

views were dismissed in favor of an institutionalized

security commitment to Western Europe, enshrined in a formal
treaty,

and built upon a common threat perception and shared

Address

The

to a Joint Session

talks

were

of Congress, 17 March 1948.

preliminary but resulted in a

principally by John Hickerson.

The

Puhlic Papers of the Presidents 184.

working paper presented by the

US

drafted

central recommendations included having the President of

Luxembourg,
the United States invite thirteen other countries (U.K., France, Canada, Belgium,
a
negotiate
Italy)
to
and
Holland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal
Pending conclusion of an agreement, the
attack against
President would issue a unilateral declaration that the US would consider an armed
undated,
Draft,"
"Final
a siimatory of the Brussels Treaty as an armed attack against itself.

collective defense agreement for the North Atlantic.

identified as "Pentagon Paper, 840.00/3-1748.
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"Memorandum by

his

and Bohlen's views

FRUS,
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Marshall and Lovett on 29 April 1948.

Secretary and
the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the

Undersecretary of State (Robert Lovett), April 29, 1948."
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values.

94

They wanted it to reflect political, moral,

"spiritual" elements which united the North Atlantic

community of nations.

As Escott Reid,

a key figure in

Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had written in

a

internal memorandum to the Prime Minister on 13 March:
.the purpose of the pact is to rally the
spiritual as well as the military and economic
resources of western Christendom against Soviet
totalitarianism;
that it must therefore not be
merely a negative anti-Soviet military alliance
but must be the basis for a dynamic liberal
counter-offensive. The pact may succeed in giving
us a long period of peace if it results in
creating an overwhelming preponderance of force
against the Soviet Union, but the force to be
overwhelming must not only be military and
economic force;
it must be the force that comes
from ability to rally to our side all nonCommunists in all countries, including our own,
who are now apathetic, fearful or doubtful. A
bold move is necessary to raise the hearts and
minds and spirits of all those in the world who
love freedom that confidence and faith which will
restore their vigor. The pact must set forth the
gospel - the good news of our faith - for which we
It must make as
are willing to live and die.
clear as possible the methods which the peoples
and governments of the Free World intend to follow
to make good their faith in human rights and
fundamental freedoms, in the worth and dignity of
man and in the principles of parliamentary
democracy^ personal freedom and political
liberty
.

.

Reid's suggestion became formal Canadian policy.

On 29

April Canadian Foreign Minister Louis St. Laurent stated
that it may be necessary for free countries of the West to

establish a security league whose purpose would be to
"create a dynamic counter-attraction of a free, prosperous,

Robert H. Ferrell, "The Formation of the Alliance:
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1948-1949." in Lawrence

OH: The Kent
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Kaplan, ed.,

State University Press,

1991) 24.
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Time of Fear and Hone (Toronto,

136.

61
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and progressive society..." 96

On 27 May British Prime

Minister Clement Atlee denied that a "power pact" was sought
but rather "an association of free peoples, based on a

community of ideas, cooperating economically and defensively
to provide a firm material basis toward spiritual unity." 97

The Vandenberg Resolution

Gaining US Senate approval for a treaty establishing

a

peacetime entangling alliance in Europe would require a
strong bi-partisan effort to overcome isolationist sentiment
in the US.

Key State Department figures

(primarily

Undersecretary of State Robert Lovett) consulted with Senate
Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Arthur Vandenberg who
indicated his support for a treaty.

98

Passed by the Foreign

Relations Committee on 19 May and approved by the full
Senate on 11 June,

the "Vandenberg Resolution" endorsed the

"progressive development of regional and other collective

arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in
accordance with the purposes, principles and provisions of
the

(UN)

Charter."

99

The Vandenberg Resolution showed that the institutional

form of the US security commitment would proceed according

"Canada Endorses Free Nation Unity," The New York Times 30 April 1948. A5.
A 10.
"Attlee Ties Peace to Brussels Pact," The New York Times 28 May 1948,
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The Vandenberg Resolution was formally titled "Resolution of the Foreign
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to clearly defined constitutional means and that it would

rest on the principle of popular legitimacy.

Popular

support for the new institutional form would aid in the task
of promoting a positive view of the world based on shared

democratic principles.

The resolution reaffirmed American

support for the UN but at the same time endorsed going

outside the UN to avoid a Soviet veto as in the Rio Treaty.
It also sought to assure that the new pact would remain

consistent with the general principles of international

relations that the US had initially hoped would prevail in
the UN.

The Vandenberg Resolution stressed that American

association with regional and other collective arrangements
must be "based on continuous and effective self-help and

mutual aid."

Thus Vandenberg sought to assure that the

Europeans would be producers, and not solely consumers, of
security.

This principle was included to strengthen

European integration as a front line of containment and to
help gain Senate support for a treaty based on burdensharing
principles.

The Europeans were not pleased with this

provision as they continued to feel vulnerable without
assurances of direct military aid from the US.

However,

they would have to agree to the burdensharing principle if

they wished to make the American commitment to European

security lasting.

63

Uniting Power and Community
Formal negotiations began in Washington D.C. on
1948 between the US,

Canada,

6

July

and the Brussels Pact states to

shape the institutional form of a peacetime security pact.

During the talks, two differing perspectives emerged
realist and the other inst itutionalist

.

-

one

The realist

viewpoint was generally represented by George Kennan who
intervened at the beginning and at the end of the
discussions.

At the outset,

Kennan proposed that the

institutional form should be based on a "dumbbell concept"
of alliance in which the Europeans would assume primary

military responsibility. 100

In this view,

the US would

provide aid while reducing its direct presence on the
ground.

Kennan also warned of a potential dilemma regarding

talk among the representatives of principles and community
on which the institutional form would rest.

He asked what

would happen in a future situation "in which the countries
of Eastern Europe might come out from under the Iron Curtain

and "be able to come into the European family?"

Kennan

advised that the "...US would not wish to do anything that
might hinder the ultimate unification of Europe."
Kennan'

s

101

realist interventions not withstanding, the

Americans most involved in the Washington negotiations were

10

°.

The Dutch

representative at the

Washington

talks,

suggested an alternative "peach" shape with

Pact the
the Brussels Pact serving as the "...hard kernel in the center and a North Atlantic
Washington
somewhat less hard mass around it. " "Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the

Exploratory Talks on Security, 9 July 1948.
l0

\
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John Hickerson and Theodore

Achilles of the State

C.

Department European Desk who held strong views that any
transatlantic treaty be more than a traditional alliance.
Both were influenced by a book published in 1939 by the

American journalist Clarence

Streit titled Union Now

K.

.

Streit called for the unification of the North Atlantic

democracies based on citizenship, defense, customs union,
currency,

and postal /communications systems.

102

In his

memoirs, Achilles notes that he and Hickerson had both read

and been impressed by Union Now and that they "shared

enthusiasm for negotiating
it ratified,

unity."

1

3

military alliance and getting

a

as a basis for further progress toward

Hickerson and Achilles entertained "a lot of

generalization about common interests, democratic values,
104
Atlantic civilization and the threat of Communism."

For

the British representative Sir Oliver Franks noted

example,

that whatever their differences over the institutional form,
all of the countries at the meetings shared a common

"...the conviction that the state

conception of democracy:

existed for the individual"

Clarence K.

Streit,

Union Now:

A

and that the Soviet challenge

-

Proposal for a Federal Union of the Free

(New York:

Harper Brothers. 1949) 3-5. For analysis of Streit and the relationship of his work to the
NATO see Kaplan The United States and NATO 51-52 and Elliot R. Goodman,
The Fate of the Atlantic Community (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975) 12-24. Later in his
conception of

career Streit
period.

made

a

Achilles 13.

NATO and the Articles of Confederation in the US formative
& Union (February 1964) 4-5.
after the US Senate approved die NATO treaty in August 1949,

comparison of

See Clarence K.

Streit,

Achilles notes that

Freedom

"Dean,

he said to Secretary of State Dean Acheson:
let's

go

after a full Atlantic federal union."

rather start with Britain, Canada, and ourselves."

Cook

now

173.

65

we've got this one wrapped up,
Acheson as responding that "I'd

that

Achilles quotes

Achilles 32-33.

was a "collective concern for all members of the North

Atlantic community." 105

Though principles and ideals were important in Paris,
France primarily came to Washington seeking urgent military

assistance to enhance its immediate national security
concerns.

106

The French wanted to ensure that if a third

world war broke out it would be fought East of the Rhine and
that American forces and military supplies would be

available from the start to defend French territory. 107

The

French were adamant to the point of intransigence about
direct military assistance programs coming in conjunction

with a formal institution.
the Canadian delegation)

108

As Lester Pearson (who headed

reported to Ottawa:

"...the

attitude of the French is causing increasing impatience and

"Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security." 6 July

FRUS, 1948, 3: 153. Escott Reid saw values that united the western countries personally
represented among the individual negotiators in Washington. Fourteen of the fifteen (with the
1948.

Laurent) were "by origin, upbringing and careers members of the group of
Protestant British and Protestant Irish origin which at that time dominated national political

exception of

St.

United States, Britain and Canada... It was thus natural for them to become
advocates of a North Atlantic alliance of which these three countries would be the core. " Reid

activities in the

67.

"The Ambassador

in

France to the Secretary of State."

FRUS,

1948, 3:142.

Henderson 38.

The French

insistence

on material

security guarantees

was consistent with

its

proposals during

In Versailles, France proposed creating a permanent

the creation of the League of Nations.
proposed that
military staff prepared to intervene immediately in the case of aggression. France
for
specifically
recruited
be
and
disposal
its
the League Council should have standing troops at

command.
League of Nations or composed of national forces put under League of Nations
of
League
the
by
organized
be
These forces would have included a standing military staff to
advance
in
planning
military
for
Nations which would train contingents and take responsibility
British governments and thus
of war. This plan received no serious consideration by the US or
Nations on terms which did not
the French accepted the institutional form of the League of
Broken Star: The Story of the
provide it with sufficient reassurance. See James Avery Joyce,
Byron Dexter, The Years ot
League of Nations. 1919-1939 (Swansea: C. Davies, 1979) 45 and
Viking Press, 1967) 39.
Opportunity: The League of Nations. 1920-1926 (New York:
the
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irritation here and is incomprehensible to everybody." 109
The Americans were more blunt in their assessment which
was

summarized by Robert Lovett in a personal letter to the

American Ambassador (Jefferson Caffery) in Paris which
began:

"Dear Jeff:

The French are in our hair." 110

The French concerns were eased when their

representative Henri Bonnet, was given a lengthy opportunity
to air his position in an informal discussion at the home of

Robert Lovett.

111

This style of formal and informal

multilateral airing of grievances, compromise, and

consensus-building played
the institutional form.

a key role in the

development of

The founders saw a clear benefit in

institutionalizing a process that would facilitate the
exchange of information among the member states and their
representatives.

As Achilles observed:

The "NATO spirit" was born in the Working
Group.
Derick Hoyer-Miller (of the British
delegation) started it.
One day he made a
proposal which was obviously nonsense.
Several of
us told him so in no uncertain terms, and a much
better formulation emerged from the discussion.
All
Derick said:
"Those were my instructions.
right.
I'll tell the Foreign Office I made my
pitch and was shot down, and try to get them
From then on we all followed
changed." He did.
If our instructions were sound
the same system.
If not,
and agreement could be reached, fine.
we'd work out something that we all, or most of
us, considered sound, and whoever had the
It,
instructions undertook to get them changed.
always worked, though sometimes it took time.

Cook
Cook

185.
185.

See Henderson 52-54.
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NATO and

While the end result might not necessarily be exactly
what
one country wanted,

short term interests were set aside for

long-term mutual gains.
The negotiators believed that such forms of

multilateral security cooperation might spill-over into
issue areas beyond collective defense.

The Canadians,

in

particular, wanted to institutionalize consultative forums

addressing non-military issues.

Ottawa felt that a

peacetime alliance required a political foundation so that
it would have longevity,

provide a positive alternative to

communism, deepen transatlantic political and economic

integration,

and promote cultural cooperation.

113

Lester

Pearson was quite prescient in his concern that security

cooperation not be tied too closely to Soviet intentions.
He argued that this "might mean that if the danger were

removed,

or appeared to be removed,

collective system would disappear.

.

this justification for a
.Such a system was

justifiable on broader grounds and should have a positive

On

18 March, Escott Reid had proposed in an internal Ministry of Foreign Affairs

provision in the treaty include:

agreement by the Atlantic Nations

memo

to organize their

that a

economic

produce the greatest possible returns by the elimination of conflict in their economic
policies, the coordination of production and the development of commercial exchanges;
promote the attainment of a higher standard of living by their people and greater economic and
social justice, and to develop on corresponding lines the social and other related services of their
countries; to work towards a better understanding of the principles which form the basis of their,

activities to

common

civilization

and

to

best efforts to secure those

promote

exchanges between themselves; and to use
the international instruments setting up the

cultural

amendments

to

specialized agencies as are necessary to ensure that the agencies

become

the

most effective

possible instruments for the speedy attainment of the objectives set forth in the charter.
168.
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their

Reid

and not merely a negative purpose." 114

Pearson's comment

demonstrates that the actors who designed NATO's early
institutional form had a forward-looking conception of
power,

threat,

and alliances.

They sought to preempt

realist predictions about alliance cohesion by creating an

institutional form with a broader purpose than collective
defense.

Such an approach represented a sophisticated

assessment of the fact that detente could be as much

a

challenge to alliance cohesion as war and that the Soviet

Union might use peace initiatives to divide the alliance.
Thus the new transatlantic security institution was given a

broader foundation as part of its institutional form so that
it could survive Cold War tension,

detente,

and even peace

-

if the member states so desired.

Interestingly, Kennan endorsed this analysis,

emphasizing that:

"...the community of interests of the

participating governments was wider than military, it was
traditional, historical, and would continue

..

.Association

was necessary entirely aside from the troubles of the moment

and might well go far beyond the military sphere."
Nevertheless,

115

the Washington working group was careful not

to endorse too broad a concept of a formal Atlantic

Community.

The British in particular did not want to

intrude on the efforts being made toward European

"Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, July

FRUS,

1948, 3:159.

"Minutes of the Third Meeting..." 159.
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7,

1948."

integration via the Brussels Pact.

France saw it as

irrelevant to their immediate quest for military assistance.
The US was also concerned that language promoting "cultural

cooperation"

(for example)

would hurt the treaty's chances

for approval in the Senate. 116

All of the parties except Britain supported the

creation of a high level council for political consultation
and cooperation within the institution.

The British worried

that excessive consultative structures could delay a

response to a crisis rather than facilitate military action.

London did not force this position and the decision was made
to give the institution a formal structure.

working group did not envisage NATO as
political authority.

117

However,

the

a supra- sovereign

States would remain the final

arbiter of how the institution would be utilized.

At its

founding, NATO was not intended to be an "independent actor"
in international relations.

Instead,

it would be a standing

structure designed to aid the needs of its member states.

supported inclusion of some non-military issues in the treaty to make it
more palatable to the Senate. However, in early 1949 the new US Secretary of State Dean
Acheson sought to dilute die Canadian initiative. Acheson felt that language stressing the

By

fall

1948 the

US

would not be accepted in the Senate and he believed that such language was
permanendy
not practical without a mechanism for its implementation. The issue was settled
to President
Minister)
Prime
Canadian
after a direct intervention by Louis St. Laurent (now the
United
The
Kaplan
S.
Lawrence
Truman who subsequently endorsed the Canadian proposal.
Kentucky,
of
Press
University
States and NATO: The Formative Years (Lexington, KY: The
"general welfare"

1984) 117-118.
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The Rationale for a Treaty and a Realist Backl ash

On

9

September 1948 the Washington working group

completed a highly classified document for home government
review explaining the rationale for a North Atlantic

security pact.

118

The report

"Washington Paper"

referred to as the

concluded that the nature of the

problem facing transatlantic relations was "to consider how
the countries of Western Europe and those of the North

American continent can most effectively join together for
mutual aid against this common danger and achieve security."
The common danger was identified as the Soviet attempt to
use indirect or direct aggression.

The Soviet Union was

termed an "implacable enemy of western civilization."
However,

the Soviet threat was not to be the sole purpose of

the institution.

The purpose would be to deter a Soviet

attack and to restore confidence among the people of Western
Europe.

"United States and Canadian association in some

North Atlantic security arrangement would be a major

contribution to this", the report concluded.

The presence

of American forces in Germany guaranteed US involvement in

any hostility in Central Europe.

stressed that:

However,

the report

"If the arrangement is... to contribute to

the restoration of confidence among the peoples of Western
Europe,

it would not be possible to base it on the presence

"Memorandum by
Submitted

the Participants in the

to their Respective

Washington Security Talks July 6

Governments

lor

71

Study and Comment."

to

FRUS,

September

9,

1948, 3:237

of U.S.

troops in Germany", the report asserted.

A broader

American commitment to Europe was necessary to guarantee
successful reassurance.
The Washington Paper concluded that a formal treaty was

essential to meeting the dual objective of collective

defense and reassurance.

To make a treaty more palatable at

home and to score propaganda points vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union,

the report recommended that:

"Soviet criticism could

be offset by fitting the arrangement squarely into the

framework of the United Nations and by providing not merely
for defense but also for the advancement of the common

interests of the parties and the strengthening of the
economic,

social and cultural ties which bind them."
the report underscored that the political concept

However,

of the treaty went beyond propaganda and that a North

Atlantic pact "should be more than an arrangement for
defense alone;

it should serve both to preserve the common

civilization and to promote its development by increasing
the collaboration between the signatories and advancing the

conditions of stability and well-being upon which peace
depends

.

The working group concluded that a pact would require

"adequate machinery for implementing its terms,

in

particular for organized coordination and strengthening of
the defense capacities of the parties, beginning immediately
as it comes into force."

The working group summarized

Canada's position noting that cooperation in fields other
72

than security would contribute to general security.

Canadians," the Washington Paper stated,

"The

"felt that the

purpose of a treaty should not be merely negative and that
it should create the dynamic counter-attraction of a free,

prosperous and progressive society as opposed to the society
of the Communist world."

As the negotiators moved toward formal treaty language,

they were aided in their efforts by the Soviet leader Joseph

Stalin who had begun implementing a lengthy blockade of

Berlin to break Western resolve over Germany.

The Dutch

representative suggested that the preamble to the treaty
simply read:

"Dear Joe:".

1

However,

in late September,

George Kennan re-entered the discussions and expressed
serious reservations about the alliance's institutional

characteristics and their potential impact on security.
26

September, Kennan prepared a draft memorandum for

Marshall and Lovett which was remarkable for its realist

overtones

.

Kennan stated that

Instead of the development of a real federal
structure in Europe which would aim to embrace all
free European countries, which would be a
olitical force in its own right, and which would
ave behind it the logic of geography and
historical development, we will get an irrevocable
congealment of the division of Europe into two
military zones: a Soviet zone and a U.S. zone.
Instead of the ability to divest ourselves
gradually of the basic responsibility for the
security of Western Europe we will get a legal
In the long
perpetuation of that responsibility.
run, such a legalistic structure must crack up on
for a divided Europe is not
the rocks of reality;
permanently viable, and the political will of the
U.S. people is not sufficient to enable us to

Achilles 27.
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On

support Western Europe indefinitely as a military
1
appendage
.

In late November a formal memorandum from the Policy

Planning Staff

(PPS 43)

drafted by Kennan emerged.

The mem<

warned that: "There is a danger that we will deceive
ourselves,

and permit misconceptions to exist among our own

public and in Europe,

concerning the significance of the

conclusion of such a pact at this time." 121
Kennan was especially concerned that a military
alliance could prevent a permanent settlement with the
Soviet Union.

He continued to stress that the primary

Soviet challenge was political and that for Moscow,

"military force plays a major role only as a means of

intimidation." 122

Thus:

A North Atlantic Security Pact will affect
the political war only insofar as it operates to
stiffen the self-confidence of the western
Europeans in the face of Soviet pressures.
Such a
stiffening is needed and desirable. But it goes
hand in hand with the danger of a general
preoccupation with military affairs, to the
detriment of economic recovery and of the
necessity for seeking a peaceful solution to
Europe's dif f iculties
We should have clearly in
mind that the need for military alliances and
rearmament on the part of the western Europeans is
primarily a subjective one, arising in their own
minds as a result of their failure to understand
correctly their own position. Their best and most
hopeful course of action, if they are to save
themselves from communist pressures, remains the
struggle for economi £ recovery and for internal
political stability.
.

.

.

Kennan concluded that a North Atlantic pact should not be
the main answer to the Soviet challenge in Europe.

A

Gaddis 63.

"Memorandum by

die Director of die Policy Planning Staff,

1948, 3:283-289.
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29 November 1948." FRUS,

transatlantic institution could not substitute for "the
other steps which are being taken and should be taken to
meet the Russian challenge, nor should they be given

priority over the latter." 124
Kennan wanted an integrated Western Europe to be the

main political and military component of containment in
Europe.

However,

the European unity that Kennan sought

could only be attained after these countries had been

sufficiently reassured of their security.

Thus Kennan'

arguments were rejected on the basis that, with its nuclear

umbrella and troops in Germany, the US could
institutionalize a security guarantee and thereby provide
the reassurance Western Europe needed to build its resources

for self-help.

As Bevin had suggested in a April 1948 memo,

the most important result of a treaty would be to provide

confidence which would make a Western Union more effective.
"If the new defense system is so framed that it relates to

any aggressor,

it would give all the European states such

confidence that it might well be that the age-long trouble

between Germany and France might tend to disappear,
,

,

,

concluded

PPS

"

Bevin

125

43.

Affairs (Bevin) of
"Paraphrase of a Telegram from the British Secretary of State for Foreign
FRUS, 1948.
April 9th Regarding Recent Talks on North Atlantic Security Arrangements."

3:80.
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Membership:

Geostrategic or Principles?

Early in the Washington talks, the geographical scope
and membership was discussed.

Options ranged from

concluding an agreement only among the core nations involved
to inviting other countries to join with "graded" or

"associate" status.

126

The group decided that all members

must be full members and share in the benefits, risks, and
costs that would come from collective defense.

The working

group also worried that membership not be viewed as an
effort to encircle Russia
war.

For example,

it be wise,

-

perhaps provoking a preventive

the French representative asked:

for example,

"Would

to enlarge the system in such a way

that could, however wrongly, be considered by Russia as

encirclement?"

127

At the outset the decision was made that,

where possible, membership would reflect shared values and

principles

-

but the primary factor would be geostrategic.

Norway, Denmark, and Sweden had hoped to create a

regional collective security institution based on shared
cultural identity,

commonality of interests, and

Sweden's insistence) neutrality.

(at

This policy suited Sweden

which had not been occupied during World War II.

However,

Norway and Denmark had suffered from direct Nazi occupation.
Additionally, Norway shared a border with the Soviet Union

which placed considerable pressure on Oslo either to take

Henderson 37, 50.
July
"Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security.

1948."

FRUS,

1948, 3:167.
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measures to enhance its security or negotiate a compromise
with Moscow.

Thus recent Norwegian and Danish historical

experiences made Sweden's insistence on neutrality
unappealing.

The US wanted Iceland, Norway, and Denmark

(which was located at an important position at the entrance
to the Baltic Sea and possessed the territory of Greenland)
in the alliance because of their strategic importance as

stepping stones to Europe.

Early in 1949 Norway came under

strong pressure from Moscow to sign a non-aggression pact
(as

had been previously signed with Finland)

.

This

accelerated the collapse of the Scandinavian defense pact
discussions and caused Norway and Denmark to move toward the

Atlantic alliance.

1

8

The Republic of Ireland was invited to join the

discussions on membership.

Dublin responded that it would

join the negotiations as representatives of a united

Republic of Ireland.

While the Americans wanted the island

state in the treaty within the context of "stepping stones"
(as a

base for antisubmarine warfare), Dublin's linkage of

the partition issue was unacceptable.

The US neither wanted

to incorporate a problem of the nature of Ireland's

partition into the treaty nor offend its key ally
United Kingdom.

-

According to Achilles, Washington's

See Henderson 83-89.
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the

response to Dublin was in effect:
you

"It's been nice knowing

„
" 12 9
.

The US and Britain also wanted Portugal as an original

treaty member.

The Azores and the position of the Iberian

peninsula as a gateway to the Mediterranean placed
geostrategic priority on Portuguese membership.

a

strong

However,

the authoritarian dictatorship of Antonia Salazar stood in

direct contrast to the non-military foundations of the

institution in the final decision.

Strategic necessity won

over principle in this first test of institutional

principles.

Salazar labeled the proposed preamble of the

North Atlantic Treaty as "manifestly unfortunate."
Nevertheless, he added:

"Be that as it may,

we feel bound

by the obligations of the treaty and by its general aims
not

(in any way

)

-

by a doctrinal affirmation pointing to the

uniformity of political regimes, of whose virtues in our
country we have learnt enough."

130

Canada raised fundamental concerns about Portuguese
membership.

Lester Pearson told a British representative

early in the negotiations:

"If a pact were to be worked out

which included declarations of belief in democracy, free
institutions, etc.,
pact,

such as were included in the Brussels

it would be a little anomalous to have Portugal as an

Achilles 28.

Albano Nogueira, "The

Pull of the Containment:

Staercke 70.
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Portugal Opts for a European Role." in de

original signatory." 131

in the US,

questioned whether Portugal was

a

Senator Forrest Donnell
democracy. 132

Senator

Henry Cabot Lodge asked Achilles in a classified meeting how
the US could square the "common heritage of freedom with the

Portuguese tradition."

To this Achilles responded that

"although its government is not the same form of democracy
as we have it,

it is authoritarian,

but it is not

totalitarian ... If it is a dictatorship, it is because the
people freely voted for it." 133

Portugal's entry into NATO

required some careful diplomatic maneuvering in selling a
treaty based on shared principles. 134

It also set a

precedent that when considering rules for membership,

geostrategic needs would outweigh the stated principles of
the institution.

Greece,

Italy,

and Turkey presented an additional

problem for the negotiators.

In April 1948 Italian voters

had overwhelmingly rejected communism despite direct Soviet
support for the Italian communists.

135

Nevertheless, there

was a general concern among the negotiators that if

Mediterranean states were admitted, they would diminish the

Reid 198.

Dean Acheson, The Struggle for a Free Europe (New York: W.W. Norton
Kaplan The United States and NATO 110-112.

& Co.,

1971) 61

.

Because

it

shared the Iberian Peninsula with Spain, Salazar wanted Madrid invited to the treaty

The US had sought ways to bring Spain into the pact given the strategic
importance of the peninsula. However, no European power was prepared to support Spanish
membership so long as its dictator (who had also sided with Hitler) Francisco Franco ruled.
Western countries also tried to influence the election through overt and covert methods. The
negotiations.

that
most important was a statement from Secretary of State George Marshall prior to the vote
the
or
not
whether
basis of
Italy's application for Marshall Plan aid would be considered on the

Communist

Party was defeated in the elections.
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"North Atlantic" character of the pact.

Having secured

Scandinavian participation, there was a legitimate concern
that extending the scope of the treaty could harm the

principle of mutual aid.

Broadening the geographic scope of

the institution raised a fundamental question of collective

defense: Would Norway go to war to defend Mediterranean

states

(or vice-verse)?

Moreover,

could a treaty covering

too large an area make effective decisions or lose its

cohesion in a crisis?

The negotiators in Washington agreed

that Italy had an important role to play in Central Europe

and should be invited to join the final treaty

negotiations.

136

Greece and Turkey were not invited over

concern that they would dilute the "North Atlantic" element
of the pact and possibly force the consideration of inviting

There was, however, a

Iran to join the treaty as well.

general understanding that the Truman Doctrine made Greece
and Turkey part of the area covered by the treaty.

Greece

and Turkey would have been defended by the US whether or not
they were part of NATO.

The North Atlantic Treaty
In his first public comments as the new Secretary of

State,

Dean Acheson said on 27 January 1949 that:

Initially

France opposed Italian participation as

it

had been disarmed

after

World War

II

and

However,
offer any tangible military contribution to western defense plans.
by the treaty
covered
area
in
the
wanted
France
which
Algeria
to
relation
in
position changed
vis-a-vis
Thus giving the institution a Mediterranean element via Italy might help its position
their

would not

Algeria.
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We North Atlantic peoples share a common
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity
and worth of the human person, in the principles
of democracy, personal freedom and political
liberty... We believe that these principles and
this common heritage can best be fortified and
preserved and the general welfare of the people of
the North Atlantic advanced by an arrangement for
cooperation in matters affecting their peace and
security and common interest.

Shortly thereafter, key elements of the security pact

between the US, Canada, and Western Europe were carefully
leaked to the press.

On 18 March 1949 the treaty was made

public in advanced of signing ceremonies planned for early

Publishing the treaty prior to its signing was a

April.

first in diplomatic history.

The public presentation of the

accord prompted the Belgian Prime Minister to call it
"diplomacy on the open market." 138

-

However, despite claims

of transparency in international security cooperation,

the

accord was the result of over a year of highly secretive
negotiations.

The NATO Treaty was neither open market

diplomacy nor, as Dean Acheson would call
covenant openly arrived at."

it,

"an open

139

The pact institutionalized a balance of power security

arrangement and reflected a growing sense of a transatlantic
community among those who crafted the institutional form.
As Acheson said in a radio address to the nation on 18

March

-.

"Text of Acheson Remarks," The

New York Times

,

27 January 1949, A4.

Market," The
"Spaak Hails Publication of Treaty's Text as Victory for Diplomacy on Open
York Times 19 March 1949, A3.
,

Acheson The Struggle 49.
,
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New

It is important to keep in mind that the
really successful national and international
institutions are those that recognize and express
underlying realities. The North Atlantic
community of nations is such a reality.
It is
based on the affinity and natural identity of
interests of the North Atlantic powers. The North
Atlantic treaty which will formally unite them is
the product of at least 350 years of history and
perhaps more.

Similar sentiments had been repeatedly stressed in public
and classified statements throughout the negotiations over
the treaty;

they were the primary focus of the speeches

given by the signators at the treaty signing ceremonies;
and they were formally institutionalized in the legal

language of the North Atlantic Treaty which was signed by

representatives of the participating states on
1949

4

April

141
.

The preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty committed the

members to "faith in the purposes and principles of the

Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in
peace with all peoples and all governments."

The

institution would be built by the members "to safeguard the
freedom,

common heritage and civilization of their peoples,

founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty
and the rule of law."

The members agreed to "promote

New York Times

"Text of Mr. Acheson's Broadcast on Atlantic Accord," The

.

19

March 1949,

A4.

For formal interpretations of the

treaty see

"Minutes of the Ambassadors' Committee," 15

March 1949. FRUS, 1949, 4:222-223. Minutes of the Ambassadors' Committee, 15 March
"The North Atlantic
1949; The Department of State White Paper on the North Atlantic Treaty:
in the North
Collective Defense and the Preservation of Peace, Security and Freedom
March 1949) 342-350;
Atlantic Community," U.S. Department of State Bulletin 20:507 (20
North Atlantic Treaty: Statements by the Foreign Ministers and

Pact:

and "Signing Ceremony of the
President Truman," The Department of State Bulletin 20:51
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1

(17 April 1949) 471-482.

stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area",

through collective defence. 142

Article

1

of the Treaty required that the members not

use force in "any manner inconsistent with the purposes of
the United Nations."

Article

incorporated the Canadian

2

design for general security stating that:

"The Parties will

contribute toward the further development of peaceful and
friendly international relations by strengthening their free
institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of
the principles upon which these institutions are founded,

and by promoting conditions of stability and wellbeing... They will seek to eliminate conflict in their

international economic policies and will encourage economic

collaboration between any or all of them.

"

Burdensharing

was identified as a priority institutional goal through

Article

3

which states that:

"The Parties,

separately and

jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and

mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and

collective capacity to resist armed attack."

Should any

member feel threatened by any state (including another
member)

,

Article

4

facilitates consultation within the

institutional structure of the Alliance and Article

5

provides the security guarantee (under the right to
individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of

Text of the North Atlantic Treaty. Signed

in

494.

83

Washington D.C., April

4, 1949.

In

Claude 49

the UN Charter)

that an "armed attack against one or more of

them in Europe or North America shall be considered an
attack against them all ..."
The treaty provided for formal organization to aid

multinational security cooperation and consensus through

North Atlantic Council (Article

9)

a

which would "set up such

subsidiary bodies as may be necessary."

Also,

the treaty

allowed for enlargement in a manner that furthers its

principles and contributes to the security of the North
Atlantic area (Article

10)

.

The treaty affirms that member

states are the key actors by insuring that the treaty "shall
be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in

accordance with their respective constitutional processes"
(Article 11)

Analysis

NATO's formative period reflects the competing themes
of realism and institutional ism

-

both of which were

incorporated into its original institutional form.

The

primary factor leading to the NATO alliance was the Soviet
challenge in Eastern Europe.

In that sense,

assessments of NATO's formation are correct:
alliance created in response to a threat.
wrote in his memoirs:

realist

NATO was an

As Charles Bohlei

"...our participation in the North

Atlantic Treaty arrangement was entirely due to Soviet

policy and power... Had the Soviet Union not chosen to
there
prevent the unification of Germany in 1947 and 1948,
84

would have been no North Atlantic Treaty." 143

However,

to

explain primary causality is insufficient to understanding
why the states chose the particular institutional form that

emerged in April 1949.

A variety of factors beyond the

Soviet threat coalesced to shape the form that the NATO

alliance would take in its early years.
First,

the national representatives who negotiated the

NATO treaty placed a high value on using the alliance to

enhance the principles that they believed united their

countries

-

peaceful international relations and democracy.

The negotiators recognized that if a peacetime alliance was
to withstand ebbs and flows of the Cold War,

it would have

to reflect a broader purpose than collective defense.

Second,

the negotiators had a concept of national security

challenges that went beyond the Soviet threat.

They saw

states challenged by fragile economies, weak political
systems,

and the potential for internal Soviet influence or

traditional nationalism spreading from within and

threatening regional stability.

Third,

the US insisted on a

specific institutional form that would prioritize

burdensharing

.

Washington was wary to make certain that the

European members would be more than security consumers
they had to contribute as well.

Fourth,

-

during the

negotiations, a pattern of consultation and information

exchange developed in which short-term compromises were made

Bohlen

1

14.
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in the interest of long-term security interests.

This so-

called "NATO spirit" of consultation and consensus was not
only viewed as beneficial to the negotiations

-

it was

institutionalized in the North Atlantic Council and its
subsidiary organs
Realist critiques of this institutional form were

present during the negotiations.

Later,

realists would

discount non-military tasks given to NATO as window dressing

designed to sell a peacetime entangling alliance with Europe
to the US Senate.

Indeed,

the

9

September 1948 Washington

Paper recommended that if the treaty were placed within
context it could have positive propaganda results.

a

UN

US

Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in particular, saw value in
a

limited acceptance of the Canadian proposals regarding

a

broader community as having value in attaining Senate
approval of a treaty.

In 1949,

Acheson spoke of NATO in

colorful language stressing its foundations in western

civilization.

However,

in 1966 he wrote that:

The plain fact, of course, is that NATO is a
Its purpose was and is to
military alliance.
deter and, if necessary, to meet the use of
Russian military power or the fear of its use in
This purpose is pretty old-fashioned.
Europe.
Perhaps to avoid this stigma, Canadian draftsmen
had Article 2 inserted into the treaty.

Reflecting on NATO's founding, Henry Kissinger writes that:

America would do anything for the Atlantic Alliance except
call it an alliance

Dean Acheson, "Canada,

... It

would practice a historic policy of

'Stern Daughter of the Voice of God'," in Livingston Merchant, ed.,
Canada and the United States (New York: Praeger, 1966) 141

Neighbors Taken For Granted:
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coalition so long as its actions could be justified by the
doctrine of collective security." 145
These realist analysis stand in contrast to that of the

widely recognized founder of contemporary realism, Hans
Morganthau.
that:

In his Politics Among Nations

.

J.

Morganthau wrote

"In its comprehensive objectives and the techniques

used to accomplish them, NATO indeed moves beyond the
traditional alliance toward a novel type of functional
organization." 146

Realist criticism of NATO's non-alliance

functions implies that statesmen such as Bevin, St. Laurent,
Pearson,

Lovett, Marshall, Acheson, and Truman advocated

institutional principles to intentionally misinform public
opinion.

However,

similar sentiments were pervasive in the

classified discussion during the treaty negotiations and the
records show that the participants placed a high value on
the principles on which the institution would be founded.

Realism was not rejected in creating the institutional form.
Realism was transformed into an understanding that

a

particular institutional form would shield this peacetime
alliance because it was founded upon a broader concept of
security challenges than the Soviet threat alone.

145

Kissinger. Diplomacy

(New York: Simon

&

146'

Morganthau 530.
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Sinister,

1994)460.

Tasks

There were four tasks that the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization was intended to perform at its founding.
first,

The

and primary function, was to promote collective

defense by signalling to the Soviet Union the collective
will of the member states to come to each other's aid in the

event of an attack.

The second was to promote reassurance

among the West European countries so that they could pursue
their own self-help objectives free from internal
instability.

The third was to strengthen and expand an

international community based on democratic principles,
individual liberty and the rule of law in the context of

peaceful international society.

a

The fourth was to build

institutional structures to aid the completion of these
goals

Organizational Capabilities
The organizational capabilities present at NATO's

founding were minimal.

The institutional form was premised

on state-dominance and avoidance of hierarchy.

NATO was

never conceived of as having institutional autonomy in
peacetime.

Article

5

Even in the event of an attack on a member,
only committed states to respond:

and in concert with the other Parties,
deems necessary...."

"individually

such actions as it

It would be incumbent upon the member

states to implement the security guarantee and the response

would not necessarily be automatic.
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In its earliest days,

NATO had no standing organization and relied on the

underdeveloped Western Union for military planning.

A North

Atlantic Council was created to lower the transaction costs
of international cooperation and it was tasked to establish
a

Defense Committee responsible for making recommendations

on meeting the needs of collective defense.

Early NATO

meetings initially consisted only of the foreign ministers
of the member states meeting on an ad-hoc basis with no

standing procedures or structures to facilitate or implement

institutional objectives.

Principles, Norms, Rules, and Procedures

Principles and norms were defined in the treaty

negotiations and were enshrined in the preamble and the
treaty language.

Specific rules and procedures were narrow

and left for further development.

Yet it was also clear

that collective defense needs outweighed principle in the

decision to include Portugal as a founding member.
Procedurally, Article

4

promoted formal consultation in the

event that a member felt threatened from any source.

The

Treaty also established procedures for national adherence to
constitutional procedures of each member.
was restricted in its membership rules.

The institution

Becoming a new

member would require a contribution to the principles of the
treaty and to the security of the North Atlantic area.
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Capacity for Change
The founders of NATO intended that the institution have
the capacity for change.

The decision to endow this

traditional alliance with institutional characteristics was
in part to aid the process of adaptation.

For example,

the

North Atlantic Council was empowered to set up subsidiary
bodies as might be necessary;

the institution could enlarge

under restricted circumstances;

the treaty was open to

review by the members after a ten year period;

and after

twenty years in force, any party could leave one year after
a

notice of denunciation had been given.

The decision on

how to advance variations in institutional form was reserved
for the member states.

Conclusion:

Getting from Here to Where?

During the intensive information exchange in the treaty
negotiations,

a

sophisticated understanding of the complex

security challenge was attained which affected the
institutional form of NATO.

By institutionalizing a US

security commitment, Europe attained a period of reassurance
in which military assistance could flow to them and in which

Marshall Plan aid could stabilize their economies.

The

information exchange created a better understanding of
national security concerns and the participants learned to

work together, and make concessions when necessary, toward
common objectives in a multilateral framework.
its founding,

However,

NATO held considerable potential as
90

a false

at

promise of security for, in fact, little actually changed

immediately following the signing of the North Atlantic
Treaty.

It is for that reason that the song selection

played at the treaty signing ceremonies was ironic

-

Ain't Necessarily So" and "A Whole Lot of Nothin'

from the

musical Porgy & Bess.

147
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Department (New York:
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CHAPTER IV

NATO DURING THE COLD WAR:

THE PRIMACY OF ALLIANCE

Introduction and Overview

Chapter Four surveys variations in NATO's institutional
form during the Cold War.

It assesses the extent to which

NATO performed its tasks of promoting collective defense,
burdensharing, restricted enlargement, and creating

institutional structures to facilitate these goals.

As an

independent actor, NATO performed poorly in all four areas

despite considerable institutional adaptation.

This chapter

confirms the realist proposition that, as it evolved during
the Cold War, NATO was primarily a US-led alliance and its

formal institutions were, at best,

intervening variables

aiding collective defense.

NATO and Collective Defense
At its founding, NATO was an institutional shell

promoting reassurance for Western Europe via
security guarantee.

In September 1949,

a general US

the North Atlantic

(NAC)

was identified as the principal authority of

the Alliance.

The NAC would meet at the request of any of

Council

its members and periodically as the situation required.

Soon a pattern emerged of the NAC meeting in formal

ministerial session biannually and in weekly meetings at the
ambassadorial level at NATO Headquarters established outside
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Paris,

France.

The NAC established a Defense Committee

consisting of Defense Ministers responsible for defense
planning.

A Military Committee was created to meet at the

Chief s-of -Staff level to advise the NAC on military issues.

A Defense Financial and Economic Committee and a Military

Production and Supply board soon followed.

Missing from this security institution was a military
capability.

As US Secretary of State Dean Acheson asserted,

NATO was conceived as a "pre- integration organization, aimed
to produce general plans for uncoordinated and separate

action in the hope that in the event of trouble a plan and
forces to meet it would exist and would be adopted by a sort
of spontaneous combustion."

forces,
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NATO had no integrated

and no real means to mobilize

no defense plan,

against a Soviet attack.

However, dramatic global events

rapidly prompted a major adaptation of NATO's institutional
form.

The Soviet attainment of nuclear weapons, the victory
and the war in Korea

of communists on mainland China,

globalized the Cold War and had

a

major impact on NATO as it

was transformed into a highly formal standing military

alliance

Relocated to Brussels, Belgium

in 1967.

Each

NATO

ambassador would have

a

Deputy Chief

preparatory work for the
of Mission, or secondary representative, to do the primary senior level
the Private Office of
and
NAC
the
near
offices
given
were
ambassadors. National delegations
the Secretary General to facilitate

communication between representatives. National delegations

within NATO.
varied in size proportionate to the country and their relative influence
(New York:
Department
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See Walter LaFeber, "NATO and
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the Atlantic Alliance (Kent,
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Context," in Lawrence

OH:
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W.W.

Kaplan, ed.,

Kent State University Press, 1991)

In Europe,

the divide between East and West had become

startlingly unbalanced in the early 1950s with 12 NATO
divisions and under 1000 combat aircraft to defend against
an estimated 210 Soviet divisions accompanied by over 6000

aircraft.

President Truman thus asked Congress for $15

billion dollars of military assistance for Western Europe.
This included a planned increase of US troops stationed in

Europe from 145,000 to 346,000 by 1952.

NATO was given a

formal military command structure to be headed by the

Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)

.

The first SACEUR

was the popular American general Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Eisenhower inherited a military command with no

military structure. 151

NATO planning was based on limited

chiefs of staff cooperation that had begun in the Western

Union and on regional national commands.

In 1952 the NATO

ministers met in Lisbon and agreed to establish
dominated military structure and to

a US-

a force structure

including 25-30 divisions stationed in Central Europe

-

Development of such an

primarily in western Germany.

ambitious force goal would require multilateral consultation
to avoid duplication in defense planning.

commented on early NATO planning:

As Eisenhower

"...devising an

organization that satisfies the nationalist aspirations of

33-51 and Walter LaFeber, America. Russia, and the Cold War. 1945-1971

(New York: John

Inc., 1972) 95-145.
while holding
defense plans had assumed an evacuation strategy in the event of an attack

Wiley and Sons,

US

line at the Pyrenees.

"Text of Strategic Plan.

94

"

FRUS, 1949,4:353-356.

a

twelve different countries or the personal ambitions of

affected individuals is a very laborious and irksome
business." 152

The NATO members thus created an international

political and military bureaucracy to aid the process of

multilateral defense planning.

organization to be headed by

a

NATO was given a political

Secretary General in charge

of an international secretariat staffed by representatives

from the member states.

The Secretary General was to speak

for and prepare matters for the NAC,

and implement NAC

decisions with the help of the international secretariat. 153

Political Consultation

Absent an international government, consultation became
the primary decision-making procedure in NATO.
of consultation",

1958,

The "habit

as President Eisenhower described it in

did not come easily. 154

The demand for increased

consultation among NATO members arose from the need to
prevent conflicts occurring outside of the NATO area
15
involving its members from decreasing alliance cohesion.
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Several events accelerated this

demand

for consultation.

In

1954 the

fall

of Dien Bien Phu and

the departure of France from Indochina strained relations between Paris and

Washington

as the

British relations with

US was quick to fill the strategic void left by the French. Both French and
US were strained during the Suez crisis of 1956. Additionally, the inability

the
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to coordinate a

In 1956 the "Committee on Non-Military Cooperation" was

established by the NAC to be headed by the foreign ministers
from Italy, Norway, and Canada
"Three Wise Men".
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-

commonly referred to as the

They completed a report which concluded

that

Consultation within an alliance means more
than letting the NATO Council know about national
decisions that have already been taken; or trying
to enlist support for those decisions ... It means
the discussion of problems collectively, in the
early stages of policy formation, and before
national positions become fixed. At best, this
will result in collective decisions on matters of
common interest affecting the Alliance. At the
least it will ensure that no action is taken by
one member without a knowledge of the views of the
157
others
In accepting the report,

the NAC empowered the Secretary

General to take a lead role in settling crisis among the
allies by using his good offices.

If the parties consented,

the Secretary General could initiate or facilitate

procedures of inquiry, mediation, conciliation or
In addition to the increased scope of activity

arbitration.

for the Secretary General, NATO further enhanced its

organizational structures and consultation was increased at
all levels of the organization.
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unified political response to the Soviet repression of Hungarian reform

movements

in

1956 made

NATO appear ineffective and irrelevant in a time of crisis. The process of de-Stalinization in
the Soviet Union and the potential for an East-West detente also placed pressure on NATO to
consult

on an

effective response or risk losing relevance as external events out-paced

its ability

to adapt.

The committee included Gaetano Martino, Halvard Lange, and Lester Pearson respectively.
Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO. NATO Information
Service,

December 1956.

Harlan Cleveland,
consultation in

who

NATO

served as

US Ambassador

to

NATO

took a variety of forms including:

96

in the

mid-1960s has noted

that

imparting information unilaterally;

Despite this expanded institutional activity, many
problems emerged in the institutionalized consultative
procedures.

155

First,

the sharing of information,

the strongest of allies,

even among

on sensitive issues of national

security policy is something that states are hesitant to
undertake.

Second, members tend to utilize consultative

mechanisms solely to enhance their interests

necessarily those of the institution.

not

-

Third,

excessive

consultative mechanisms can prove time consuming therefore

a

state is likely to circumvent the institution if a situation

requires quick decisions.
can frustrate, delay,

Fourth, national bureaucracies

or even block collective action due to

their own decision-making procedures.

the flow of

Fifth,

information can highlight differences among allies and

exchanging information

bilaterally or multilaterally;

notifying others of national decisions

already taken, but without expecting any reaction on their part; notifying others of decisions
already taken, in such a

way

as to build consent for them;

actions that affect the interests of others;

made

possible reaction to a national decision not yet
itself):

consulting in advance on a matter lending

others;

or consulting for the purpose of arriving

or carried into action collectively.

Harper

&

Row, 1970)

shown, the

19.

institutional

consulting in advance on national

consulting internationally to ascertain in advance the
(that is, as

an input to the national decision

itself to separate parallel national actions

at a

decision by which

its

by

nature must be taken

Harlan Cleveland, The Transatlantic Bargain (New York:

As another study by

network gave

rise to a

a former

NATO official,

heavy flow of

exchange, advice-giving, decision-making, communications

Roger

Hill, has

activity, including information

to capitals,

formal meetings,

informal gatherings, distribution of documents, translations visits back and forth, report writing,
and collective drafting. The headquarters machine, bureaucracies in capitals, and other parts of
the

network continuously process the

and memoranda. Roger

tide

of inflowing requests,

NATO

Hill, Political Consultation in

initiatives, draft

(Toronto:

documents,

Canadian

Institute

of

International Affairs, 1978) 74.

The following overview of NATO's
available from

NATO

including

political

NATO:

and military processes

Facts About

is

based on information

the North Atlanti c Treaty Organization,

North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures and the NATO Handbook published by
personal discussions
the NATO Press Service in Brussels. That information is supplemented by
,

with

NATO and member state officials and

via direct observation of

97

NATO

activity.

possibly contribute to a public crisis of cohesion and lower
the deterrent value of the alliance.

Most importantly, NATO's formal political structures

were not designed to have an independent affect on state
behavior.

The decision-making heads of state met rarely and

then only to endorse previously debated and approved

documents.

Foreign, defense, and military staff leaders

would generally meet twice a year.

Lower level NATO

committees,

chaired by representatives of the International

Secretariat

(to ensure continuity of committee mandates and

provide a neutral voice) was where the everyday
institutional activity occurred.
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Committees were often

instructed by the NAC or other organs to conduct particular
tasks such as short and long-term studies

(eg.

threat assessments or Warsaw Pact capabilities)

of Soviet
.

If,

in

committee work, an impasse would arise which could not be

resolved via consensus, the dispute would be referred to the
NAC or to the member states for instructions.

After

completion of their work, committees might forward their

recommendations to the NAC for action.

This advise would

then be reviewed by member state governments and a final

decision taken by national ambassadors in the NAC acting on
instructions from their home governments.

NATO's committee

activity did contribute to collective defense by aiding the

As one study has shown by the end of the Cold War. formal and ad-hoe NATO struetures
NATO (London: Bloomsbury
totaled over 400. Pan Smith. Pressure: How America Runs
Publishing Ltd., 1989) 10.
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flow of information and expertise

-

but not by making

independent decisions.

Despite these obstacles, the NATO members saw benefit
from institutional consultation.

Larger states gained from

consultation by attaining a better knowledge in advance of
other members' national security perspectives so as to avoid

confrontation when gaining support for a policy.
Alternatively, bargaining or coercive strategies could be

more readily developed by the larger states in the attempt
to bring others toward a particular position.

Smaller

members also gained as the institutional structures

facilitated efforts to organize coalitions to influence the
larger states with more leverage than when acting alone.

Additionally, because each member of the NAC had a veto over
formal NATO activity, maintaining alliance cohesion often

required considerable time and effort when bargaining with
state for its support in the NAC

-

a

thus a small state could

exact concessions from a larger member via the consultative

process
In this environment,

the most effective form of

consultation that developed in NATO was informal.

"Hallway

negotiations" among national representatives were often the
best way to get an understanding of the reasoning behind

another member's formal positions or toward building
consensus on a particular initiative.

nature of such negotiations

-

However,

the very

private and confidential

-

makes it difficult to demonstrate specific linkage to an

increase in national security.

1 " 1

One indication that states

saw benefit in this form of consultation was the emergence
in the early 1960s of a lunch among the NAC ambassadors

where no subject was barred.

The lunch occurs prior to the

weekly NAC ambassadors meeting so that the participants have
a

better sense of what to expect in the NAC.

The meetings

were institutionalized but remained informal and off-therecord.

Each member state hosts the lunch on an

alphabetical rotation giving Iceland or Luxembourg as much

opportunity to shape the agenda as France or the US

.

The

Secretary General was invited to participate as an equal
voice among the member states at the table.

Participants

give personal views of international events occurring in or
out of NATO.

The ambassadors are free to challenge or

debate their own national instructions

-

possibly leading to

a request for a change of instruction if it would facilitate

consensus.
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Nevertheless, consensus among NATO ambassadors

did not guarantee that anything substantive would result in
the NAC.

In their formal activity,

representatives still

had to act according to their national instructions.

The same can be

said of semi-official discussions between

Office of the Secretary General.

Such

member

states held in the Private

meetings are conducted primarily absent staff and are

in strict confidentiality.

Jordan 127, 184.
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Defense Planning
NATO's military organization was based on integrated
regional command headquarters under the command of SACEUR

based at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
(SHAPE)

who,

general. 1 "

by tradition, was always a senior American

The standing NATO commands were assigned

personnel by member states and organized as an integrated

military staff.

Three kinds of forces were made available

for military planning in NATO:

forces assigned to NATO and

which are either under the operational control or command of
SACEUR or which would come under SACEUR'

s

operational

control or command during periods of emergency;

those

nations which have agreed to assign forces to the

operational command or operational control of a NATO

commander at some future date;

and forces under national

command such as land, sea, and air forces not specifically

assigned to or earmarked for a NATO command but which might
be placed under the operational command,

control,

or

cooperation with a NATO command under certain circumstances.
Effective collective defense required that national military

planning take into consideration the interests of the
Alliance.

NATO was thus tasked to lower the transaction

costs of collective defense planning by overcoming

Also by tradition the
located outside of

NATO

Secretary General

Mons, Belgium.
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is

a European.

Since 1966,

SHAPE

has been

disparities between collective defense needs and national

military planning.
This process was completed through a defense planning
cycle conducted by NATO.
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The process was initiated with

"Ministerial Guidance" as approved by Defense Ministers.
Once guidance was given to the NATO staff, military planners

developed force goals to be met by the member states.
a

Then

follow up was carried out to review national actions

during the current year and adapt lessons learned into the
next cycle of defense planning.

Transparency was enhanced

via an annual exchange of information on national military
planning.

Additionally, NATO conducted command post and

live action exercises to better refine the planning process

and expose national militaries to the technical requirements
of collective defense.

This annual defense review would

then be incorporated into a common NATO Force Plan which
came to provide the basis for NATO defense planning over a
five year period.
If collective defense planning were to succeed in an

efficient manner, NATO would have to promote the national

adoption of common standards to assure interoperability of
forces and equipment and to promote efficiency in

multinational military planning and effectiveness in

164
.

This cycle was
triennial

initially

review

in the

conducted as an annual review begun

in

1

1960s and a two year review by the 1980s.

102

95

1

,

which evolved

into a

multilateral military operations. 165

NATO made numerous

attempts to promote standardization including independently

aiding in the development of common military equipment via
the NATO Basic Military Requirement

beginning in the late 1950s.

(NBMR)

However,

procedure

the NBMR could not

overcome national perspectives on defense requirements and
was abandoned in 1966.
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Subsequent efforts,

including

statements endorsing standardization in formal NATO
communiques, proved equally ineffective.

By the 1980s NATO

efforts were limited to promoting "interoperability" of
equipment.

Member states would endorse standardization

but in practice they supported it to the extent that their

own national model was to be the standard for common NATO

purchases.
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The inability of NATO to affect the collective

defense requirement of standardization demonstrated the

weakness of NATO's institutional functions and the primacy
of its member states.

As one observer concludes of NATO's

standardization efforts:

Standardization goals in

NATO

"The biggest impediment stemmed

included equipment, components and parts for systems,

maintenance and training systems in a way

that assures the

most economical and

the research, development, production and logistical resources of

Interdependence:

member

effective use of

states.

"Allied

Trade and Cooperation in Military Equipment," Transatlantic Policy Panel

Report CSIS Special Report 16, (May 1977) 7.
Robert R. James, Standardization and Common Production of
,

Wea pons

in

NATO

(London:

International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967) 1-11.

Interoperability

is

the degree of compatibility

between national military equipment. Though not

that could be
based on one standard, the goal was that national planning would promote systems
basis.
effective
on
an
integrated into a NATO command
(the M-44
For example, in the cases where NATO did attain some standardization of equipment

American model
torpedo, the F-104F fighter, and several missile systems), it was on the
industries. See
defense
related
attained only after hard leverage was exerted by the US and its
of Alliance
Study
A
NATO:
in
Vandervater Jr., Coordinated Weapons Pro d uction
-

General E.

Process (Santa Monica,

CA: The Rand Corporation,
103

1967).

from the need for unanimity at each individual decision
level; centralized control proved to be impossible because
the

jealously guarded their independence." 169

(members)

The identification of areas for infrastructure

development

fixed military installations for the

-

deployment and operation of integrated armed forces in the
event of war

planning.

170

-

was another major task for NATO defense

Infrastructure facilities could also provide

early warning and enhance information available to decisionmakers.
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NATO was granted authority to identify

infrastructure needs and for aiding the flow of budgetary
resources for infrastructure activities.

The NATO member

states would then jointly contribute to a common NATO
Impetus remained with host countries

infrastructure fund.

(those which would host infrastructure)

and user nations

(those who would contribute forces to the program)

NATO

.

civilian and military committees played an important

advisory role in the process, but initiative and

James R. Carlton,

"NATO

Kaplan and Robert

W. Clawson,

Resources Inc., 1981) 21

NATO

Standardization:
eds.,

An

NATO

Organizational Analysis", in Lawrence S.

After Thirty Years (Wilmington,

DL: Scholarly

1.

infrastructure needs included sites such as airfields, signals and telecommunications

installations, military headquarters, fuel pipelines

aid stations, port installations,

For example, the

NATO

and missile

and storage, radar warning and navigational

installations.

Air Defense Ground Environment

(NADGE) was

established as a

Turkey equipped with radar and
military authorities of an incoming air

ranging from Norway

to

linked system of standing sites
attack.
communications systems designed to alert NATO
NATO
of
a
acquisition
the
with
1980s
the
in
This early warning capacity was adapted further
commanded fleet of E-3A Airborne Early Warning and Control (AW ACS) which serve as
crisis
mobile information gathering systems and control centers. At NATO headquarters
NATO
major
the
to
linked
was
management was aided by the NATO Situation Center which

commands and

infrastructure warning systems as well as to the

highest available quality equipment.
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member

state capitals with the

implementation remained with the member states.

Pressure

for infrastructure expansion grew from smaller states who
saw it as a means of enhancing their security and as having

spill -over economic benefits.

However,

once implemented and

running NATO could not justify or originate program

expansion as it had no independent control over funding.
The primary criteria for national contributions to the

common infrastructure program was state-based and did not
result in substantial financial resources.

17 "

Moreover, NATO

did not administrate the distribution of infrastructure
The members would enter into mutual financial

funds.

commitments and pay each other the requested amounts on
request as needed.

NATO's primary administrative role was

to keep account of such transactions.

The responsibility

for actual administration lay in the Infrastructure Payments

and Progress Committee composed of member state delegations

operating under national instructions.

Toward Integration or Disintegration?
While NATO had the appearance of accelerating

institutional integration based on its increased

consultative and defense planning characteristics by the

The

criteria for establishing national contributions

included:

1)

the contributing capacity of the

was decided by

member

countries;

NATO

authorities and

2) the advantage accruing to

economic benefit for the host country. Though it was central to
NATO military planning, the infrastructure program on average totalled less than .3 percent o:
A. Huston, One For All: NATC
total combined NATO national defense spending. See James
(Newark, NJ: University of
Strategy and Logistics through the Formative Period. 1949-1969

the use country;

and

3) the

Delaware Press, 1984) 157-183.
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1960s,

the trend in the institution was actually toward

disintegration. 173

The successful Soviet launch of the

Sputnik rocket in 1957 meant that Moscow now had the

capacity to reach US territory with intercontinental

ballistic missiles.

The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962,

in

which the Soviet Union deployed intermediate range missiles
90 miles off the US coast,

had given the world a glimpse of

a superpower standoff bordering on intercontinental nuclear

war.

Ongoing crisis in Berlin leading to the construction

of the Berlin Wall heightened tensions between the US and

the Soviet Union in Europe.

This new strategic environment

tested the credibility of NATO's collective defense function
and contributed to France's withdrawal from the integrated

military command in 1966.
Initially,

the ultimate deterrent value behind NATO was

the principle of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) which

threatened massive retaliation with US nuclear forces in the
event of a Soviet attack.

By the late 1950s MAD was

undermined by a fundamental challenge to the principle of
collective defense

-

would the US risk its own territory for

that of its NATO allies once the Soviet Union could threaten

American soil?

So long as the US maintained control over

nuclear decisions in the Alliance, reassurance had

decreasing value for some European members.

With growing

of Alliance Cohesion
See Francis A. Beer, Integration and Disintegration in NATO Processes
Press.
University
and Prospects for Atlantic Community (Columbus, OH: The Ohio State
:

1969).
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nuclear parity emerging between the US and the Soviet Union,
the concept of MAD actually increased the potential for a

lower level conventional attack in Europe should the Soviet

Union wish to test US resolve to defend Western Europe.

As

Roger Hilsman, a senior State Department official, wrote in
"In the face of this new strategic situation,

1959:

Europeans have begun to translate E=MC2 into local terms." 174
To reassure the European allies, and prevent a

conventional war in Europe from escalating into a major
global nuclear exchange, the US backed a plan (conceived by

SACEUR General Laris Norstad)
(MLF)

for a Multi-Lateral Force

which would have made NATO a fourth nuclear power.

The US would not put all of its nuclear forces under a NATO

command but would grant NATO a role in the decision to use

nuclear weapons.

The primary hope of the MLF was to

reassure France (in particular) about the quality of the

security guarantee it received in NATO and thereby convince
Paris not to develop an independent nuclear force.
to President de Gaulle,

However,

the MLF was an insincere effort to

enhance European reassurance that strengthened NATO

integration and which increased the US role in Europe and
thereby constrained independent French action.

Roger Hilsman, "On

NATO

Strategy," in Wolfers 152.

For further discussion of nuclear issues

Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers.
1957); Pierre M. Gallois, "U.S. Strategy and the Defense of Europe," Orbis 8:2 (Summer

see

Hedley Bull, "Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance: A Critique of United States
Doctrine," Policy Memorandum No. 29 (Princeton, NJ: Center of International Studies, 1964);
151-232.
Kugler 141-190; Weher Multilateralism in NATO 48-80; and Duffield Power Rules
1963) 226-249;

,
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De Gaulle's concerns were heightened when, after first

promoting the MLF, the Kennedy Administration decided that
crisis decision-making required maximum US control over

nuclear forces and that multiple decision-making centers
could cloud the capacity to respond quickly.
alternative,

As an

the US advanced a policy of "flexible response"

in which NATO would respond step-by- step to a crisis by

continually assessing the degree to which escalation might
be necessary.

Reassurance to the European members of NATO

was offered via the creation of a ministerial level
(ministers of defense) Defense Planning Committee (DPC) with

primary responsibility for military affairs (replacing the
Defense Committee) and a Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) to
increase smaller NATO members' involvement in the

development of nuclear policy.
None of these institutional efforts satisfied General
de Gaulle who increasingly worried about the US commitment
to its security.

For several years,

the US used NATO

planning structures to sooth French worries, but strategic
concerns and national pride were driving France away from
NATO.

To the extent that France was participating in NATO,

it was as an obstacle to NATO planning.

In 1966,

France

informed its allies that it would withdraw from the NATO

integrated military command and that all NATO installations
should be removed from French territory. De Gaulle was
careful to distinguish between NATO as an organization and
the "Western Alliance" of which France still considered
108

itself a part of.

Moreover,

France did not completely

withdraw from NATO's political structures thereby confirming
the proposition that states found value in non-military

participation in NATO institutions.

By continuing its

political role, France could continue to raise concerns
and even block, NATO policy.

about,
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Little changed with the French withdrawal

-

the

structure of the international system remained intact and
NATO cohesion was actually enhanced as the remaining allies

were able to proceed with decisions that had been held up by
France.

France also maintained its role in areas where it

felt that NATO increased its security

-

such as in the NADGE

early warning system of which France continued to pay about
12

percent of the costs.

Realizing that little had actually

changed with the withdraw of France, the US was not

especially critical

.

The US remained committed to West

European security and the primary means to reassuring
security in Europe remained forward defense in Germany.
That policy was revised to account for nuclear planning via

flexible response, but it was unaffected by the absence of
France.

Paris and Bonn negotiated a new status of forces

accord allowing France to maintain its forces in West

De

Gaulle's actions were not universally welcomed in France.

assembly, former Premier Rene

Pleven launched a strong attack

For example,

on

NATO

in the national

the unilateral nature ot the

without any concessions Iroi
decision and the tact that France appeared to be weakening
Mr. L. Radoux (Rapporteur), France and NATO (Paris:
- or weakening of - the Warsaw Pact.

Western European Union, 1967) 65-78.
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Germany outside of the NATO command structure and thus the
balance of power remained unchanged.
The dramatic external and internal changes which

created crisis in NATO in the 1960s produced a reassessment
of NATO's institutional tasks.
as accepted by the NAC,

The Harmel Report of 1967,

broadened NATO's scope to include

coordinating a multilateral detente strategy toward the
Soviet Union.

176

The report concluded that:

Military security and a policy of detente are
not contradictory but complimentary.
Collective
defense is a stabilizing factor in world politics.
It is the necessary condition for effective
policies directed towards a greater relaxation of
tensions.
The way to peace and stability rests in
particular on the use of the Alliance
constructively in the interests of detente.
The report recommended that NATO coordinate a multilateral

approach to bridging gaps between East and West;

commit the

major powers to full consultation with NATO allies on German
overcome the division of Germany and foster

reunification;

and coordinate and consult on arms

European security;

control and mutual and balanced force reductions between
East and West.

Named

178

Despite this continued adaptation, NATO

after the Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre

Harmel who proposed, and

"The Future Tasks of the Alliance (Harmel Report)." December 1967.

led, the study.

NATO

Office of

Information and Press.

(MBFR) signaled
NATO's formal activities

Future Tasks. The proposal for Mutual and Balanced Forced Reductions
acceptance of a

Warsaw

Pact offer for negotiations the year before.

were expanded via the creation of a Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS).
The committee was chartered to improve: "...the exchange of views and experience among the
problems of the human
allied countries... with the deliberate objective of stimulating actions on
of Modern
environment by member governments. Mandate of the Committee on the Challenge s
Society 17
see

November

1969,

NATO

Press Service.

Edwina Campbell, Consultation and Consensus

Article

(New York:

For
in

full

NATO:

University Press of America, 1985).
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discussion of the role of the

CCMS

Implementing the Canadian

increasingly appeared to be an alliance that had outlived
its usefulness and was struggling to find new missions.
In a comprehensive overview of NATO's consultative

functions written in 1969, Robert Hunter noted that NATO's

institutions have "...been unable, perhaps inevitably, to
affect seriously the complicated process of diplomatic

bargaining that have been the life-blood of the Alliance and
the relations conducted among fifteen nations within that

context."
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a short list of major challenges to

Indeed,

international security during the Cold War shows that NATO
had little if any direct role.

During the Suez, Cuban, and

Vietnam crises, the views of European allies were largely
ignored by the US.

Major decisions related to Berlin and

Germany were taken by the US, Britain, and France, outside
of the consultative framework of NATO.

The US and its

allies were in disarray by the mid-1970s over disputes

related to the Middle East.

In the 1980s,

Britain ignored

its allies concerns over its war in the Falkland Islands and

the US launched air attacks on Libya over the objections of
all of its allies except Britain.
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By the 1980s,

the

Soviet deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear

missiles targeted at Western Europe, the Soviet invasion of

Robert Hunter. Security
see

Morton A. Kaplan,

in

Europe (London: Eleks Books, 1969) 54. For a similar

"NATO

in the International System of the 1970s," Orbis

8:

1

analysis,

(Spring

1969) 28.

Out-ot-Area Problems
See Douglas Stuart and William Tow, The Limits of Alliance: NATO
Beer; and Chernoff
since 1949 (Baltimore, MP: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990);
War crises.
Cold
other
and
these
in
role,
of
lack
or
role,
for detailed discussion of NATO's

ill

Afghanistan, and the violent repression of the Solidarity

reform movement in Poland renewed the American commitment to
a

global Cold War strategy with NATO its centerpiece.

However,

the same kinds of problems that the institution

failed to ameliorate before returned to divide NATO in this
new phase of Cold War tension.

In particular,

differences

between the US and Western Europe over the perceived danger
of the Soviet threat prompted increased resentment in the

Washington DC over the failure of Europe to share in the
burdens of collective defense.
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US Senator Ted Stevens

symbolized a growing frustration in the US commenting that:
"If they

feel so secure in their

(the Europeans)

relationship with the Russians, then

I

think it is time for

us to re-examine the number of troops we have in Europe."

181

18

2

and
For example, the Afghan invasion signaled what the Americans viewed as a threat to US
any
offset
to
commitments
European
get
to
hoped
European access to Persian Gulf oil. The US
while
operations
of
theater
Gulf
the
to
Continent
reallocation of American resources from the
did not
US-led Rapid Deployment Force for the region. However, the Europeans
establishing a

planned sale of gas pipeline
share this assessment and indeed rejected American opposition to a
materials to the Soviet Union.

182

Simon Lunn,
1983) 49.

Burdenshariinz in

NATO

Editorials published in major

questioning the

US commitment

to

Royal Institution of International Affairs,
newspapers in late 1981 took an even harder line

(London:

US

West European

security.

Tribune opined:

"The heirs of Talleyrand, Bismarck

Chamberlain)

us that

tell

we

don't

know how

As an

editorial in

The Chicago

and Disraeli (and of Petain, Hitler and

to deal intelligently with the Soviet colossus.

We

look at the record. These paragons
are hamhanded, they say, unsubtle, and simpleminded...But
in such an unholy mess that the U.S.
of diplomacy managed twice in this century to get Europe
Quoted in Simon Sertaty.
was called upon to rescue it at a vast cost in wealth and blood."
Wrigley, eds., The Atlant.c Alliance and
"Atlantic Fantasies," in Robert W. Tucker and Linda
its

Critics

(New York:

Praeger, 1983) 122.
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Burden sharing in NATO

NATO institutions did not perform well in the task of

promoting burdensharing

.

In fact,

the primacy of alliance

contributed to a political economy of West European security
dependence on the US and NATO.

This contradiction

constrained Europe's capacity to act on its own and became

a

constant irritant for many American members of Congress who
felt that the Europeans were "free-riding" on the US which

spent disproportionate amounts of its Gross National Product
(GNP)

securing Western Europe. 183

The lack of burdensharing

in NATO became ingrained in the political economy of West

European integration.

Empirical evidence for

disproportionate cost sharing in NATO is demonstrated by
comparing relative defense expenditures as a percentage of
GNP among major Alliance members: 184

Free-riding

is

a public choice

collective defense

became

dilemma

a public

for collective action.

good

-

During the Cold War, the

a benefit which, once provided,

recipients whether they contribute to the costs of service provision or not.

greater

demand

for a public

good than

others,

it

utilized

is

If

will place a higher valuation

by

all

one nation has a

on

its

provision.

Ultimately, that state provides a disproportionate level of the collective good as the smaller

members of an

alliance tend to supply only suboptimal amounts.

Moreover, a small country

which views defense costs as a burden could withdraw from (or not contribute to) the military
obligations of an alliance knowing that the larger power and its remaining allies would still
come to its defense if attacked. See Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic
Theory of Alliances," The Review of Economics and Statistics 47:3 (August 1966) 266-279 and
Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups

MA:

Harvard University Press, 1965). For a mathematical application of the
Olson and Zechauser study see Gavin Kennedy, Burden Sharing in NATO (New York: Holmes
(Cambridge,

and Meier, 1979) 18-21.

The

figures

on European and American defense expenditures

as a percentage of

GNP

are

compiled from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (London:
Brassey's, 1960-1993). These dates reflect various stages of shifts in the Cold War including
the impact of the Korean War (1953), limited detente (1958), Vietnam and the French
withdrawal from NATO (1965 and 1970), 1970s detente (1980), the new Cold War and die
Reagan years (1985) and the impact of Soviet reform under Mikhail Gorbachev (1991). There
dispute over the best

way

to

measure burdensharing including the military plans
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that are set out

is

Defense Expenditures as a Percentage of Gross National Product
among Major NATO Members During the Cold War
Country

1953

1958

1965

1970

1980

1985

1991

14.7

11.1

8.0

7.8

5.5

6.5

5.1

4.9

3.8

4.4

3.3

3.2

3.2

1.9

France

11.0

8.0

5.6

4.0

3.9

4.0

2.8

United Kingdom

11.3

7.8

6.0

4.9

5.1

5.2

4.2

United States
Federal Republie of

Germany

As the major power in the Alliance,

the US maintained a

larger percentage of the defense burden in NATO

185

Other

major NATO powers did maintain a relatively high level of
peacetime defense spending.

186

However,

over time, European

contributions averaged just above or below 3.0 percent.

by NATO members, the ability of a country to contribute to those plans, and a variety of
economic factors including relative growth in defense spending over time. The relevant figures
prompting political disputes over NATO burdensharing were drawn from comparisons of the
percentage of GNP allocated to national defense. See James R. Golden, The Dynamics of
Change in NATO: A Burden-Sharing Perspective (New York: Praeger, 1983) 24-54 and Simon

Duke, The Burdensharing Debate:
l50
Adjusting for

A

Reassessment (New York:

St.

Martin's Press, 1993) 124-

-

5

non-NATO

national defense outlays

numerous military commitments and

is

related costs.

difficult as the

This

is

US and

its allies

especially true for the

had

US which saw

defense spending rise considerably during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. Nevertheless,
Leonard Sullivan Jr. and Jack A. LeCuyer show that the US, with 48 percent of the aggregated
NATO Gross Domestic Product (GDP), provided 66 percent of NATO defense costs when
Vietnam is excluded Sullivan and LeCuyer maintain that for equity to have been attained the
US would have spent $1.1 trillion less between 1961 and 1988 on defense. Leonard Sullivan Jr.
and Jack A. LeCuyer, Comprehensive Security and Western Prosperity (Washington D.C.: The
Atlantic Council of the United States, 1988) 48. Also see Melvin Krauss, ed., How NATO
Weakens the West (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986) 32-33 and David P. Calleo, "Inflation
and American Power," Foreign Affairs 59:4 (Spring 1981) 781-812.
its

.

6

The

GNP

allocated for defense among the major
of factors. For example, the Federal Republic of

different levels of percentage of

NATO

members
Germany

can be explained by a number
maintained a large standing army as the front-line state in Europe. However, the internal and
West
external constraints on West Germany assuming any role outside its own territory kept
German defense expenditures low. France maintained a relatively high share of the defense

not
burden because of its perception that the American commitment to France's security could
tell after its
actually
expenditure
defense
France's
Nevertheless,
always be counted on.
selt-help
withdrawal from the NATO integrated military command - suggesting that France's
gains.
security
goals were also motivated by soft
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American gains in political influence in NATO were
somewhat offset by opportunity costs in soft security

-

where Europe made gains under the US security guarantee.

Differences among the main NATO countries in terms of
government expenditures for social security programs as

a

percentage of GNP were very disparate during the Cold War. 1
Government Expenditures on
as a Percentage of

Country

GNP Among
1957

Social Security
Selected

1960

Programs

NATO

1963

Countries

1966

1971

1977

Canada

6.5

8.7

9.4

9.0

14.8

14.6

United States

5.0

6.29

6.8

7.7

11.1

13.7

Federal Republie of

United

Kingdom

United States

Germany

16.6

16.2

16.9

18.4

18.8

26.5

10.0

11.0

11.1

12.3

13.5

17.1

14.3

13.7

15.4

16.6

N/A

26.5

European government investment into human and industrial
resources through welfare states was part of a strategic
effort to provide an alternative economic model to Soviet
communism.

Yet as the European welfare states grew,

so did

domestic bureaucracies resistant to reallocating resources
that might have reassured the US that European promises to

share the costs of European security were sincere.

Even if

there had been a desire to contribute more to the costs of

collective defense, the political economy of NATO and

European integration made this an unlikely policy option

7

in

Press, 1982) 96.

David Calleo, The Imperious Economy (Cambridge. MA: Harvard University
insurance, workmen s
These figures include old age, survivors and incapacitated, public health
programs, and
employee
public
allowances,
family
compensation, unemployment insurance,
York: Basic
(New
Hegemon
American
Bevond
y
Calleo.
P.
David
see
Also
public assistance.
and
Interests
"Enduring
Kelleher,
M.
Books Inc 1987); Krauss 28 and 138; and Catherine
(Washington DC:
in Stanley R. Sloan, ed., NATO in the 1990s
Negotiable Bargains,"
Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989) 93-95.
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Europe.

Forced to choose between continued free-riding on

the US versus raising taxes,

spending,

reducing popular welfare-state

or increasing budget deficits, European

politicians were left with an easy decision

though often

-

publicly berating NATO and the US, they continued to support
the Alliance.

The European Pillar of NATO
One day after signing the NATO Treaty the Brussels Pact

countries submitted a formal request to the US for military
and financial aid.

189

This request fueled congressional

concern that the US was expected to underwrite the economic
and military recovery of Western Europe.

190

Therefore, at

the outset, pressure was placed on the US to establish its

forward defense plans in Europe on a basis of burdensharing
-

initially focusing on German rearmament.

As President

Truman wrote in his memoirs:

See Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1982); Leon N. Lindberg and Charles S. Maier, eds., The Politics of Inflation and Economic
Stagnation (Washington

D.C: The Brookings

Institution, 1985) 213;

Christopher Pierson,

PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991 );
and Andrew Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act," in Robert O. Keohane and
Stanley Hoffmann, eds.. The New European Community: Decisionmak ing and Institutional
Change (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991) 73.
5
"Requests from the Brussels Treaty Powers to the U.S. Government for Military Assistance",

Bevond

the Welfare State ? (University Park,

FRUS, 1949,4:285-287.
George Kennan worked against large scale military aid

April 1949.

to

Europe arguing

that the militarization

Senator
would hinder efforts toward
as tin
NATO
of
aspects
military
Vandenburg felt that it was inappropriate to over-emphasize the
postpone
to
Senate was about to debate its ratification. A compromise was reached
See Lawrence
congressional debate on military assistance until after the Treaty was approved.

of

NATO

S.

Kaplan,

a political settlement with the Soviet Union.

A Community

of Interests:

(Washington D.C: Office of

NATO

and t he Military Assistance Program, 1948-1951

the Secretary of Defense, Historical Office, 1980).
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Without Germany, the defense of Europe was a
rearguard action on the shores of the Atlantic
Ocean.
With Germany there could be a defense in
depth, powerful enough to offer effective
resistance to aggression from the East... Any map
will show it, and a little arithmetic will prove
what the addition of German manpower means to the
strength of the joint defense of Europe.
Moreover, as Lawrence

Kaplan asserts:

S.

"Not only was it

illogical to omit the German component to NATO,

it was also

unfair.

labor to

.

.Why should Americans

-

and Europeans

-

defend a West that includes Germany without the Germans

participating in the common defense?" 192
France insisted that German rearmament be done through
an all European army which would grant Paris authority over

German military activity.

To that end,

French Premier Rene

Pleven proposed creating a European Defense Community

(EDC)

which would also accelerate European economic integration
via the creation of a supranational integrated planning
The EDC would be based on a Special European

structure.

Force with its own European Minister of Defence and with an

independent command staff under the authority of existing
NATO command structures.

153

The US endorsed the EDC as a

means of strengthening the European contribution to

collective defense while maintaining the primacy of NATO and

Harry

S.

Truman, Memoirs Vol.

Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, NY: Doubleday,

II:

1956) 253.

Kaplan

NATO and

the United States

Germany would have

contributed

ministry, or armaments industry.
Atlantic Security (Baltimore,

,

45.

manpower

MP:

but would not have

See Michael

M.

Harrison,

its

own

General

The Reluctant

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).

Ally:

Staff, defense

France and

Unlike

NATO,

EDC would decide independently the direction and control of arms industries. See Edward
Martin's Press,
Fursdon, The European Defence Community: A History (New York: St.
1980).
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the

attaining both through the inclusion of West Germany in
NATO.

The EDC Treaty was signed on 27 May 1953.

194

Though a

number of parliaments soon approved the EDC, France
had originated the concept

-

caused it to fail.

who

-

Because of

historical sensitivity toward military integration with
Germany,

concern that French colonial distractions in

Indochina would allow Germany to increase its power in
Europe,

and intense differences of domestic opinion between

pro-NATO forces and nationalist Gaullists, the French
National Assembly defeated the EDC on procedural grounds on
30 August 1954.

For its part, Washington had not helped

promote a favorable climate in France for the EDC, NATO, or
the US.

For example, US Secretary of State John Foster

Dulles had warned that failure of the EDC might prompt an
"agonizing reappraisal" of the American commitment to
Europe
As an alternative to the EDC, Britain proposed an

institutional solution

-

backed by power

-

as a means of

managing Germany and promoting reassurance for its
neighbors.

In September 1954 Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden

proposed revitalizing the Brussels Pact to create

Western

a

Because

European Union (WEU) to include Germany and Italy.

The signators of the EDC included France, Belgium the German
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The US and Britain provided
the

same day) on mutual

sign the

EDC

as

it

security guarantees between

EDC

and

Federal Republic,

NATO

members.

could not accept the supranational element of the accord.

FRUS, 1952-1954, 5:711-712.
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Italy,

support via protocols (signed
Britain did

t

the security guarantees of the WEU would apply to
the same

states as the NATO guarantee,

the WEU became the means of

bringing West Germany into NATO.

This institutional option

avoided militarizing the WEU and was thus more

a

political

event than an effort to create a functional European pillar
of NATO.

196

Nevertheless, the WEU settled the question of

forward defense,

included Britain, reassured France, and

promoted the principle of a European pillar of NATO and
operational burdensharing therefore satisfying the US for
time.

a

This institutional evolution facilitated an

acceptable compromise among disparate national security
concerns in which the major participants believed that their

security had increased.

The Modified Brussels Treaty
military staffs of

NATO,

197

specified that:

the Council and

its

"Recognizing the undesirability of duplicating the

agency will rely on the appropriate military

NATO for information and advice on military matters." Protocol Modifying and
Completing the Brussels Treaty: Paris, France (October 23, 1954). For discussion of the WEU
see Alfred Calien, The Western European Union and NATO: Building a European Defence
authorities of

Identity within the Context of Atlantic Solidarity (London:

After

its

creation, the

of the Saar lands

in

WEU

UK,

Brassey's

could claim only one major achievement

-

1989).

aiding in the settlement

1955 which further eased historical tensions between France and Germany.

See Calien 4-5. The European members did apply some elements of economic integration to
security, primarily through the creation of the EUROGROUP in 1968. This was an inner-

NATO

caucus of European ministers of defense. The

EUROGROUP

received a degree of

institutionalization (though without French participation) with high level staffing from European

defense ministries responsible for coordinating European activity in communication

(EUROLOG), and defense procurement (EURONAD) designed to
enhance Europe's commitment to NATO. In the European Community, France participated
the Independent European Programme Group (1EPG) which included all of the EC member

(EUROCOM),

logistics

in

and Turkey and Norway. The Single European Act of 1984 gave the
1EPG a goal of creating a European defense industry. See Trevor Taylor, European Defence
Cooperation (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984) 17-27 and Jeffrey Harrop, The Political
Economy of Integration in the European Community (Brookfield, VT: Gower Publishing,
states (except Ireland)

1989) 10.
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Institutional Bargaining and Economic Burdensharing
The failure to establish a functional European pillar
to NATO continued to cause concern in Washington and in the

US Congress.

Such distress was reflected in a growing

dispute over balance-of -payments deficits between the US and
Europe.

198

The issue took the political form of American

pressure on Germany to provide "offset" payments for

maintaining US forces there.

Germany agreed to a program of

arms purchases from the US and some direct payments for

American troop activities.

159

However,

in Europe there was

an increasing sense of already shouldering the greatest

burden given that war would most likely take place in the

European theater.

Additionally, the German public was

increasingly frustrated with the presence of foreign troops
stationed on their land.

200

Off-set payments not

withstanding, the primacy of NATO's alliance functions

brought about by the structure of the international system
impeded the ability of the institution to meet one of its

primary tasks
In 1966,

US Senator Mike Mansfield began a series of

Senate Resolutions stressing that NATO would not be

Caused by

the costs of maintaining troops and variations in currency exchange rate losses.

Germ any: Managing

Gregory Treverton, The Dollar Drain and American
Economics of Alliance (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1978).
This included a $2.2 billion program over two years based on military procurements,
German coverage of some property costs of the US in Germany. Golden 54-59.
Forces in

Intangible forms of burdens for Europeans included the

US

force presence in

loans,

Germany

and general dislike for
particular), the physical presence of nuclear weapons in Europe,

War

strategy.

Duke 211-213.
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See

the Political

and

(in

US Cold

fundamentally harmed by substantial reductions in US troop
levels in Europe.

Senator Mansfield hoped to use

legislation to return NATO to its origins with a strong
European self-help component organized within the
transatlantic context.

The original Mansfield Resolution

declared that:

(1967)

The condition of our European allies, both
economically and military, has appreciably
improved since large contingents of forces were
deployed.
The commitment by all Members of the
North Atlantic Treaty is based upon the full
cooperation of all Treaty partners in contributing
materials and men on a fair and equitable basis,
but such contributions have not been forthcoming
from all of the Members;
relations between the
two parts of Europe are now characterized by an
increasing two-way flow of trade, people and their
peaceful exchange; and the present policy of
maintaining large contingents of US forces and
their dependents on the US continent also
contributes further to the fiscal and monetary
problems of the US

Seeking to reassure the NATO allies, President-Elect Richard

Nixon wrote to NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio in early
1969 that:

"There will be no diminution of America's

commitment to the defense of Western Europe or to the

Organization you so ably serve..."

202

The Nixon

Administration persuaded its allies to agree that any
reductions in NATO troop levels be done in the context of
mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) to be negotiated

between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and not through unilateral
declarations.

The claim that support for Mansfield- style

Hearings Before the Combined Subcommittee of Foreign
States Troops in Europe".
Relations and Amis Services Committees on the Subject of United
and S. Res 83. 26 April
Res
49
on
S.
Session
First
United States Senate Ninetieth Congress,

"United States Troops in Europe:

3

May

1967.

Joan Hoff-Wilson, "'Nixingerism,'

NATO,

and Detente,"

121

in

Kaplan American Historians, 9

legislation could harm arms reduction efforts (and thus
hinder military cost-reductions) took some steam out of

Mansfield's legislative efforts. 203

Nevertheless, Mansfield

had struck a chord in Congress which was increasingly

frustrated with maintaining 315,000 uniformed troops,
235,000 dependents and 14,000 civilian employees stationed
in Europe which all contributed to a dollar gap in foreign

exchange amounting to a $1.5 billion annual deficit. 204
In 1977 NATO members agreed to an institutional

strategy to promote burdensharing as measured by percentage
of GNP
a

.

As part of US President Jimmy Carter's proposal for

Long Term Defense Plan (LTDP) to modernize conventional

and nuclear capabilities and promote standardization of

equipment among the Allies, the DPC agreed on 18 May to fund
the project from 1979-1984 with a required three percent

annual increase in NATO related defense expenditure in real

Mansfield continued his efforts with an amendment
requiring that

US

to the Selective Service

force levels in Europe be reduced by 50 percent

-

to

Act of 1971

about 150,000 troops by

end of the year. The White House enlisted former SACEURs, former Secretary of State(s)
George Ball and Dean Acheson, and former President Lyndon Johnson to lobby against the
amendment which was defeated by a vote of 61-36. In 1973, the Senate approved a similar
Mansfield Amendment by a vote of 49-46. Caught by surprise, the Nixon Administration
defeated a bill put forward by Senator Alan Cranston (which contained virtually the same
the

language as the Mansfield Amendment) thus assuring Mansfield's procedural defeat. Senators
Sam Nunn and Henry Jackson continued the Mansfield tradition through an amendment to the

Defense Department Authorization Act of 1974. This amendment stated that a failure of the
European members to offset fully the costs of troops in Europe would result in automatic
reductions in troop levels. Had the amendment passed, it would have required the President to
payments
reduce US forces in Europe on a percentage equal to the amount of the balance of
Mansfield's
of
discussion
detailed
For
deficit the European members of NATO failed to offset.
Press,
Martin's
York:
St.
(New
efforts see Phil Williams, The Senate and US Troops in Europe
1985) 169-204.

Lawrence

S.

Kaplan,

"NATO: The Second

Generation,"

122

in

Kaplan and Clawson

7.

terms by each member state. 205

Administration official told

A senior Carter
a closed

meeting with US

Senators that, the three percent solution was based on
"...our perception that we needed some kind of an agreed

program whereby we could get the Allies to come along with
us in the rearmament we saw as necessary in NATO." 206

This

was in spite of the fact that European defense expenditures
had actually been rising on average of about three percent

during the 1970s as part of national force modernization

programs

-

while US spending had been in decline. 207

In calling for a three percent solution to promote

burdensharing, the NATO members had created a supranational

institutional guideline to which member states were expected
to adhere.

compliance.

However,
208

there was no mechanism for guaranteeing

For example,

in Washington the program

sparked bureaucratic debate with the Office of Management
and Budget

(OMB)

insisting that only defense outlays for

NATO should be counted and thus there may not be
an overall increase in national defense spending.

a

need for

Meanwhile

the National Security Council and the Department of Defense

205
.

Defence Planning Committee Communique, 18

.

2

Duke

0.

208
.

1977.

NATO

Office of Information and

recommendations became formal NATO policy at a Washington D.C. Heads of
in May 1978.
Summit
State NATO
17-18.
The official, Robert Komer (Special Assistant for NATOAffairs to the
Quoted in Lunn
its own
Secretary of Defense) noted that in reality the US had already included increases into
have
would
who
countries
only
the
that
and
LTDP
planning for the time period covered by the
NATO.
of
members
European
be
would
to increase their percent of GNP toward defense

Press.

206

May

The

The

DPC

73.

DPC Communique

qualified the plan

by adding

that:

"This annual increase should be in the

economic circumstances will
region of 3 per cent, recognizing that for some individual countries
affect

what can be achieved.
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asserted (successfully) that the NATO plan should apply to
the entire defense budget.

209

The internal American debate

over how to measure national commitments to this

burdensharing plan suggested to the Europeans that creative
legerdemain might allow members to circumvent the
institutional directive.

The result was a divisive program

based on redundant military planning.

Even if successful,

the results would have maintained the "unfairness" aspect of

burdensharing
level of GNP

.

-

only measured at a higher proportionate
Thus as NATO moved toward the end of the Cold

War it had failed to achieve the institutional task of

burdensharing.

The objective of a reassured and

economically strong Western Europe was attained in the form
of West European economic integration,

but it was built upon

a political economy of security dependence on the US.

NATO Enlargement

Article 10 of the NATO treaty states that:
Parties may, by unanimous agreement,

"The

invite any other

European state in a position to further the principles of
this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North

Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty."

210

The relevant

principles are "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage
and civilization of their peoples,

Foreign Policy Research
(Philadelphia:

Institute,

The Three Pe r cent Solution and

Foreign Policy Research

North Atlantic Treaty,

founded on the principles

Institute,

1981) 29-30.

Washington D.C., 4 April 1949.
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the Future of

NATO

of democracy,

individual liberty, and the rule of law." 211

NATO expanded three times during the Cold War

-

to include

Greece and Turkey (1952), West Germany (1955), and Spain
(1982)

Each enlargement was done for strategic gain.

.

Principles were secondary and in some cases ignored

entirely

Greece and Turkey

Though Greece and Turkey were the core states of the
Truman Doctrine, they were not original NATO members. 212

The

changed strategic environment in the early 1950s facilitated
their entrance into NATO.

Greece could serve as a

containment point on the Balkan peninsula and Turkey would
cut off Soviet naval access to the Mediterranean Sea.

Turkey would provide NATO planning with one of the largest
standing armies in Europe

-

up to 25 divisions which could

tie down and distract the Soviet Union should it attack

Central Europe.

Enlargement would also shore up NATO's

southern command and open the way for US bases in Turkey.

213

North Atlantic Treaty, Preamble.

A number of strategic

and

formal relationship with

NATO's

political objections

NATO.

were raised against Greece and Turkey having a

Central to these arguments were concerns over extending

defense into the Middle East and up to the Caucasian border of the Soviet Union.

Neither country could really be considered "Atlantic" and as Greeks were Orthodox Christians
and Turks Islamic, neither were representative of the western understanding of tire "Atlantic

Community". Ferenc A.

Vali.

Institution Press, 1972) 83.

Straits

Additionally, Britain

and

NATO

was more

(Stanford,

CA: Hoover

interested in establishing a non-

would look toward the Middle East.
Clawson, and
Victor Papacosma, "Greece and NATO," in Lawrence S. Kaplan, Robert W.

NATO
S.

The Turkish

alliance in the Mediterranean that

Raimondo Luraghi,

eds.,

NATO

and the Mediterranean (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly

Resources, 1985) 192.
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In September 1950 Greece and Turkey were invited to

coordinate with NATO defense planning.

On 22 October 1951

Greece and Turkey signed protocols on their accession to the

North Atlantic Treaty
1952

-

which was formalized on 18 February

.

After joining NATO, Greece made initial steps to
promote democratic civilian control of its military by
sending officers to the NATO Defense College in Rome.
However,

in 1967 Greek colonels staged a coup.

The junta

took control using a NATO counterinsurgency plan (called

Prometheus

intended for use in response to serious internal

)

subversion.

214

NATO faced what one observer termed a "crisis

of conscience" regarding one of its members.

215

However,

NATO did nothing to discourage the Greek military.

216

American, British, and NATO officials met regularly with the
coup leaders.

217

Reflecting the realist policies of US

Several of the coup leaders had served with the Greek Central Intelligence Agency

had close

ties to the

between the two

(KYP) which

American CIA. The coup leader Papadopoulos had served as liaison
Theodore Couloumbis, The United States. Greece, and Turkey: The

services.

Troubled Triangle (New York:

Praeger, 1983) 51.

D. George Kousloulas. "The Origins of the Greek Military Coup, April 1967," Orbis 8:1
(Spring 1969) 332.

The Scandinavian NATO members did raise the issue of the Greek regime
NAC. However, their efforts were deflected by more powerful members.
General Brosio also opposed discussion of the Greek regime
members believed went beyond the authority of his office.

Though

the

US embargoed

heavy weapons

sales to Greece,

-

for discussion in the

NATO

Secretary

an act which the Scandinavian

Washington continued

to

be the

In fact, there were more US
Greece in 1967-1970 than there had been in the three years before the coup. In 1972
Washington negotiated an "open-ended" home-port agreement for the stationing of US Naval
also traded
forces in Greece (rescinded in 1974 after the junta fell). Both France and Germany
and sold military equipment to Greece. Benjamin Cameron Sharp, NATO and the

military supplies transferred

highest supplier of weapons to Greece.
to

with,

Mediterranean. 1949-1979:

Deterioration on the Southern Flank (Ann Arbor, MI:

102-103.

126

UMI,

1981)

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (after 1969)

,

these

officials believed that it was necessary to live with the

Greek coup out of strategic necessity

-

even if it meant

working with a military that was using NATO plans to subvert
democracy.

218

The coup leader, George Papadopoulos

responded with decidedly pro-NATO policies. 219

However, NATO

paid a price for this sacrifice of principles for, after the

military government fell in 1974, the new civilian
government quickly withdrew from the NATO integrated

military command. 220

Short sighted realist policy had

actually decreased the security of NATO member states by

damaging collective defense.

2"1

Greece eventually decided

that it could better constrain its historical enemy in

Turkey with a voice in NATO affairs.

However, Athens was

not able to negotiate re-admission to the NATO integrated
222
military command until 1980.

Turkey experienced a series of military coups,
restrictions on the press, violent public protests, and
martial law.

218

By 1987 Turkey had parliamentary elections

Robert Jordan and Werner Feld, Europe
International Politics (London:

219

For example,

in

in the Balance:

the

Changing Context of European

Faber and Faber, 1986) 216.

1967 he withdrew a Greek brigade from Cyprus rather than allow tensions there

- much to Washington and NATO's pleasure.
Couloumbis 101-102.
See Laurence Stern. The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of
American Diplomacy (New York: Times Books, 1977). Stern notes similarities between

to exacerbate

220
22l'

Metternich
Kissinger's willingness to overlook principles in Greece with the approach taken by
1821.
in
Empire
Ottoman
during the Greek uprising against the

222

command and control
Greece's re-entry was delayed due to obstacles raised by Turkey over
Veremis, "Greece and NATO:
issues and territorial disputes in the Aegean Sea. See Thanos
Allies: Int ernal and External
Continuity and Change," in John Chipman, ed., NATO's Southe r n
Challenges (New York: Routledge, 1988) 269-270.
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showing momentum toward democracy.

This movement continued

in 1995 when parliamentary elections brought a peaceful

change of government.

marginally in Turkey

Democracy appeared to function
but not due to NATO

-

In fact,

.

in the

1995 elections the victorious Islamicist Welfare Party

campaigned on a platform that included withdrawing from NATO
and establishing an "Islamic NATO."

Ambassador to Turkey asked:

As a former US

"How do you deal with a NATO

ally led by a man who is fundamentally anti-NATO,

fundamentally anti-Semitic and fundamentally pro- Islamist
even when he's largely behaving himself?" 223

NATO's record of managing relations between Greece and

Turkey is equally weak.

In 1964 Greece and Turkey were

nearly drawn into a civil war on Cyprus which held sizeable
Greek and Turkish populations.

NATO Secretary General Dirk

Stikker attempted to mediate on behalf of NATO."

24

There was

also inconsequential debate in the NAC about the possibility
of deploying a NATO peacekeeping force.

225

However, war was

only deterred by the US acting unilaterally with power
politics.

223

On

5

June 1964 US President Lyndon Johnson

.

Steven Erlanger, "Turkish Prime Minister's Islamic Tour Worries U.S.," The

.

Jordan 136.

New York

Times.

10 August 1996. A2.

224

In 1956

NATO

Secretary General Lord Ismay suggested that

forum for mediation of Greek-Turkish disputes over what

was then

NATO

the British

NAC

In 1957 Secretary General Paul Henri-Spaak proposed that the
conference on Cyprus. Spaak advocated a federal arrangement for Cyprus

Cyprus.

serve as a

mandate of
sponsor a

composed of Greek

of seven
and Turkish assemblies which would work with a British governor over a period
in the
and
acting
from
NATO
prohibited
In the first case, a lack of consensus in the NAC
the parties

were unwilling

to place

good

faith in

NATO

as a

mechanism

disputes.

225
.

Sharp 85-86.

UN

peacekeepers were eventually deployed

128

to the region.

years.
later

for resolving their

dispatched a personal letter to Turkish Prime Minster Ismet
Inonu asserting that:

"I

hope you will understand that your

NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they
have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet

Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet
intervention without the full consent and understanding of
its NATO allies." 226

While Johnson appealed to the

principles of peaceful settlement of disputes in his letter
it was the implied threat that the US might not come to

-

Turkey's defense in the event of a Soviet attack that

prompted

a

change in Turkish policy and not NATO.

The

Turkish Prime Minister replied that the tone and substance
of the US letter raised "great sorrow and concern"

Turkey.

227

for

NATO did reassure Turkey somewhat as the NAC

instructed Secretary General Stikker to observe Greek-

Turkish disputes and report to the Council

.

Given disparate

views between Athens (which preferred the UN) and Ankara
(which preferred NATO)

of NATO's role,

it was necessary for

Stikker to distinguish between facilitating information
flows and mediation.

The Johnson

letter

was published

The Turkish response
upon

all

member

Thus Stikker was limited to stating

stated that:

in the

"Our understanding

states the obligation to

of an aggression. The only point
scale of this assistance.

If

NATO

Middle East Journal (Summer 1966) 386-389.

left to

come

is

that the

North Atlantic Treaty imposes

forthwith to the assistance of any

the discretion of the

members should

start

member

states is

member

victim

the nature and the

discussing the right and

wrong of

the

this aggression was
situation of their fellow-member victim of a Soviet aggression, whether
member
provoked or not and if the decision on whether they have an obligation to assist this

foundations of the Alliance
should be made to depend on the issue of such a discussion, the very
Journal (Summer
would be shaken and it would lose its meaning. " Published in the Middle East

1966) 389-393.
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that:

"I

am a watch-dog trying to diminish tensions between

Greece and Turkey." 228
In 1974,

civil war in Cyprus again drew the two NATO

allies to the brink of conflict.

While negotiating with

Greece in Geneva, Turkey quietly built up 40,000 troops on
Cyprus and then in a quick action took over 40 percent of
the island in August.

The US Senate responded by imposing

an arms embargo on Turkey (lasting from 1974-1978)

.

This

restriction on Turkish freedom to act angered Ankara which
temporarily closed over two dozen US military installations
on Turkish territory. 229

Turkish foreign policy toward

Cyprus had been constrained by balance of power on the

island and by the US

-

NATO had no independent role to play

beyond reinforcing the American pressure on Greece and
Turkey in at least ten special sessions of the NAC
However, Turkey built up considerable resentment for the US
and,

by association, NATO for the constraints it felt had

been unjustly placed on its foreign policy.
By 1996 Greece and Turkey were still close to war (in
this case over small rock islands in the Aegean Sea)

Jordan 136.

In 1967

renewed

strains over

23 °

Cyprus nearly brought Greece and Turkey

to

war

NATO Secretary Brosio was given a mandate by the NAC to use his office to lower
Although the US approved of Brosio's mission in the NAC, President Johnson
countries.
appointed his own special representative (Cyrus R. Vance) to mediate between the
and not
US
of
the
influence
the
it
was
manner,
complimentary
in
a
Though the two worked

once again.
tensions.

NATO

which brought the two countries away from

the brink of war.

UK, 1991)
James Brown, Delicately Poised Allies: Greece and Turkey (London: Brassey's,
GreekRocks:
than
"More
Papacosma,
For the roots of this particular crisis see S. Victor
Nationalities:
Turkish Discord in Historical Perspective," Association for the Study of

of Current Events 7:9 (May 1996) 3-6.
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9.

Analysis

NATO did provide a forum in the NAC where they were "read
the riot act" for setting a poor example while NATO was

implementing peacekeeping plans in nearby BosniaHerzegovina.'

1

However, when NATO Secretary General Javier

Solana offered his good offices for mediation, Athens

rejected his participation as it would imply there was even
something to negotiate over

-

in Greece's view the rocks

were non-negotiable and protected by international law. 232

Once more,

the tensions between Greece and Turkey were

resolved by US diplomatic pressure

-

this time by President

Bill Clinton and his top foreign policy representatives.

Ongoing differences between Greece and Turkey have been
time consuming for NATO

-

taking up considerable amounts of

staff energy and often distracting NATO from more important

security issues.
times,

NATO did play a constraining role and, at

served as a channel for information between the two

thereby lowering the risk that each member's military

maneuvers (for example) might be misinterpreted as plans for
an attack.

However,

constant tension over Cyprus and the

Aegean Sea ruined any chance at institutional socialization.
From the mid-1970s through 1990 there were no significant
joint military exercises between the two allies which might

have contributed to a culture of cooperation between the
two.

Most of the exercises that Greece and Turkey have

NATO
senior NATO

Interview with senior

official, Brussels,

February 1996.

Interview with

official, Brussels,

February 1996.
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undertaken in the Aegean Sea since 1974 have not been with,
but rather against, each other. 233

Germany
The inclusion of West Germany in NATO was part of

strategic defense plans requiring West German rearmament and

forward defense.

To attain these goals, NATO leaders looked

to institutions to allay its neighbors'

German gain.

fear of this postwar

As the US representative in western Germany

John J. McCloy, asserted in a classified memo in 1950 the

challenge was:

"...to foster the right kind of Germany and

have that Germany accepted by other Western powers, and
indeed the whole democratic world, as an equal partner."

234

Even in France the issue was not "whether" western defense
plans should include West Germany, but rather "how"

.

West

German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer believed that West
Germany's future lay in identifying with Western
institutions.

Although the West German public largely

opposed rearmament, Adenauer felt that West Germany's
strategic position could be used to bargain for formal West

German statehood.

235

voluntary restraint insured by NATO
(and British and French)

Brown

statehood meant

For West Germany,
-

but guaranteed by US

ground troops.

5.

"The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy)
25, 1950.

FRUS,

to the Secretary

of State," April

1950, 4:634.

John A. Reed, Germany and

NATO

(Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press,

1987) 37, 43.
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Meeting in Paris with its soon-to-be Allies in October
1954 West Germany agreed as a condition of statehood not to

manufacture atomic, chemical, biological weapons, guided
missiles, magnetic and influence mines, warships, or long-

range bombers, except at the request of NATO.

236

West

Germany also promised not to use its new military forces
(which became the 500,000 man Bundeswehr

unification.
"

.

)

to force German

Upon entering NATO, West Germany agreed:

.never to have recourse to force to achieve the

.

reunification of Germany or the modification of the present
boundaries of the German Federal Republic, and to resolve by
peaceful means any disputes which may arise between the
Federal Republic and other states."

237

The US, Britain, and

France added that any event which would "threaten the

integrity and unity of the Atlantic alliance" from within,

would result in the "offending government as having
forfeited its rights to any guarantee and any military

assistance provided for in the North Atlantic Treaty" and
will act with a view to "taking other measures which may be

appropriate

2 38
.

The entrance of the Federal Republic of Germany into
As

NATO was a compromise among diverse national interests.

Richard Kugler writes:

236
.

Modified Brussels Treaty, Protocol Number
Declaration by the

238
.

"...each participant was required to

Government of

III:

Paris, France (23

the Federal Republic of

October 1954).

Germany:

Paris, France (23

1954).
Declaration by the Governments of the United States of America, the United

France.

Paris, 23

October 1954.
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October

Kingdom and

undertake important, enduring obligations of the sort that
sovereign nations do not normally accept

... (The

Paris

Agreements) made these obligations acceptable by offering

each participant offsetting strategic gains that exceeded
the costs of these commitments." 239

Joffe concludes,

Moreover,

as Joseph

the resolution of the German question

created a situation in which "...collective gain could

overwhelm the zero- sum logic of rivalry and relative
gain."

240

This transparency and reassurance in turn provided

an opportunity for complementary institutional activity

especially economic integration

-

-

to bind Germany to the

West as a stable and peaceful democracy.

West German public opinion occasionally ran counter to

NATO interests and periodic popular movements supporting

German neutrality as a means of gaining unification arose
during the Cold War.

In the 1980s considerable West German

public opposition grew on West Germany over NATO nuclear

deployment strategy during the INF crisis.

Nonetheless,

West Germany remained firmly embedded in NATO.

The end of

the Cold War has shown the continued validity of this "dual-

containment" function of NATO.

When proposing

"2

plus 4"

negotiations on German unification to Soviet President
Mikhail Gorbachev in February 1990, US Secretary of State
James Baker asked:

"Would you prefer to see a united

Kugler 66.
Joseph Joffe, The Limited Partnership:

(Cambridge,

MA:

Ballinger Publishing

Europe, the United Stat es, and the Burdens ot Alliance

Company, 1987)
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184.

Germany outside of NATO and with no U.S. forces, perhaps
with its own nuclear weapons?

...

Or would you prefer a

unified Germany to be tied to NATO, with assurances that
NATO's jurisdiction would not shift one inch eastward from
its present position?" 241

member of NATO

-

By 1991 Germany was unified as a

with Soviet approval. 242

Spain

Although NATO was comfortable with dictatorships in
Portugal and Greece, the Spanish ruler General Francisco

Franco's support for Hitler during World War II prevented
Spain from entering NATO.

Nevertheless,

the US viewed

Franco as a useful ally based on in his virulent anti-

communism and Spain's strategic location at the entrance to
the Mediterranean Sea.

In 1953 the US began providing Spain

with economic assistance in return for basing rights on
Spanish territory.
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Spain gained economic assistance and

aid in military modernization from the bilateral

relationship but ceded considerable sovereignty through

a

secret accord granting US access to Spanish territory in the

Quoted
the

in

End of

Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: Th e Inside Story of
the

See Stephen F.
1992);

Brown and Company, 1993) 185-186.
Unification (New York: St. Martin's
German
Szabo, The Diplomacy of

Cold

War

(Boston,

MA:

Little,

Press,

Gregory F. Treverton, America. Germany, and the Future of Europe (Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press, 1992);

Context (University Park, PA:

Peter H. Merkl,

Penn

German

Unification in the European

State Press, 1993) 312-313;

Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed:
(Cambridge,

MA:

S tudy in Statecraft

Harvard University Press, 1995).

See Esther Barbe, Espana v
(Barcelona:

A

and Philip Zelikow and

la

Otan:

La nrohlematica eu ronea en materia de seeuridad

Editorial Laia, 1981) 51-90.
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event of war without previous consultation with the Spanish

government

244

After Franco's death in 1974, Spain began a period of
gradual democratic reform

-

with only one major setback

a

-

failed coup attempt by armed forces associated with the

Franco regime in 1981.

Under Franco the primary function of

the Spanish military was to prevent domestic unrest with no

independent civilian oversight of this responsibility.
its planning and operations,

In

the Spanish military was thus

oriented toward domestic rather than external activity.

To

maintain loyalty to this arrangement, Franco established an
officer-heavy patronage system.

When democratization and

military reform arrived in the late 1970s, the military thus
became a formidable source of resistance.

4

The 1981 coup

attempt demonstrated that weak civil -military relations

posed a serious challenge to democratization in Spain.
Spain's path to NATO was guided by a desire among post-

Franco Spanish political elites to use European institutions
to aid democracy and decrease the likelihood of another

Once Spain joined NATO,

coup.

the Socialist Government of

Felipe Gonzales resolved to hold a referendum on Spanish

membership.

While the political leadership backed

Politics
Antonio Sanchez-Gijon, "On Spain. NATO and Democracy," in Douglas Stuart, ed.,
Johns
The
Ml):
(Baltimore,
and Security in the Southern Region of the Atlantic Alliance

Hopkins University Press) 99.
Angel Vinas, "Spain and NATO:
ed

.

NATO's

Southern Allies:

Internal

Internal

Debate and External Challenges,"

and External challenges (London:

153-154.
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in

John Chipman,

Routledge, 1988)

membership,

the public was hostile to the US

association, NATO)

(and,

by

for its past support of Franco. 246

Two

key strategies combined to win public support for Spain's

membership in NATO.

First,

foreign leaders and domestic

politicians informally linked Spain's membership in NATO
with membership in the European Community
proposition.

247

Second,

-

a more popular

the Gonzalez government made

concessions to public opinion on the status of Spain's

membership in NATO.

Spain would remain in NATO without

joining the integrated military command, there would be no

deployment of nuclear weapons in Spain, and efforts would be
made to reduce the role of the US military on Spanish
territory.

With these concessions to public opinion, the

12

March 1986 referrendum affirmed Spain's conditional

membership in NATO by a vote of 52 percent in favor and 40
NATO and democracy had been directly

percent opposed.

linked through the Spanish referendum.

variables besides NATO were at work

-

However,

other

including the US

desire for formal inclusion of the entire Iberian peninsula
into NATO defense planning and Spain's desire to join the

European Community.

See Javier Perez Royo, "Repercussions on the Democratic Process of Spain's Entry into

and Joseph S. Tulchin, eds., Spain's Entry into NATO:
and Strategic Perspectives (Boulder, CO: Lynne-Rienner Publishers, 1988)
Janes, 1986)
?f)-28 and Javier Ruperez. Espana en la Otan: Relato Parcial (Barcelona: Plaza and

NATO,"

in Frederico G. Gil

Conflicting Political

141-187.

Sanchez-Gijon
admitting

it

Spain signed a Treaty of Accession to the Treaty of Rome
January 1986.
in June 1985 and became a full member of the EC in

(in Stuart) 112.

to the

EC
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Though Spain did not join the integrated military
command, NATO military goals were incorporated into Spain's

national security planing.

The Spanish military began

preparing and organizing for external activity rather than
civil -control functions.

248

The Spanish government

instituted a comprehensive reform of its civil -military
relations including a pardon of those who had been punished
for support of democracy in the military and full civilian
49
control over the Ministry of Defense."

the Cold War,

Since the end of

the trend in Spain has been toward increased

support for NATO

-

with Spain sending considerable

peacekeeping forces, first under a UN mandate and then under
NATO command, to keep peace in the Balkans.
1996,

In November

the Spanish Parliament voted to join the NATO

integrated military command.

Analysis
This chapter shows why realists are pessimistic about

NATO's capacity to function in the absence of a unifying
Soviet threat.

During the Cold War, NATO developed

considerable institutional attributes.

248
.

The Spanish

military

was assigned

five

key tasks within

However,

NATO planning:

the

assuring security on

defense of the western
the Iberian peninsula; contributing to the strengthening of the
open and assuring the aeroroutes
Mediterranean flank; participating in keeping the Atlantic
to monitor and control the tw
conflict;
naval passage between the US and Spain in the event of
air-warning network into th
Spanish
approaches to the Straits of Gibraltar; and to integrate the

NATO-wide
249
.

Gregory

early warning systems.

Vinas, in Chipman, 183.

F. Treverton, "Spain, the United States,

Realities," in Gil

and Tulchin 129-132.
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and

NATO:

Strategic Facts

and

Political

structure of the international system and the relative

balance of power between the US-led West and the Soviet-

dominated East was what kept war from breaking out in Europe
-

either between East and West or, at a lower level, between

Greece and Turkey.

NATO did enhance collective defense

through institutional mechanisms but key areas such as

consultation and defense planning were dependent upon other

primary factors

-

mainly the distribution of power.

does not imply that NATO was irrelevant

-

This

only that as an

institution NATO was a dependent variable during the Cold
War

Tasks
The primacy of collective defense led to an expansion
of institutional tasks to include intensive consultation and

defense planning.

The Secretary General was empowered to

facilitate consensus and resolve disputes among allies.

Military representatives were responsible for coordinated
planning of the contributions made by member states to
collective defense.

In Germany,

task of internal containment

.

NATO was given a formal

The changed strategic

environment accompanying advancements in nuclear weapons

technology highlighted the importance of institutional
efforts to strengthen the credibility of collective defense

during the 1960s.

Also in the 1960s, NATO was given an

increased political role as part of a general detente with
the Soviet Union.

Formally, burdensharing remained a task

of the institution as did enlargement consistent with

institutional principles.

However,

only in the case of

Spain did NATO have an independent role affecting national

security

Organizational Capabilities
The organizational capabilities of NATO were expanded
to include political and military headquarters involving

representatives from member states and including a
secretariat and staff serving the institution.
Nevertheless,

in its efforts to meet its tasks, NATO had no

independent peacetime authority despite the growth of its

organizational attributes.

Thus,

NATO's institutional

characteristics had little measurable independent impact

affecting the national security of its member states.
NATO's dominant organizational capabilities were highly
formal with low autonomy.

Principles, Norms, Rules, and Procedures

The principles upon which NATO was founded were

secondary to geostrategic concerns during the Cold War.

Consultation and defense planning became institutional norms
and were given formal rules as the primary decision-making

procedures for NATO.

However,

it is not clear that they had

any measurable impact beyond enhancing collective defense.

Consultation and military planning were dependent on the
extent to which states chose to share information with their
140

allies.

The primary area where consultation may have been

effective was in the informal and highly secretive

discussions held by national representatives at NATO
However, without a full historical disclosure,

a direct

relationship between informal consultation and increased
security can only be inferred.

Military planning did

enhance the capacity for action in the event of a

conventional war and states that were not contributing fully
to collective defense were more easily identified through

the information sharing process in NATO.

However,

there was

no independent enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance

with common objectives.

Membership remained restricted and

enlargement was based on geostrategic objectives.

In the

most serious threat to security within the alliance, NATO's

institutional attributes had no impact on relations between

Greece and Turkey.

Strong institutional rules were placed

on Germany with the objective of socializing it into a

peaceful democratic state and limiting its capacity for
independent action.

However,

these rules were enforced by

NATO only to the extent that it symbolized the presence of
foreign occupation forces on German territory.

Only in the

case of Spain can a clear linkage be shown between NATO

enlargement and institutional principles.

Capacity for Change
The expansion of NATO's institutional tasks

demonstrated a capacity for change.
141

However,

institutional

adaptation was responsive and did not shape events.
example,

one major change

-

For

empowering the Secretary General

to resolve disputes among allies had no measurable impact on

Greek-Turkish tensions.

Additionally,

in the changed

strategic nuclear environment the ability of the MLF or

flexible response failed to assure France that NATO had

adapted sufficiently to have continued relevance to its
national security.

In the case of burdensharing,

largely cosmetic after the failure of the EDC

.

change was

In fact,

the

primacy of NATO's alliance functions contributed to a West
European political economy of security dependence on the US

which constrains the ability of NATO to adapt to the absence
of a threat after the Cold War.

responsive,

slow,

Change in NATO was

and dependent on the structure of the

international system.

The Constraints of Alliance

Conclusion:

Realists have good reason to be skeptical of NATO's

ability to adapt to the absence of a threat after the Cold
War.

Even in areas where NATO is generally thought to have

been highly successful during the Cold War,
always function well

-

if at all.

it did not

As NATO developed,

the

variations in institutional form were dependent upon
external events and the interests of the member states.
That is not to say that NATO was irrelevant to national
security.

NATO facilitated the essential elements of

stability in Europe for over forty years
142

-

it helped keep

the Americans involved in Europe,

reassured Germany's

neighbors that it would not easily become a military threat
to their security,

and deterred the Soviet Union from

encroaching into the West.

However,

this conclusion does

suggest that for NATO to have relevance for the post-Cold

War European security environment it would have to be

substantially transformed as an institution.
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CHAPTER V
NATO AFTER THE COLD WAR:
NEW CHALLENGES AND INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTATION

Introduction and Overview

Chapter Five demonstrates the high value that the member
states of NATO placed on institutional adaptation to enhance

post-Cold War European security.

It shows that,

contrary to

some realist predictions, NATO did not dissolve but actually

became central to the concept of "interlocking institutions"

designed to enhance security in Central and Eastern Europe.
However,

despite considerable institutional activity

involving NATO, the EU, WEU, the CSCE and the UN, the

promise of institutions failed to deliver peace in the
Balkans.

NATO did produce two effective institutional

programs promoting stability in Central and Eastern Europe
via the Partnership for Peace and the Bosnia Peace

Implementation Force.

However,

in the Balkans,

NATO only

functioned when its traditional alliance mechanisms were

activated via US leadership.

This chapter therefore shows

that its members have considerable work to do if NATO is to

have lasting relevance in the absence of a threat.

Winning the Peace?
By the late 1980s economic and political crisis forced
the Soviet Union to withdraw from the Cold War stalemate in

Europe.

This process began in December 1987 when the US and

the Soviet Union eliminated an entire class of nuclear

weapons in Europe through the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty (INF)

A year later Soviet President Mikhail

.

Gorbachev announced a reduction of 500,000 personnel from
the Soviet military to include a withdrawal of the most

threatening Soviet forces from Eastern Europe.

In November

1990 the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) was

concluded by all NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. 250

Conventional reductions were followed by agreements between
the US and the Soviet Union to reduce strategic nuclear

weapons through START

I

and START II.
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In the long-term,

a

revitalized Russia could challenge European security with
its large inventory of nuclear and conventional weapons and

the capacity to promote instability in its neighboring

states.

However,

there would be considerable warning time

of a direct Russian threat to Central Europe as it would

require large scale violations of the verifiable CFE treaty.
The immediate danger from post-Cold War Russia was not

expansion

-

but implosion, disintegration, and the potential

for nuclear proliferation.

Absent the Soviet threat, democracy appeared to be
spreading after the dramatic post -Communist revolutions of

deployment of military equipment between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact
vehicles, 13,600 combat
to 40,000 battle tanks, 40,000 artillery, 60,000 armored combat
participating country with
each
by
implemented
to
be
aircraft, and 40,000 attack helicopters
1989 and 1997)
(between
lower
would
levels
intrusive verification procedures. CFE troop

CFE

limits the

from 3,410,600 persons to 2,158,000; East European levels
persons to 452,000,
(Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary) from 820,200
included an
This
persons.
and former Soviet Republic levels from 4,260,000 to 2,124,000
1997.
by
personnel
estimated size of the Russian armed forces of around 1,500.000

NATO

collective force levels

Together the two

treaties

would eliminate nearly two-thirds of
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existing strategic nuclear forces.

1989.

Yet democracy did not necessarily mean stability.

As

Czech President Vaclev Havel told NATO Secretary General

Manfred Worner in early 1992:

"We have a country that is

run by dissidents, but none of whom have studied tax law." 252

What is most telling about Havel's comments is the person to

whom they were made.

As NATO Secretary General Worner

observed in 1993, NATO's members and many countries from
Central and Eastern Europe looked to the institution to:

maintain the transatlantic relationship;

manage

international conflict by serving as a forum for

multilateral diplomacy toward the East backed by substantial

military resources,-

alleviate traditional conflicts within

Western Europe and contain a united Germany;

provide

predictability and reassurance in European-American
relations in a time of increasing economic competition;

and

lower the costs of national security by pooling defense

resources in cooperation with like-minded states.

253

Additionally, because NATO command and control arrangements,
logistics,

communications, and some forces were used with

considerable success in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, some of
its members hoped that NATO could facilitate the

multinational use of force outside the NATO area.

With its

standing structures and years of consultative patterns and

Interview with a senior

NATO

official, Brussels,

March 1992.

Manfred
Manfred Worner, "European Security: Political Will Plus Military Might," in
Philip Morris
Worner, et al. What is European Security after the Cold War ? (Brussels: The
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1993) 12.
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mutual trust among its members, NATO members preferred it to
the G-7,

Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development, or the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe for addressing their national security concerns.

Contrary to realist predictions, rather than dissolve
as most alliances have in the absence of a threat,

NATO

moved to the core of an emerging European security
architecture.

Yet,

for a time,

it also became the core of

false promises of security in Central and Eastern Europe.

While NATO countries would use the institution to make

overtures toward "winning the peace"

-

little security was

provided on the Balkan peninsula between 1991 and 1995.
Events in the former Yugoslavia out-paced the ability of

institutions to adapt to new security challenges and the

willingness of states to make them work.

In fact,

some

institutions such as the EU and UN often caused more

problems than provided solutions in post -Cold War Europe.
Nevertheless, there were some important successes as a
secure environment was established with NATO in the Balkans
in 1995-1996.

Early Adaptation of NATO:

Promoting Stabili ty in the East

Meeting in London in July 1990, the NATO heads of state
stressed the continued task of collective defense while

acknowledging that challenges to that mission had been
radically transformed to include promoting stability among
its former adversaries:
147

We recognize that, in the new Europe the
security of every state is inseparably
linked to
the security of its neighbors.
NATO must become
an institution where Europeans, Canadians and
Americans work together not only for the common
defence, but to build new partnerships with all
the nations of Europe.
The Atlantic
must reach out to the countries of theCommunity
East which
were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend
4
to them the hand of friendship.

NATO invited East European leaders,

including Soviet

President Gorbachev, to address the NAC and to establish

regular diplomatic liaison with the Alliance.

"This will

make it possible for us to share with them our thinking and

deliberations in this historic period of change", the NATO
leaders proclaimed. 255
In November 1991 NATO adopted a new strategic concept

after 16 months of work and 12 different drafts by its

Strategy Review Group (SRG)

The process was completed with

.

the understanding that the new strategic concept would

represent the collective diplomacy of the NATO members. 256
NATO agreed that the primary challenge to the security of
its members was uncertainty and instability in the former

Warsaw Pact
...the adverse consequences of instabilities
that may arise from the serious economic, social,
and political difficulties, including ethnic
rivalries and territorial disputes, which are
faced by many countries in Central and Eastern
Europe.
The tensions which may result, as long as
they remain limited, should not directly threaten
the security and territorial integrity of members

London Declaration on

a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, July 1990.

NATO

Office of

Information and Press.

London

Declaration.

Reflecting the political nature of the drafting process, France joined the

only participated

when

it

became

clear that

European security were being made

major

in its absence.
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SRG. However, Fiance

strategic decisions affecting the future of

of the Alliance.

They could, however, lead to
crises mimical to European stability and even to
armed conflicts, which could involve outside
powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a
direct effect on the security of the Alliance.

NATO outlined four "fundamental tasks" for the Alliance

after the Cold

War-.

1.

To provide one of the indispensable
foundations for a stable security environment
in Europe, based on the growth of democratic
institutions and commitment to the peaceful
resolutions of disputes, in which no country
would be able to intimidate or coerce any
European nation or to impose hegemony through
the threat or use of force.

2.

To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the
North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic
forum for Allied consultations on any issues
that affect their vital interests, including
possible developments posing risks for
members' security, and for appropriate
coordination of their efforts in fields of
common concern.

3

.

To deter and defend against any threat of
aggression against the territory of any NATO
member state

4

.

To preserve the^trategic balance of power
within Europe.
25

During the drafting there were divisions within the SRG

Some members opposed the stress on preserving the strategic

balance of power in Europe given that the Warsaw Pact was in
rapid dissolution.

Additionally,

some Alliance officials

and member states were deeply divided on whether NATO's

The

Alliance's Strategic Concept.

in the

Agreed by

the

meeting of the North Atlantic Council in

Information and Press. The

Communique

Heads of

Rome on

State

7-8

and Government participating

November 1991

.

NATO

Office of

also specified potential challenges arising from the

Mediterranean region and nuclear proliferation.

The

Alliance's Strategic Concept.

Discussion with

J.

Michael Legge, Chairman of the

SRG

and

NATO

Assistant Secretary

January 1992.
General, at the Belgian Royal Defense College, Brussels, 23
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successful adaptation would require amending its mission to
include action outside of its territorial area.

Indeed

among senior NATO officials, there was considerable

enthusiasm for giving NATO an out-of-area role
arguing that NATO's future depended on it. 260
particular,

document

-

-

some

France,

in

opposed any "out-of-area" language in the
insisting that NATO should be maintained in

reserve as a hedge against a Soviet threat while not taking
on new missions.

261

Thus, NATO's most dramatic military

adaptation was to establish an Allied Rapid Reaction Corps

within the new strategic concept.
to respond to Article

5

However,

its function was

challenges within the NATO area.

A key area of agreement was a general understanding
that NATO should be placed within a new framework of

interlocking institutions.

The intent was to use

international institutions to aid post -Communist democratic
and economic transitions in Central and Eastern Europe and
to establish a mechanism for early warning, preventive

diplomacy, and conflict management as an amalgamated form of

collective security.

Though European security institutions

would remain controlled by states, their members sought to
enhance the capacity of institutions for meeting the

evolving challenges of post-Cold War European security.

primary impetus in this outreach to Central and Eastern

NATO

conducted by the author from 1991-1993.
See "Transatlantic Relations and the Management of Disorder," Report to the Netherlands
Interviews with senior

Atlantic

officials

Commission (The Hague: Netherlands

150

Atlantic

Commission, 1993) 27.

The

Europe came from NATO which continued to represent the

collective diplomacy of its member states.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

Early NATO initiatives to the East focused on

strengthening the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE) as a "Pan European" institution ranging from
2h2

Vancouver to Vladivostock

Established through the

Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the CSCE promoted international
norms of the rule of law, non-aggression, and the peaceful

settlement of disputes. 263

For NATO, building a working

partnership with the CSCE was a pragmatic means of reaching
out to the nascent democracies to the East without expanding
As a senior NATO official

formal security guarantees.

"...at the London Summit in July of 1990,

commented:

the

decision was that we would establish a friendly
that we would cooperate, and as this has

relationship,

See Sean Kay,

"NATO

and the CSCE:

1993) 59-77 and Sean Kay,

"NATO

PapaCOSma and Mary Ann Heiss,

(New York:
The

original

expanded

to

St.

the

NATO

53 by 1992.

CSCE

Partnership for the Future," in Paradigms 7:2 (Winter

and the CSCE:

Martin's Press, 1995)

members of

A

1

in the

A New

Post-Cold

Russian Challenge,"

War

Era:

Do es

It

in S. Victor

Have

a Future?

13-133.

included 35 states from Europe and North America

During the Cold War, the

US and

its

NATO

allies

-

emphasized

CSCE

norms to expose contradictions in the Soviet system and as part of the general policy of detente.
However, (hey were reluctant to grant the CSCE operational authority as this would have
since CSCE
allowed the Soviet Union a veto over mailers of direct concern to the Alliance
on the inviability
stress
the
CSCE
liked
Union
Soviet
The
decisions were taken with unanimity.
ot the
incorporation
their
and
Germany
of
of existing borders which codified the division
and
in
Central
revolutions
post-Communist
USSR. Leaders of the
Baltic countries in the

Eastern Europe valued the
institution with

CSCE

as a

forum

exposing their populations

lo

to raise security

concerns and credited the

Western norms and
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values.

evolved,

this has taken more and more concrete forms

-

but

membership is not one of these." 264
The CSCE heads of state met in Paris in October 1990
and approved the Charter of Paris emphasizing that:

"Our

common efforts to consolidate respect for human rights,

democracy and the rule of law, to strengthen democracy and
the rule of law,

to strengthen peace and to promote unity in

Europe require a new quality of political dialogue and

cooperation and thus development of the structures of the
CSCE."

265

Prague,

The CSCE leaders established a Secretariat in
a Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna,

Office for Free Elections in Warsaw.

and an

Furthermore,

the

members created a Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
to take appropriate decisions,

for political consultation,

A Committee of Senior

and to prepare biennial CSCE summits.

Officials was established to endow the CSCE with a standing
body and a permanent structure.
The trends in NATO toward engagement with former Warsaw
Pact countries were accelerated at the Copenhagen meeting of

Comments of a senior NATO official visiting Riga, Latvia, April 1992. At the London
meeting, the members proposed that the CSCE endorse, inter alia: CSCE commitments

NATO
to

cooperation,
respect and uphold the rule of law; CSCE guidelines for enhancing economic
cooperation on
CSCE
and
economies;
market
competitive
and
of
free
development
based on the
for regular
structure
adopt
a
to
the
CSCE
encouraged
NATO
also
environmental protection.

consultations

among member governments

to

meet

at the

heads of

state or ministerial level at

over two years; a small CSCE
least once a year; a schedule of CSCE review conferences once
data and information center: a
as
a
serve
and
conferences
Secretariat to coordinate meetings and

CSCE mechanism

to

monitor elections

Prevention of Conflict; and a

CSCE

Charter for a

New

CSCE

in all the

CSCE

countries;

a

CSCE

Center for the

Parliamentary Assembly.

Europe. Available from the

Czech Republic.
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CSCE (OSCE)

Secretariat in Prague,

1

he

the NAC on 6-7 June 1991 where the foreign ministers

declared that NATO's security was linked to that of Central
and Eastern Europe and provided further encouragement for
the CSCE.

However, wanting to insure that the primary

decisions affecting security in Europe were taken in the

institution where it had the most influence, the US insisted
that the Copenhagen Communique state that:

"...NATO is the

essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the
forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and

defense commitments of its members under the Washington
Treaty."
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Further measures to strengthen the CSCE mandate

were taken by its foreign ministers in Berlin on 20 June
1991.

At that meeting,

agreement on an emergency mechanism

for consultation and cooperation on violent conflict in

Europe was reached.
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In December 1991 the NATO foreign

ministers agreed to exchange information and documents and
expressed a desire to make the collective experience of NATO
available to the CSCE.

NATO offered to contribute to

seminars sponsored by the CSCE Conflict Prevention Center on

defence conversion and the role of armed forces in

democratic societies.

The ministers also invited military

North Atlantic Council Communique, Copenhagen 6-7 June 1991.

NATO

Office of Information

and Press.

Such

situations

were defined as a violation of one of the Principles of

the Helsinki Final Act or

A state with a
as the result of major disruptions endangering peace, security, or stability.
explanation
request
could
state
another
of
actions
particular security concern resulting from the
forty-eight hours from the
for that state's behavior and be entitled to receive a response within

requested date.

The

foreign ministers agreed to allow twelve or

emergency meeting of

the

Committee

more members

to call

an

of Senior Officials in the absence of the violating state

should the time limit be breached.
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officials from all CSCE states to attend special courses at
the NATO Defense College in Rome and the NATO School in

Oberammergau

.

NATO's parliamentary organization, the North

Atlantic Assembly (NAA)

,

sponsored special CSCE

interparliamentary conferences on European security and

provided staff support for CSCE parliamentary meetings. 268
Increased institutional activity originating from NATO

enhanced stability in the East by reassuring new democrats
that they had the moral support of the West during a time of

uncertainty and rapid change.

They also gained practical

benefit from interacting with Western officials within this
institutional context.

For example,

in the NATO military

the participants were exposed to principles of

schools,

civilian control of the armed forces

-

a key aspect of

In the North Atlantic Assembly,

stable democratization.

Central and East European parliamentarians gained practical

experience in parliamentary procedures which they could then
use to educate colleagues in their capitals.

High level

exchanges of military officials coming from Central and

Eastern Europe to NATO headquarters

-

and NATO officials

traveling to the new democracies of Central and Eastern
Europe

-

helped raise the awareness of the challenges these

countries faced and began to build a sense of trust and

The North

Atlantic

Assembly

is

independent of

NATO. Complimentary

to

NATO, the NAA
the FSU by granting

began an extensive program of outreach to Central and Eastern Europe and
addressing areas such as
of associate membership and funding for their participation in seminars
security.
democratization, civil-military reform, and broader issues of European
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transparency.

By increasing their understanding of the

challenges facing Central and Eastern Europe, NATO members
could also more efficiently plan programs for multilateral
or bilateral assistance.

All of these actions were designed

with the intention of enhancing the principles and norms of
the CSCE.

However,

as the Balkan crisis escalated in 1991-1992

Europe needed action beyond social activity if its

institutions were to have any direct capacity to deal with
violent conflict.

The immediate problem was a CSCE

decision-making procedure requiring that all decisions be
unanimous.

This procedural arrangement in the CSCE made it

a useless institution for conflict resolution as an

aggressor could use CSCE procedures to block any effective
Gathering at Prague in January 1992 the

action against it.

CSCE foreign ministers amended the consensus rule so that in

situations where there are clear, gross, and uncorrected

violations of CSCE commitments, a majority of member states
Consensus

could act in the absence of the state concerned.

would remain an institutional norm of the CSCE.
this new approach

-

called "consensus-minus-one"

However,
-

could

allow the CSCE to take political action against a member
state that was in violation of its principles.
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Thus

The ministers

also agreed to strengthen the Conflict Prevention Center by reinforcing and

increasing

role in fact-finding missions, the monitoring of disputes,

its

and implementation and

thus sent an observer mission to Nagorno-

amis control agreements. The CSCE
and
Other such missions undertaken since 1992 include fact-finding, rapporteur
Chechnya.
and
Moldova,
Estonia,
Georgia,
monitoring in Kosovo, Sandjak, Vojvodina, Skopje,
verification of

Karabakh.
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Europe had taken a small step toward rationalizing the

institutional capacity to promote security.

Meeting in Helsinki in July 1992, CSCE foreign
ministers called for the continued strengthening of orderly
procedures for conflict prevention and crisis management by
seeking the support of other international institutions and
organizations,

the strengthening of the chairman- in-off ice

the establishment of a high commissioner for national

minorities, and the creation of a Forum for Security

Cooperation (FSC) to meet regularly in Vienna.

The

ministers also established procedures for crisis prevention
and management to include

:

early warning mechanisms

(focusing on human rights and the development of democratic

institutions)

;

political management (drawing attention to

non-violent measures available for lowering tensions);
specific instruments (such as fact finding missions)
formal peacekeeping operations.
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;

and

Further steps to build

CSCE institutions were made by the CSCE foreign ministers

meeting in Stockholm in December 1992 where they established
a

commission of Conciliation and Court of Arbitration to

examine and rule on disputes.

The ministers also created an

Office of CSCE Secretary General.

However, despite these

institutional advancements which were encouraged by NATO,
the CSCE did not have the joint planning,

"Helsinki

training,

Document 1992: The Challenges of Change." Available from

in Prague.

156

the

and

CSCE

Secretariat

infrastructure that would be needed to assume responsibility
for peacekeeping even if a consensus could be attained among
the 50-plus members.

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council

(NACC)

Hoping to promote a more direct relationship between
NATO and the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, NATO

created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) at the
Rome Summit in November 1991.

An American initiative, the

NACC was a new "institutional relationship of consultation
and cooperation on political and security issues" open to
all of the former (and newly independent) members of the

Warsaw Pact.
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The NACC states consult on issues including

national defense planning;

principles and key aspects of

force and command structures;

strategy;

military

democratic concepts of civil -military relations;

exercises;

civil/military coordination of air traffic management;

and

the conversion of defense production to civilian purposes.

272

As one senior NATO official suggested, the objective of
the NACC was to promote extended security based on

assessments of self-interest by the NATO members:

Rome

Declaration on Peace and Cooperation.

November 1991.

NATO

Office of Information

and Press.
Information
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of
to include
grew
NACC
and Press, 1995) 44-45. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
on
information
sharing
38 members. The NACC also serves as a technological forum for
scientific

NATO

and environmental issues and

among

the

NACC

to facilitate in the dissemination

countries.
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of information about

What we are after is our own security.
In
the kind of situation in which we live now, the
security of any state in Europe is linked to the
security of all other states.
If there is chaos
throughout Europe, if there are local conflicts,
if there is ethnic strife, our own security in the
long run will suffer.
So this is one of those
circumstances where it (security) is not a zero
sum game.
Increased security for one does not
mean less security for another.
Increased
security for us means increased security for the
rest of Europe.
It is in that spirit that the
North Atlantic Cooperation Council was set up.

NATO officials stressed that the NACC was a consultative

forum and not a decision-making body.

the NACC

Rather,

would permit formal and informal exchanges of views and
promote a long-term understanding of national and

multilateral security concerns.

the NACC

Nevertheless,

alone was insufficient to meet the security demands of
The NACC had a limited budget

Central and Eastern Europe.

(1.5 million dollars in 1993),

doctrine,

no secretariat,

no formal

and no security guarantee.

The most important function of the NACC was to provide
a

multilateral forum for discussion and sharing of

information on peacekeeping.

The NACC partners created an

Ad Hoc Committee on Peacekeeping, which released an
extensive report on NATO /NACC peacekeeping planning in June
1993.
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The group sponsored a number of high level seminars

focusing on the peacekeeping experiences of individual

Comments of a

senior

NATO official

visiting Riga. Latvia, April 1992.

UN

under the authority of the
report stressed that peacekeeping can be carried out only
or CSCE defining
the
with
Security Council, or of the CSCE; on a case-by-case basis;
requires a
peacekeeping
that
and
peacekeeping operations, including command relationships;

The

UN

Committee on
and a precise mandate. Report of the NACC Ad Hoc
Press.
Peacekeeping, June 1993. NATO Office of Information and

clear political objective
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participants and on cooperation with other relevant
institutions.

They also received detailed studies from

NATO's military authorities addressing technical issues of

peacekeeping. 275

In sharing military experience in the NACC,

military- to-military contacts between NATO and the former

Warsaw Pact nations grew considerably to the extent that

military relations out-paced political cooperation.

Due to

French opposition, there was no (ministers of) defense

component to the NACC.

Thus,

one of the most important

aspects of democratization, that of civilian control over
the military, was missing from the NACC experience. 276

Because it is a multilateral forum with no decision-

making structures, a participating state could create major
obstacles within the working agenda of the NACC thereby

limiting its potential

.

This became clear after a NACC

meeting in Istanbul, Turkey on 10 June 1994.

The Russian

delegation haggled over the final communique (forcing the
NACC to drop any language related to NATO enlargement) and
CFE deployment levels for five hours causing an embarrassing

This included detailed presentations addressing assets and capabilities required for the conduct of

peacekeeping operations; the possibility and

utility

of developing a database of available

resources; and the requirement for forces, procedures, and equipment to facilitate cooperation
theoretical
in peacekeeping operations. NATO also developed a paper for the NACC covering
standard
procedures,
and
standards
control
and
command
relating
to
issues
and generic planning

operating procedures, and rules of engagement for peacekeeping operations. The NACC also
technical issues
created its own Ad Hoc Technical Sub-Group to facilitate the development of
affecting peacekeeping missions
S.

Nelson Drew,

NATO

from Berlin

to Bosnia:

Trans- Atlantic Se curity in Transition

remaining
(Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 1995) 25-26. Absent France, the
body
non-decision-making
NATO countries created a Group of Defense Ministers which is a
NATO
to
countries
European
that channels requests for assistance from Central and East

member

nations most willing or capable to deal with a particular problem.
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delay in the release of the NACC Final Communique.

A senior

NATO diplomat described Russia's behavior in the NACC as

a

"pretty bloody affair... an absolutely Soviet exercise, a

disastrous performance by the Russians and it does not augur
well." 277

Another NATO official openly pondered whether

there could ever be another working NACC meeting if this was
the way the Russians would behave in the future.

the Istanbul meeting,

278

After

the NACC stopped issuing a formal

communique and instead opted for a chairman's summary

-

thus

weakening the importance of the NACC for some non-NATO
participants who had seen it as a way to move closer to
formal NATO activities leading toward membership.

The Partnership for Peace (PFP)

By 1993 several Central and Eastern European states
felt that only full membership in NATO would resolve their
(real or perceived)

security dilemmas;

promote stability to

attract economic investment and membership in the EU;

and

provide reassurance for democratic and market reformers
This view was promoted by three senior American analysts at
the RAND Corporation who circulated a draft paper in the

summer of 1993 calling for NATO to reassess its mission to
focus on internal and external restructuring

-

including a

gradual enlargement of NATO membership to include Hungary,

277
.

278

Reuters.

10 June 1994.

Interview with a senior

NATO

official. Brussels,
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Belgium, June 1994.

Poland,

the Czech Republic and possibly Slovakia.

to do so would make NATO:
in splendid armor,

Failure

"...like the aging knight replete

impressive to admire until someone one

day lifts the visor to discover it is a hollow shell.
will go out of area or out of business." 279

NATO

Arguing that the

challenge in Europe was between forces of integration and
forces of disintegration,

the authors felt that the Alliance

could encourage the former by shifting its focus to Article
4

of the NATO treaty to include issues such as peacekeeping,

search and rescue, and humanitarian/disaster relief.

There was a sense of urgency for the US to address the

question of NATO enlargement.

Germany had begun quietly but

assertively pushing to expand NATO to stabilize its Eastern
border and provide economic stability and reassurance for
the growing free-markets in the region.

Germany suggested

Associate Membership in NATO for some Central and East
Defense Minister Volker Ruehe (in

European countries.
particular)

argued that Associate Membership could speed

full entry into NATO for the Visegrad countries.

In theory,

Germany might act

if NATO did not engage the East,

unilaterally to provide security guarantees to its Eastern
neighbors

-

something that both Russia and the West would

view as provocative.

The

RAND analysts were

Kemp, "NATO: n„

r

»f

Ron Asmus, Richard

Ar^

Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee.

See Frederick

The Wall Street Journal. 11 August 1993. A
Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kuglar, and F.

nr n,.f nf Rainess

"

formal version of the RAND paper appeared in
(September/October 1993) 28Stephen Larrabee, "Building a New NATO", Foreign Affairs 4
40.
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Senior officials in the US State Department and

National Security Council agreed that NATO enlargement could
be used as a tool to encourage and promote political and

economic reform to the East.

However,

the pace and scope of

enlargement was hotly debated with serious inter-agency

differences emerging. 280

Supporters advocated a policy of

gradual enlargement to show Europe that the US was committed
to its security,

East,

that Germany was not driving the Alliance

and that NATO was relevant after the Cold War.

Enlargement would also satisfy a number of American ethnic
groups of Central and East European origin lobbying for
their home country's inclusion in NATO.

This domestic

appeal might give members of Congress, who were becoming

increasingly skeptical of funding a US role in Europe, with
new justification for supporting NATO.

Thus a prolonged

debate over NATO enlargement would shift discussion from

whether NATO was needed after the Cold War, to whether or
not it should expand.

A major initiative toward NATO would

also help President Clinton establish his foreign policy

credentials

National Security Advisor

W.

Anthony Lake and key State

Department figures (including Ambassador to Germany Richard
Holbrooke and the US negotiator at the Helsinki CSCE
conference John Kornblum) were convinced of the
institutional value of using enlargement to encourage

Interview with a former senior Administration
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official,

Washington D.C., March 1996.

reform.

A gradual approach to NATO enlargement fit well

into the new US policy of "enlargement and engagement"

formulated by Lake and his National Security Council staff.
This approach stressed the importance of international

institutions where the US could best direct policy
NATO.

such as

-

The goal was to expand the number of democratic

nations in the world while engaging troubled areas through

partnership where possible and with power if necessary. 281
Nevertheless, as support within the Clinton Administration
for NATO enlargement grew,

senior officials in the

Department of Defense, and especially in the Joint Chiefs of
Staff,

expressed concerns about taking on substantial new

military commitments while downsizing US capabilities.

Such

concerns combined with caution signals from Russian experts
in the Department of State to produce an inter-agency

compromise
On

the Partnership for Peace.

-
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October NATO Secretary General Worner met with

6

President Clinton and his top foreign policy advisors in

See United States Security Strategy for Europe and

NATO

(Washington, D.C.:

Department of

Defense. Office of International Security Affairs, June 1995).
NATO there was shared sentiment that some sort of compromise was necessary

Within

beyond

the

NACC

NATO

but stop short of membership as there was no consensus in
senior
official told The Washington Post on 31 August:

NATO

enlargement.

As

the prevailing

wisdom

a

is

out of discussion

While

the

in

PFP was

SHAPE

,

1

go

for

"Right now,

risky and selfOpening Pact to E.
September 1993, A25. The name Partnership for Peace grew

that bringing in

defeating for the Alliance as a whole."

Europe/ The Washington Post

to

Poland or any other

William Drozdiak,

about giving the

NACC

state

would be

"NATO

Balks

at

a "Partnership for Peacekeeping" function.

the result of considerable inter-agency review, the primary impetus

was

policy office in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. If any one
European and
Kruzel, who
individual can be most closely identified with the initiative it was Dr. Joseph

NATO

headed

that office as

accompanying

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

staff.
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for

Europe and

NATO,

and his

the

Washington DC and received a briefing on the US plans for
partnership with Central and Eastern Europe.

The stated

intention was to use perspective toward NATO membership to

maintain momentum for reform in Central and Eastern Europe
while buying the Alliance time.

NATO partnerships would be

open to all NACC/CSCE countries and they would gain all of
the institutional benefits of NATO

guarantee.

-

except a security

Practical security cooperation could be attained

through training and exercises in preparation for joint

peacekeeping operations.

83

At a meeting of NATO defense ministers on 20-21 October
in Travemunde, Germany an informal agreement was reached

that new members would only be admitted in the long term and
the PFP was endorsed as an alternative.

Reflecting concerns

in the Alliance that premature discussion of NATO

enlargement would isolate Russia and perhaps hinder reform
in Moscow,

NATO Secretary General Worner affirmed that the:

"Western Alliance would consider the legitimate concerns of
Russia" and that "we do not want to isolate Moscow."
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These comments reflected an informal response to a letter
sent by Russian President Boris Yeltsin on 15 September to

NATO Headquarters and to the major NATO countries outlining
strong Russian opposition to NATO enlargement.

Yeltsin

indicated that enlargement would violate the 2-plus-4

Interview with a senior

Comments

NATO Official, October 1993.
NATO Secretary General Manfred

to the Press by

Office of Information and Press.
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Worner, 21 October 1993.

NATO

arrangement for German unification.

As an alternative,

Yeltsin proposed a NATO-Russian security guarantee for
Eastern Europe
In a speech to the Atlantic Council of the United

States on

3

December 1993 US Secretary of Defense Les Aspin

identified five key benefits of the PFP
First, it does not redivide
Europe ... Partnership for Peace gives all nations
the same chance to take part, but makes the
results dependent on the effort of each partner.
Second, Partnership for Peace sets up the right
incentives.
In the old Cold War world, NATO was
an alliance created in response to an external
threat.
In the new, post-Cold War world NATO can
be an alliance based on shared values of democracy
and the free market
Partnership for Peace
rewards those who move in that direction. Third,
Partnership for Peace requires that partners make
It doesn't just ask what
a real contribution.
NATO can do for its new partners, it asks what the
new partners can do for NATO. .Fourth, it keeps
NATO at the center of European security concerns
and thereby keeps American involvement at the
Finally, it puts the question
center of Europe.
of NATO membership for the partners where it
belongs, at the^end of the process, rather than at
the beginning.
.

.

The PFP would, according to Aspin, allow those partners

which take full advantage of the program to "pick up NATO's
standard operating procedures, habits of cooperation, and
routines of consultation."

28 6

Personally briefed on the PFP by US Secretary of State

Warren Christopher, Russian President Boris Yeltsin
described the plan as "brilliant".

Les Aspin, "Partnership for Peace:

Les Aspin
3

to

Remarks

Central and East

as Prepared for Delivery

by Secretary of Defense

Hotel, Washington D.C
the Atlantic Council of the United States," J.W. Marriott

December 1993.

Aspin "Partnership for Peace..."

For

official discussion

of the objectives behind the

PFP

of North Atlantic Security," in
Joe Kruzel, "Partnership for Peace and the Transformation

Papacosma and Heiss 339-346.
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see

European countries were not as thrilled but a promise to
keep open the door to NATO via the PFP was intended to

provided reassurance that they might ultimately attain
Article

membership in the Alliance.

5

Despite promises from

US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian

Affairs Stephen Oxman on 26 October that "we do not want to
be perceived or in any way treat others as second-class

citizens",

some critics felt that PFP did exactly this.

Polish officials were especially animated in their rhetoric
-

disturbed by what they perceived as a "Yalta II" in the

PFP.

US Senator Richard Lugar called PFP a "band-aid

offered in place of corrective surgery."
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The PFP was approved by the NATO heads of state meeting
in Brussels on 10-11 January 1994 who stated that:

"We

expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to

democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary
taking into account political and security

process,

developments in the whole of Europe."
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The NATO leaders

invited NACC and other CSCE countries that are able and

willing to join the PFP which:

"...will play an important

role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of

Senator Richard G. Lugar,

Speech

PFP

to

The

'Near Abroad':

Atlantic Council of the United States

as a bureaucratic half-step that

defacto veto over

NATO's

future and encourage neo-imperial tendencies in

Partnership for Peace Invitation.
the

New Membership, New Missions:
on 9 December 1993. " Lugar criticized the
had a "Russia-first" orientation that would give Moscow a

"NATO's

Issued by the Heads of

Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO
NATO Office of Information and Press.

January 1994.
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Moscow.

and Government participating
Headquarters, Brussels on 10-1

State

in

NATO."

The NATO countries would establish 16-plus-l

consultations with permanent offices at NATO Headquarters
and at a SHAPE Planning Cell in Mons. 290

16-plus-l refers to

the multilateral relationship of the 16 NATO members with

each individual Partner country. 291

Consultation would

include the right to call a 16-plus-l PFP meeting "...if
that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial

integrity, political independence, or security." 292

heads of state added that

:

The

"At a pace and scope determined

by the capacity and desire of the individual participating
states,

we will work in concrete ways towards transparency

in defense budgeting,

promoting democratic control of

defense ministries, joint planning, joint military
exercises,

and creating an ability to operate with NATO

forces in such fields as peacekeeping,

search and rescue and

humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed."

293

NATO did not have a strong history of effective
institutional efforts in the new missions that it was

advancing vis-a-vis the PFP.

However, given the demand from

some Central and Eastern European countries for direct

cooperation with NATO, the Alliance was in a strong position
to use its leverage to link cooperation and consultation

289

Partnership for Peace Invitation.

290'

The

actual Planning Cell

SHAPE
291

The

located near the Allied

Command Europe

Headquarters outside the

is

located near the Allied

Command Europe

Headquarters outside the

compound.

actual Planning Cell

SHAPE
292

is

compound.

Partnership for Peace Invitation.

293*

Partnership for Peace Invitation.
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with certain behavior from the states that joined the PFP

Therefore at the Brussels meeting, NATO approved

a

uniform

document for each country to sign when joining the program.

Participation was contingent upon adherence by the partner
to the "...protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms

and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and

peace through democracy (which) are shared values
fundamental to the Partnership." 294

The PFP required NATO

partners to cooperate with the Alliance in pursuing the
following objectives:

Facilitation of transparency in national
defense planning and budgeting processes

1

2

.

3

.

Ensuring 9tdemocratic control of defense
forces

Maintenance of the capability and readiness to
contribute, subject to constitutional
considerations, to operations under the
authority of the UN and/or the responsibility
of the CSCE.

4.

The development of cooperative military
relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint
planning, training, and exercises in order to
strengthen their ability to undertake missions
in the fields of peacekeeping, search and
rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as
may subsequently be agreed.

5.

The development, over the longer term, of
forces that are better able to operate with
those of the members of the North Atlantic
Alliance

Partnership for Peace

This point

was

left

armed forces had

Framework Document.
NATO as it was unclear

vague by

to be maintained.

Partnership for Peace

Framework Document.
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to

whose

satisfaction democratic control of

Each partner would submit an Individual Partnership Program
(IPP)

identifying ways to work with the Alliance and what

assets it might contribute to joint planning for

peacekeeping and other forms of 16-plus-l (or multilateral)
activity.

Partner countries were required to list the steps

that have been,

or will be undertaken to promote

transparency in the national defense planning and budgeting
processes, and to ensure democratic control of the armed
forces.

Operationally,

of long-range plans,

the program required an indication

force development goals,

and other

planning factors that could affect a Partner's future
involvement in the Partnership (such as changes in the
structure of the armed forces or the setting up of special

peacekeeping units)

.

Partners were required to fund their

own PFP activities and share the full burdens of mounting

exercises in which they take part.

Describing the PFP, a senior advisor to Polish
President Lech Walesa commented to the press that:

"We've

gone from Chamberlain's umbrella to Clinton's saxophone."

Nevertheless, the PFP grew to include 27 partnerships

-

29

none

of which were hampered by the size constraints of the NACC

or CSCE.
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Those countries who chose to integrate closely

with NATO planning were invited to join the PFP Planning and

United Press International. 12 January 1994.

This activity involved hundreds of

PFP

or "in the spirit of

has included major peacekeeping exercises
-

-

largely

PFP"

modeled

related

NATO

after hypothetical

programs.

PFP

Balkan scenarios

Czech Republic, and
held in Poland, the Netherlands, the North Sea, the Baltic, the US, the

Hungary

(for example).
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Review Process (PARP) where they can (every two years)
exchange data on their defense plans and budgets, and

identify areas in which they agree to work toward improving

interoperability between their military forces and those of
NATO in the fields of peacekeeping,

search and rescue, and

humanitarian operations (to include areas as specific as
communications procedures and refuelling capabilities)

299

To facilitate this restricted opening of NATO to Partners,

NATO committees were expanded in their scope to include
direct activities in support of the NACC and the PFP
The PFP was a creative compromise balancing between

reassurance of Russia and of the smaller democracies in
Central and Eastern Europe.

PFP helps prepare interested

Partners for NATO membership

-

thus lowering the costs of

restructuring their militaries and integrating their forces
into NATO military planning.

Should the political and

military situation in Russia and the former Soviet Union
change or other unforeseen events threaten the stability of

Central and Eastern Europe, NATO could expand quickly since
the states will have had a period of working toward NATO

standards via the PFP.

Several months after the

announcement of the PFP, a senior US official asserted that
"...should the situation deteriorate in the East and Russia
and it became necessary at some step to draw the line

between Eastern and Western ... the Partnership for Peace

By 1996

15

PFP

countries had joined the

PARP.
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would put us in a better position to do that." 300
that worst case analysis,

Absent

the PFP allowed for considerable

flexibility in direct and multilateral relationships among
potential partners

-

including Russia.

The PFP was not, however, without problems and

contradictions.

Because the PFP was seen by many Central

and East European countries as a direct path into NATO

,

it

unintentionally encouraged competition between some Partners
racing to meet unspecified NATO criteria at the expense of

bilateral or multilateral settlement of regional disputes.
Also,

by deferring enlargement, the PFP had the potential to

undermine reform governments in Central and Eastern Europe
who had made full NATO membership their primary foreign

policy goal.
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the PFP tends to emphasize

Like the NACC,

military- to-military cooperation with the potential to

undermine civil -military reform efforts in Central and
Eastern Europe.

302

Additionally, the trend in some PFP

countries has been to stress quantity over quality in their
IPP.

Of the 232 PFP programs proposed by Hungary in its

1995 IPP there were only

4

White House Information Service 27
,

The US hoped

to

show

that promoted democratic control

May

1994.

PFP would have visible
PFP support programs.

that participation in

million dollars for Fiscal Year 1996 for

gains by providing 100

Asse ssment 1995: U.S. Security Challenges in
compensate
Transition (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1995) 44. To
civilian oversight of
links
which
(PMSC)
Committee
Steering
Military
Political
NATO created a
PFP programs and their military implementation. Under the PMSC (Chaired by the Deputy
any ministry that is most
Secretary General of NATO) countries can send representatives from
of partners
number
a
among
or
format
16-plus-l
the
relevant to the issue being raised in
Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic

coordinating activities.
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of the armed forces.

These were limited to three

information exchanges among experts and one conference. 303
The PFP process also failed to promote transparency because

Partners have been reluctant to publish their IPPs with only

Hungary volunteering.

In a worst case,

the PFP had the

appearance of security enhancement without increasing

deterrence capacity for the Partner states.

A participant

could participate in peacekeeping planning, but it was not
clear how preparation for peacekeeping was relevant to the

capability of, for example, the Baltic states to defend
their borders against an attack.

Interlocking Institutions:

A False Promise of Peace

By 1994 the elements of a new European security

architecture were in place
CSCE,

-

NATO,

the NACC,

the PFP,

and to a lesser extent the EU and the WEU.

the

The

missing ingredient was peace in the former Yugoslavia.

In

1992 NATO embarked on a process of building peacekeeping

capabilities via interlocking institutions for collective

diplomacy to signal threats toward the warring parties.
practice, however,

In

there was no consensus on how and when to

conduct peacekeeping operations.

What became a debate over

institutional architecture for peacekeeping obscured,

Jeffrey

1995)

Forum 44 (September
Simon, "Partnership for Peace: Guaranteeing Success," Strategic

3.
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clouded,

and inhibited the attainment of peace and security

in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1991-1995.

Institutions and Peacekeeping in post-Cold War Europe
At a June 1992 meeting of NATO foreign ministers in
Oslo,

Norway,

the US announced that it would contribute

manpower to a NATO and CSCE peacekeeping force in the former
Yugoslav republics. 304

Addressing the NAC, US Deputy

Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger stated that:

"The

United States is prepared to make essential contributions,
such as lift and logistics,

to peacekeeping operations ... We

also do not exclude providing ground contingents on the same

basis as other nations." 305
concurred,

While the German delegation

the United Kingdom and France were hesitant.

Britain was especially distressed that NATO could become
"Europe's policeman."

In a speech to the Diplomatic and

Commonwealth Writers' Association prior to the meeting,
British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd stated that "neither
marines nor parachutists nor new-fashioned Blue Helmets can
fight their way to peace among peoples mingled together

village by village."

Yet Hurd conceded that:

"NATO must

make its resources available when the international

At the Prague

CSCE

foreign minsters meeting in January 1992 the

German

delegation (with

proposed
strong support from Italy, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, and Poland)
the US, Britain and
from
opposition
of
Because
forces.
peacekeeping
CSCE
standing
creating
France, the proposal was tabled.

However,

the idea

Minister Hans van den Broek who suggested

CSCE

that

was kept

NATO

alive

by the Dutch Foreign

should have a peacekeeping role under

auspices.

USNATO

Wireless File:

Security Issues Digest 1088:5 (June 1992).
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community has decided that action needs to be taken." 306
France,

For

there was an ongoing concern that any overture from

NATO to the CSCE would increase the role of the US in
Europe.

Therefore France (joined by Belgium and Spain)

insisted that any peacekeeping request be made to individual

governments and not to NATO as an organization.
Because of the differing perspectives among key NATO
members toward peacekeeping, the Oslo meeting was mostly
symbolic.

However,

a

political framework had been

established for institutional adaptation.

The foreign

ministers stated that
The Alliance has the capacity to contribute
to effective actions by the CSCE in line with its
new and increased responsibilities for crisis
management and the peaceful settlement of
disputes.
In this regard, we are prepared to
support on a case-by-case basis in accordance with
our own procedures, peacekeeping activities under
the responsibility of the CSCE, including by
making avaj^able Alliance resources and

expertise
NATO members were concerned not to create an automatic

mechanism for NATO peacekeeping and thus the case-by-case
language.

the offer included a requirement that NATO

Also,

forces could be made available in response to an official

CSCE request addressed to NATO (where consensus was required
for a response)

and to its individual member states.

This

procedural mechanism turned the relationship into
"

A consensus would have to

interblocking" institutions.

306
.

Michael Evans,

.

Oslo Summit:

"UK

Reluctant to Use Troops in Bosnia." The Times

.

(London)

3

June 1992,

11.

307

Final

Communique.

NATO

Office of Information and Press, 10 June 1992.
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exist in NATO for CSCE peacekeeping.

Should a NATO member

(all of whom had overlapping membership in the CSCE)

peacekeeping,

oppose

it could discourage or veto an initial CSCE

request and still deflect blame for inaction onto the

institution
Nevertheless, NATO Secretary General Manfred Worner

suggested that peacekeeping could cover "not only transport,
other infrastructure facilities, and supplies of military
equipment, but also troops if necessary." 308

While

proclaiming the agreement historic, NATO stressed that

it

did not indicate a commitment to intervene in the Balkan
conflict.

Thus,

the Oslo statement served two essentially

The first was a veiled threat to the

symbolic roles.

warring parties in the former Yugoslavia that mechanisms for
the possible use of force were being incorporated by NATO

and the CSCE.

The second provided continued impetus to the

CSCE for its scheduled review conference the following month
in Helsinki.

At Helsinki the CSCE foreign ministers welcomed the

NATO initiative, but failed to act.

309

The false promise of

NATO/CSCE peacekeeping in the Balkan crisis therefore

prompted NATO to look to the UN for an out-of-area mandate

See Robert Mauthner,

"NATO

Agrees

to

Peacekeeping Role in Europe." The Financial Times

(UK)

5 June 1992, 4.
Meeting on the sidelines of

the

summit

NATO

and

patrol exercises in the Adriatic Sea to enforce the

Yugoslav republics.

WEU members did agree to begin joint naval

UN arms embargo against

the former

the
This was, however, a largely symbolic action as the major violations of

embargo were occurring over

land.
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in spite of the fact that its own members were largely

responsible for blocking action in the CSCE.

The CSCE did

identify itself as a regional organization under Article
VIII of the UN Charter (at Helsinki) and the UN was quick to
call on the CSCE for peacekeeping assistance in Bosnia-

Herzegovina.

A copy of a UN request for CSCE assistance was

forwarded to NATO Headquarters prompting a divisive internal
debate in the Alliance as to how to respond to these

overlapping institutional requests.

Some NATO members felt

that to get a mandate for planning out-of-area activities,
it was necessary to receive a formal request from the CSCE.

However,

others argued that since the CSCE was now a

regional organization under the UN, the request to the CSCE
was sufficient to justify NATO planning.

310

As a result,

ongoing debates within and among institutions inhibited
international efforts to bring peace to the Balkans.

The Rise and Fall of the United Nations in the Balkans

Absent a consensus among its members for direct NATO
involvement in the Balkans, UN peacekeeping became the only

alternative for arranging international efforts to promote
peace.

At the December 1992 NAC ministerial, NATO signaled

that it was prepared to undertake peacekeeping operations

under the authority of the UN Security Council and to
"respond positively to initiatives that the UN Secretary

Drew

9-10.
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General might take to seek Alliance assistance in the

implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions." 311
However,

internal NATO disputes continued to block active

consideration of policy options toward attaining peace in
the Balkans.

becoming,
worst,

By early 1993,

at best,

interlocking institutions were

excuses for national inaction and, at

obstacles to ending the conflict.

In particular,

the

UN had imposed an arms embargo on all parties in the former

Yugoslavia in 1991.

Enforced by NATO (and the WEU)

,

the

embargo enhanced an imbalance of power favoring Serb forces
(which had inherited most of the military apparatus of the

Yugoslav National Army) allowing them to make territorial
gains and carry out a policy of ethnic cleansing.

Lifting

the arms embargo became politically impossible once the UN

had deployed peacekeepers on the ground in 1992 for

contributing states worried that their troops would get
caught up in increased fighting if more weapons flowed into
the region.

This new procedural arrangement did mean that NATO

could now support UN humanitarian efforts and enforcement of
a

no-fly zone over the region.

By 1994 the NATO mission in

Bosnia-Herzegovina included protection of heavy weapons
•

exclusion zones and safe havens for civilian populations.

Communique
1992.

Issued by the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 17

NATO

312

December

Office of Information and Press.

NATO see Kofi Annan, "UN
41:5 (October 1993) 3Peacekeeping Operations and Cooperation with NATO," NATO Review
Yugoslavia: Partners
Former
O
in
NAT
7
Also see Dirk A. Leurdijk, The United Nations and
For an

official

UN

perspective on the relationship with
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Operationally, the institutional cultures of NATO and the UN

clashed thereby contributing further to the false promise of

interlocking institutions.

In response to the initial UN

request for assistance in Bosnia-Herzegovina NATO began

planning for military operations in the region.

Charged

with making estimates on how to support the provision of

humanitarian assistance to alleviate the Serb siege of
Sarajevo, NATO planners began with the assumption that since
a peaceful environment did not exist,

the UN request to

guarantee the delivery of aid in a hostile environment would
require up to 100,000 troops.

Because UN peacekeeping

planning assumed a peaceful environment before forces were
the UN had estimated needing only 2000-4000

deployed,

troops

313

Though the US was extremely reluctant to place its
forces on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

in 1993 NATO

military officials were instructed by the NAC to began
informal planning for a force of around 50,000 peacekeepers
-

of which 25,000 would be US personnel

-

that could be

deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina in the event that
settlement was reached.

activities such as:
of forces;

escorting,

NATO planning included peacekeeping

monitoring cease-fires and withdrawals

supervising disarmament and control of weapons;

controlling and protecting convoys;

in International

Cooperation (The Hague. Netherlands:

1994).

Drew

a peace

12.
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creating

Netherlands Atlantic Commission,

safe corridors;

creating and monitoring buffer zones;

providing logistical assistance;
munitions.
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and removing hazardous

However, working simultaneously in the UN and

NATO political bodies, and with troop commanders on the
ground,

France successfully blocked formal NATO

consideration of command and control arrangements by
insisting they remain in the UN and thereby effectively

blocking any immediate or substantial NATO role in promoting
peace in the region.
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By this point 141,000 people had

been killed and 3.5 million refugees had fled the conflict

-

all in spite of UN and EU negotiated cease-fires and the

deployment of some 24,281 UN peacekeepers on the ground.

A New Russian Assert iveness and a Return to the CSCE
Just as Europe and the US were bypassing it in Bosniathe CSCE re-entered the debate over security

Herzegovina,

institutions in autumn 1993

Russia promoted the CSCE as an

.

alternative to NATO's increasing role and to codify Russian
On

peacekeeping or peacemaking in the former Soviet Union.
30 November Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev asked

the CSCE to support

(especially financially) Russian

peacekeeping missions in the former Soviet Union and
suggested that the CSCE should take over the political

John Kriendler, "NATO's Changing Role

NATO

Review

is

Urging

March 1993,

A 1,1 6.

Michael R. Gordon, "U.S.

York Times

,

11

-

Opportunities and Constraints for Peacekeeping",

41:3 (June 1993) 15-22.

NATO

to Prepare
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Force for Duty in Bosnia," The

New

coordination of peacekeeping missions organized by the CIS,
NATO,

the NACC,

and the WEU.
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The Russian proposal placed

NATO members in the difficult position of balancing the
strong opposition of the three Baltic countries and Ukraine
to the Russian proposal;

the reality that NATO would not

assume a peacekeeping role in the former Soviet Union;

and

a desire not to alienate Russia over the expanding role of

NATO.

1

Central and East Europeans were especially

concerned that the Kozyrev proposals were part of a return
to traditional Russian nationalism or even neo- imperialism.

While Moscow's rhetoric out-paced Russian capabilities,

growing public support for extreme Russian nationalists in
the December 1993 parliamentary elections fueled this

concern

318

The CSCE foreign ministers did not endorse the Russian
proposal, but agreed to strengthen the CSCE as a pan-

European forum for cooperative security and political
In deference to

consultation on the basis of equality.
Russia,

"...to pursue the possibility of

they also agreed:

enhancing capabilities to apply CSCE crisis management

RFE/RL

Daily Reports

Estonia acknowledged
operations for the

1

.

that

CSCE

in

December 1993.
it

may be

some

necessary to allow Russia to undertake peacekeeping

parts of the former Soviet

was adamant

Union

in particular cases.

However,

that Russia should only be permitted to

Estonian Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste
stressed that under "no
strict conditions and only on a case-by-case basis. He
force." RFE/RL Daily
CSCE
the
be
to
mandate
circumstances should Russia be given a broad

do so under
Reports

.

30 November 1993.

Liberty

"Why Has Russian Foreign Policy Changed?" Radio Free Europe/ Radio
of the Russian
Research Report 6 May 1994 and Sean Kay, The Political Victory

Armed

Forces:

See Suzanne Crow,

.

Assessing the Impact in the

Information and Press,

NATODATA

New

Military Doctrine (Brussels:

Service. 1994).
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NATO

Office of

arrangements on a case-by-case basis to situations involving

third-party forces when such arrangements are determined to
be supportive of CSCE objectives.
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However, most NATO and

Central and East European countries had lost interest in the
CSCE.

Thus the challenge was to find a creative way to keep

Russia facing West short of granting too much authority to
the CSCE.

The solution would be found in another

institution

-

the PFP

Though President Boris Yeltsin welcomed the PFP, Russia
began using its participation in it to obstruct NATO
enlargement and restore Russian national pride.

When

Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev addressed NATO
defense ministers on 25 May 1994, he said that:

"...it

wouldn't be correct for Russia to set forth some specific
conditions for cooperation or trying to say that we want to

occupy a better place, a so-called warmer place under the
sun,

in the program.

"

However, Grachev was also clear that

Russia would request special privileges via an undefined
"active mechanism" for consultation with the West over

peacekeeping operations, strategic planning, and joint
exercises outside of the PFP.
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The NATO members agreed to negotiate a "special status"

with Russia but strove to avoid any perception that they
were granting Russia a sphere of influence in the East or a

CSCE

Ministerial Final

Indivisible,"

Reuters.

25

November

May

Communique, "CSCE and
1993.

CSCE

the

New

Secretariat in Prague,

1994.
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Europe

-

Our

Security in

The Czech Republic.

veto over NATO policy.

But at the 10 June NACC meeting,

NATO appeared to defer to Russian sensitivities to the point
of conferring a de facto veto for Russia within the

Alliance.

Kozyrev announced Russia's intention to join the

PFP but insisted on first negotiating a detailed and signed

cooperation program that would formalize a relationship

based on what Kozyrev called "no mutual vetoes or
surprises." 321

Kozyrev expected

a

formal piece of paper from

NATO signaling broad deference toward Russia to prove to

hard-liners in Moscow that NATO had given in to Russian
demands.

3

""

At a press conference in Moscow that afternoon

President Yeltsin said with regard to Russia's special
status that:

"NATO has agreed... it is necessary to sign

such a protocol

-

even if some bureaucrats reject that

protocol, we will sign it anyway."
In Brussels,

323

the NAC took up the prospects of

increasing dialogue with Russia.

After lengthy discussion

between NATO Assistant Secretary General Gebhardt von Moltke
and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaly Churkin, a deal
was announced on a framework for relations between Russia

and NATO.

Kozyrev traveled to Brussels on 22 June and

signed the PFP coupled with a joint NATO/Russia declaration.
The declaration stressed that both NATO and Russia have an

important role in European security and that cooperative

Reuters.

10 June 1994.

Interview with a
Reuters.

NATO

official, Brussels,

June 1994.

10 June 1994.
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relations of mutual respect and friendship between the

Alliance and Russia are a key element for security within
the entire CSCE area.

The NATO/Russia special relationship

was designed to promote dialogue and cooperation in areas

where Russia has a unique and important contribution to

commensurate with its size and role as a nuclear

make,

power,

through the establishment of an extensive IPP.

This

relationship would be based on the sharing of information on
issues regarding political - security related matters having a

European dimension;

political consultations, as

appropriate, on issues of common concern;

and cooperation

in a range of security- related areas including,

appropriate, peacekeeping.

324

as

NATO officials expressed

relief at the commitment by Russia to work with NATO which

could pave the way toward close military cooperation in
areas of shared interest

-

especially peacekeeping.

Toward Peace in the Balkans?
By 1995 several NATO operations were providing

operational support to enhance UN peacekeeping in the
Balkans.

Joint

325

Despite the hope that this institutional

NATO-Russia

Declaration, 22 June 1994.

NATO

Office of Information and Press.

Bosnia
This included operation "Provide Promise" which flew humanitarian assistance into
jointly
conducted
was
Guard"
"Sharp
(totalling several thousand sorties by 1995). Operation
"Deny
Operation
parties.
warring
to enforce the UN arms embargo against the
with the
region.
the
over
parties
warring
Flight" used NATO air power to deny military flights by the
ground forces placed
Operation "Able Sentry" was a UN mission including several hundred US
outside of its
war
of
the
spread
in Macedonia as a preventive "trip-wire" force to deter the

WEU

current boundaries.
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activity could end the war, nearly 250,000 had now died.

In

the fall of 1993 the US sought consensus among its NATO

allies for a more "robust" use of air power against

violators of UN resolutions to include targeting

transportation facilities, command and control sites,
weapons storage depots and other non-civilian stationary
targets.

326

European countries with troops on the ground

were reluctant to support this policy.

However, by spring

1995 NATO agreed on a more robust use of air power to

support a new cease-fire negotiated by former US President

Jimmy Carter.
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Responding to Serb violations of UN

resolutions in May, NATO bombed Serb ammunition depots and

brought forth the UN peacekeeper's worst nightmare:
forces took several hundred peacekeepers hostage

-

Serb
some of

whom were chained to likely NATO targets as human shields.
Shortly after the release of the UN soldiers, Croatia

launched successful attacks against Serb-held territory it
had lost in 1991 and Bosnian government forces massed near

Sarajevo preparing to break the Serb siege of this so-called
NATO was fundamentally split on its response

"safe haven".

This policy was publicly criticized by the

Yasushi Akashi.

He

NATO air strikes.
afraid, timid

UN

political representative

on

insisted that Serb attacks

Akashi publicly criticized

and tentative" and

UN

on

the ground in Croatia.

Safe Areas were not sufficient to call in

US policy as "somewhat reticent, somewhat
US should send ground forces to Bosnia.

insisted that the

These

comments thoroughly discredited Akashi with the US, NATO Headquarters, and the Bosnian
Muslims. US Ambassador to the UN Madeline Albright complained to Secretary General
Boutros-Boutros Ghali that Akashi was out of line and that international servants "should
remember where

their salaries are paid."

NATO also began

Associated Press.

planning for the possible deployment

in the event that they

might be withdrawn.
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2

May

1994.

of forces to evacuate

UN

peacekeepers

with the US quietly encouraging the Bosnian Muslims and the
Europeans attempting to maintain neutrality.

The essence of

the crisis was summarized by a senior French military

official on 30 June 1995 who stated that:

"If the Europeans

are on one side and the Americans on the other,

it would be

like an earthquake in the Atlantic alliance." 328

US

Secretary of State William Perry was even more blunt in his
assessment of NATO in the summer of 1995:

"Paralysed into

inaction, NATO seemed to be irrelevant in dealing with the

Bosnian crisis... It appeared to me that NATO was in the
process of unravelling." 329
In July Bosnian Serbs over-ran UN safe havens

and Zepa)
the UN.

(Gorazde

in Eastern Bosnia in blatant defiance of NATO and

330

The offensive borrowed heavily from Serb forces

occupying Muslim lands in Western Bosnia thus creating

a

power vacuum that allowed Muslim and Croatian forces to make
simultaneous gains in Western Bosnia and Southern Croatia.
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Recognizing this power shift on the ground, the US launched
a

major diplomatic initiative in July and August 1995 to

bring peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina and restore the

Reuters.

30 June 1995.

Reuters.

20 November 1996.

According

to

some

NATO officials, NATO

was turned town by
While Bosnia had been under a
the request

the

sought to launch air strikes to protect these

cities but

UN.

variety of cease-fires in 1994 and 1995, the

Muslim

forces had

of the UN arms
regrouped and rebuilt their forces with outside assistance attained via violations
to permit Iran
Administration
Clinton
the
by
decision
informal
embargo. This was aided by an
to export

arms

to the

Muslims.
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credibility of NATO. 3,2

US determination was heightened by

the death of three of its most capable and experienced

diplomats on the Mt

Igman road outside Sarajevo.'"

.

On 28

August Bosnian Serbs shelled Sarajevo killing 39 civilians.
NATO responded with Operation Deliberate Force in early
September.

This was a major NATO air operation with narrow

political objectives:

to end the shelling of Sarajevo,

to

open the airport and the roads around Sarajevo, for safe
transit,

to remove all Serb heavy weapons from a 12.5 mile

radius of Sarajevo and to deter attacks on other safe
The air power combined with Muslims and Croat

havens.

territorial gains to push the Bosnian Serbs toward

a

negotiated settlement that would retain Bosnia-Herzegovina
as a unitary state based on a 51-49% division favoring a US-

negotiated Muslim and Croat Federation.
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Under the tutelage of US Assistant Secretary of State
the warring parties

for Europe and Canada Richard Holbrooke,

On

25 July 1995

NATO

agreed to prepare for a

much more

assertive use of air

by the NAC to protect UN Safe Areas.
This included Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and

power should

a

political decision be taken

NATO

Policy Joseph

Kruzel, National Security Council official S. Nelson Drew, and Ambassador Robert Frasure.
Dr. Kruzel and Col. Drew were the brain-trust of US action not only in Bosnia but toward

PFP

NATO

the

Joint

NATO

as a whole. This was particularly true regarding
Task Forces (Drew) proposals of the January 1994

Domestic
the

US.

political calculations also contributed to the decision

(Kruzel) and the

Combined

summit.

by President Clinton

to

engage

Congress had been asserting considerable pressure on the Administration with

bipartisan support for a unilateral lifting of the arms

embargo against

the Bosnian Muslims.

The

knew
Administration argued that such "feel good" measures were endorsed by members who
and
NATO
split
bloodshed,
the
increase
that such a step, taken unilaterally, would probably
on
entering
while
peacekeepers
UN
raise the possibility of US troops being deployed to evacuate
Congress
Republican-led
the
to train and supply Bosnian Muslims. Nevertheless,
the

mound

Balkan policy and thus President Clinton's political future was linked
"Putting Bosnia on the
an ability to reassert his authority in foreign policy. See Sean Kay,
White House Lawn," European Brief 3:1 (October 1995) 51-52.

was now

directing

US
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to

met in Dayton, Ohio,

in October and reached an agreement on

a peace settlement for Bosnia-Herzegovina signed on 15

December 1995.

The political preconditions for peace were

not entirely due to NATO activity.

There had been dramatic

shifts in the balance of power on the ground and the

Yugoslav patrons of the Bosnian Serbs in Belgrade needed to
gain favor with the West to end devastating UN economic
sanctions.

However,

the accord and the peace it hoped to

preserve depended on NATO and its institutional planning
begun in 1993

.

Without a rapid deployment of strong and

credible peacekeeping forces the agreement would likely

unravel as adequate reassurance did not exist for the

warring parties in the absence of a credible peacekeeping
presence.

Rapid deployment was necessary to reassure the

Muslims and Croats who feared that the Bosnian Serbs might

negotiate a cease-fire only to regroup in the hope that the
Serb- led Yugoslavia would intervene and annex Serb territory
in Eastern Bosnia in the name of "Greater Serbia"

.

Such

Serb actions might prompt Croatia to annex Western Bosnia.
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Only NATO could meet these requirements because the plans
that the Alliance had undertaken since 1993 in the NACC,
PFP,

and NATO were quickly put into place through the Bosnia

Peace Implementation Force (IFOR)

335

1995 for Croatian President Fanjo Tudjman, the leadei
how he viewed Bosnia in 10
of the British Liberal Party Paddy Ashdown asked the Croatian
of the region where there
map
a
drew
years. Tudjman reportedly took his dinner napkin and
having divided the
Serbia
expanded
was no Bosnia at all - rather an expanded Croatia and an

At a London dinner reception earlier

in

territory.
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Without NATO the warring parties would not have been

sufficiently reassured of their protection while agreeing to
end hostilities.

A temporary international coalition might

have been attainable for peacekeeping.

However,

establishing such a force would have required consolidating
a

multinational force, infrastructure, and a new command and

control structure.

Because there was urgency to the

peacekeeping deployment, only NATO had the standing
integrated plans, command and control and infrastructure to
act quickly.

Under the framework of Operation Joint

Endeavor, NATO was able to deploy rapidly some 60,000 troops
to Bosnia-Herzegovina

-

of which about 1/3 were Americans.
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NATO troops were given a mandate by the UN Security Council
to use "all necessary force" to maintain the integrity of

its mission of peace implementation.

In late 1995,

NATO's

Crisis Management Organization (CMO) was activated to
This included elements

coordinate operation Joint Endeavor.
from operations,

intelligence,

logistics,

systems divisions,

and liaison elements coming together in one planning cell to

streamline and lower the transaction costs of this

The

specific military tasks of

IFOR

as

approved by the

NAC

were:

to

ensure self-defense and

freedom of movement; to supervise selective marking of boundaries and Zone of Separation
(ZOS) between the parties; to monitor and - if needed - enforce the withdrawal of forces to their
airspace over
respective territories, and the establishment of ZOS; to assume control of the
to
routes;
ground
key
over
traffic
Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the movement of military
establish Joint Military

Agreement; and

Commissions,

to assist with the

Fact Sheet (June 1996),

NATO

the Peace
to serve as the central bodies for all Parties to

withdrawal of

UN

forces not transferred to

Office of Information and Press.
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IFOR. IFOR

multilateral military action. 337

in so doing,

NATO

demonstrated that after four years of institutional
activity,

it had moved from adaptation in theory to practice

in terms of its missions.

NATO had become more flexible,

could field new and creative command structures, and at the
same time continue to facilitate the use of raw power when

necessary.

However, NATO had also shown that it could not

function in the absence of American leadership.

IFOR and the Partnership for Peace

The multilateral nature of IFOR, which brought together

military forces from thirty- three countries, was greatly
enhanced by the PFP.

Eager to show their willingness to

contribute to a NATO operation, and hopefully enhance their

prospects for membership in NATO, over a dozen PFP countries
joined IFOR.

8

The exercises that PFP countries had taken

with NATO paved the way for quick integration of contingents
from PFP countries totaling nearly 10,000 personnel. "
3

The

importance of this contribution was acknowledged by the NATO
foreign ministers meeting in Berlin in June 1996 who stated
that

Partnership for Peace has become a permanent
element of European security cooperation and has
337
.

See General George Joulwan,

"SHAPE

and IFOR: Adapting

to the

Needs of Tomorrow,"

NATO
.

Review 2 (March 1996) 6-9.
Poland,
Including Austria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland. Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,

.

Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Sweden and Ukraine.
For example, in October 1995 (just prior to IFOR deployment)

338

339

staff officers

from nine

NATO/PFP countries participated in operation Cooperative Light as a command post exercise
simulating the establishment of a buffer zone between two warring parties.
189

demonstrated its value in the current IFOR
operation.
We are particularly pleased that 12
Partners have joined us in this endeavor, which
has benefitted from the experience and
interoperability gained in the last two years from
the participation of Partner troop contributors in
joint PFP exercises and other PFP activities.
This first common experience in IFOR charts the
course for future security cooperation. We hope
to ensure that cooperative relationships developed
during the IFOR operation between Allies and
Partners con^nue in the future to enhance the
Partnership
Through IFOR the PFP countries gained operational experience
in the NATO command structure that could never be attained

through exercises and seminars alone.

For Hungary,

IFOR

meant a direct increase in its security as its territory was

used as a staging ground for US forces going in and out of
Bosnia-Herzegovina.

A former Warsaw Pact country now had a

More generally, PFP participation in

NATO base on its soil.

IFOR could only help those countries sharing the risks in

their quest for NATO membership.
The PFP also provided an institutional framework to

bring Russia into IFOR under a NATO command.

Russia had

been critical of NATO's Operation Deliberate Force

-

with

President Boris Yeltsin labeling the attack on Serbs

genocide and threatening to withdraw from the PFP if the air
attacks did not stop.

Eventually realizing that the US

initiative was bringing peace to the Bosnians, Russia co-

sponsored the Dayton talks and agreed to send 2000 troops to

Bosnia-Herzegovina under a NATO command with
General serving in the IFOR command at SHAPE.

Final

Communique of the North

Germany,

3

June 1996.

NATO

a

Russian

Operating

in
Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session Meeting

Office of Information and Press
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under NATO command and alongside American troops in the
Posevina Corridor (one of the most dangerous areas of
operation) would help show Moscow that NATO was not working

against Russia.

IFOR had become an inclusive model for

NATO-Russian cooperation. 341
IFOR would also strengthen the PFP process itself.

Military command and control problems are most likely to
increase proportionally to the amount of participants in

multinational operation.

However,

a

the movement toward

common procedures attained via the PFP had lowered this
probability.

Nevertheless,

some serious interoperability

and language barriers hindered the command and control of
PFP participants in IFOR.

Experiencing these problems in

action would feedback to the PFP countries who might then
compensate for them in their future military planning via
their IPP and PARP, resource allocation, and future budget
plans.

NATO could contribute by helping to identify areas

for further improvement in future exercises and training.

Peace without Security?
IFOR completed its major military tasks by the summer
of 1996.

Warring parties were successfully separated

thereby creating an environment in which the non-military
aspects of rebuilding could begin.

The Dayton Accords were

premised on the conclusion that a lasting peace would

Interview with a senior

US

official at the

Department of Defense, March 1996.
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require reintegration of

a

multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina

requiring reconciliation among the parties.

Thus freedom of

movement, expression, and association guaranteed through
free and fair elections was necessary.

This responsibility

fell on the Organization for Cooperation in Europe

the CSCE was renamed OSCE in December 1994)

High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

342

(OSCE

-

and on the UN
In addition to

organizing elections, the OSCE was responsible for arms
control and human rights guarantees in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 343

Successful implementation of the civilian aspects of
the Dayton accords would be essential for lasting security.

Thus IFOR was tasked to play a limited but important role in
this process by the NAC

.

Within its capabilities and

resources, and the limits imposed by carrying out its key

military tasks,
1

.

2

.

IFOR was mandated to:

help to create secure conditions for the
conduct by others of non-military tasks
associated with the Peace Agreement, including
free and fair elections,assist the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees and other international
organizations in their humanitarian missions
and assist the movement of these
assist in the observation and
organizations;
prevention of interference with the movement

See Carl Bildt, "Implementing the Civilian Tasks of the Bosnian Peace Agreement,"

NATO

Review
The Hague War Crimes Tribunal (established in February 1993) meeting in the Netherlands
would indict and prosecute war criminals, and other international agencies including the EU
would channel aid for economic reconstruction and provide administration in some cities (such
5 (1996) 3-6.

Reconstruction costs were estimated by the World Bank to cost up to 6 billion
Aid programs would be organized by the EU through a conference of donor countries.

as Mostar).
dollars.

Governments
By summer 1996 $1.8 billion had been pledged. William Drozdiak, "European
Respond with Relief," The Washington Post 22 November 1995, A22.
,
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of civilian populations,

refugees and

displaced persons, and respond appropriately
to deliberate violence to life and person;
3

assist in the monitoring of the clearance of
minefields and obstacles.

.

In carrying out its basic mission,

NATO indirectly

contributed to a number of non-military operations by

contributing over 400 Civil Affairs personnel to IFOR in
support of the Combined Joint Civil Military Cooperation
(CJCIMIC)

program which unites active and reserve civil

affairs officers from around the world.

Their specific role

was to identify needs and projects for rebuilding civil

infrastructure and institutions and to coordinate with
international organizations, non-governmental organizations
and humanitarian agencies to obtain necessary materials,

and manpower to meet these needs.

money,

345

NATO military and civilian representatives worked in

consultation with the World Bank and

a

variety of non-

governmental organizations to identify over 200 projects for
infrastructure reconstruction.
344
345'

IFOR
IFOR

346

IFOR also made use of

Fact Sheet (June 1996).
Fact Sheet

-

Civil Military Cooperation.

NATO

Office of Information and Press, 20

August 1996.
346

Infrastructure rebuilding

1996 there remained up

became

a substantial challenge to creating peace in Bosnia.

to six million land mines;

80 percent of power

By summer

generators were

of bridges destroyed; and telecommunications inoperative in
Bosnia-Herzegovina's health facilities,
large parts of the country. Additionally, 30 percent of
Per capita income is
50 percent of its schools and 60 percent of its housing have been damaged.
overwhelming
left an
$500, industrial output is 5 percent of its former level, and war has
bilateral creditors. In addition
and
banks
commercial
to
owed
mostly
arrears
and
external debt

damaged or out of

operation;

40%

There are some two
250,000 dead, 200,000 were wounded, about one fourth children.
one million outside the territory.
million displaced persons within Bosnia-Herzegovina and some
to

assistance. Central and federal
80 percent of Bosnia's population depends upon humanitarian
embryonic at best. Christine Walhch
ministries are weak and low level political institutions are
Leave," The Washington Quarterly
(World Bank), "Policy Forum: Bosnia - After the Troops

19:3

(Summer 1996)

82-83.
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NATO's Infrastructure Program to build bridges, repair
and provide staff for similar projects such as power,

roads,

natural gas, water, and telecommunications in carrying out
its deployment mission.

347

By March 1996 80 percent of

Bosnia's major roads were open for use
to freedom of movement.

348

-

a key contribution

Small but symbolic steps toward

reconciliation included IFOR assistance in transporting

87

school children on an educational field trip from Tuzla to

Zagreb and arranging for local schools to receive computers
as donations from private voluntary organizations

.

Computer

and public administration expertise was also made available
to the OSCE to help it prepare for the process of electoral

reconciliation
Most importantly, establishing a secure environment

leading to new elections would require apprehension of

indicted war criminals for trial in the Hague.

NATO was

willing to arrest such figures if they were to happen upon
them

-

but not to seek them out.

Not wishing to spark

confrontations, NATO commanders applied a strict

interpretation of this mandate.

Thus while NATO could

provide security as a rapidly deployed peacekeeping force to
help aid the voluntary separation of the warring parties,

347

nature such
For example, IFOR provided increased security presence when cargo of a strategic
over
transported
were
shafts
as electrical transformers and hydroelectric turbines and turbine

disputed territory.
348

it

Joint Press Conference of Secretary General and

Headquarters. 18 March 1996.

Supreme Allied Commander Europe

NATO Office of Information and Press.

at

NAIO

For example, IFOR

which leads to the primary gas
troops rebuilt the Sarajevo Airport access road and the road
facility outside Sarajevo.
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was not well suited for policing or long-term security

provision.

349

However,

the other institutions charged with

facilitating the civilian elements of long-term peace in

Bosnia-Herzegovina remained weak.

Thus on 15 November 1996

President Clinton announced what had been in the works for

months

-

that US and NATO forces would remain in Bosnia-

Herzegovina and in substantial numbers for an additional

18

months in a follow on Stabilization Force or SFOR.

Analysis
As realism predicts,

the effort to build interlocking

institutions failed to prevent or end war in the Balkans and
at times made matters worse.

Nevertheless, realism alone is

insufficient to explain the institutional activity that did
enhance reassurance in Central and Eastern Europe during

a

highly unstable period of European history and contributed
to peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina after 1995.

Institutional

planning and outreach to Central and Eastern Europe via the
PFP allowed NATO to move quickly into effective peacekeeping

via IFOR.

However, NATO's capacity to move Bosnia-

Herzegovina from peace to lasting security was extremely
limited
OSCE,

-

as was that of other institutions such as the UN,

and EU.

The

Most significantly,

serious nature of this institutional weakness

IFOR and SFOR

was underscored hy Bosnian President

Ali ja

who said that: "No one can expect us to legalize something that
ask us to accept the results of a war of conquest and
and
have been fighting against
Reuters. 14 August I!
genocide... As days go by our doubts and questions are multiplying."
Izetbegovic in August 1996
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demonstrated that NATO only worked when it was led by the US
in its traditional alliance functions.

Tasks

NATO formally identified four tasks it was to perform
after the Cold War:

promote stability, enhance and expand

consultation, deter aggression against member states, and to

maintain the general balance of power in Europe.

To this

NATO added linking institutional cooperation with free-

market and democratic reform in Central and Eastern Europe
and organizing and undertaking peacekeeping missions.

Additionally, NATO sought a contradictory goal of preventing
a

Russian veto over Alliance activity while building

a

special NATO-Russia relationship.

Organizational Capabilities

After the Cold War, NATO remained a highly formal
institution with low autonomy.

However,

its member states

increasingly gave NATO authority to socialize states from
the former Warsaw Pact into the West.

NATO expanded its

formal structures to give PFP participants access to NATO

officials and national delegations.
PFP process,

Through the NACC and

extensive opportunities were created for

military-to-military cooperation designed to increase
Partner security via training, expertise, and conditional

integration into NATO.

Nonetheless, as the Balkan

member
experience shows, when a real crisis emerged and
196

state interests diverged, NATO was ineffective.

Only after

the absence of action had threatened the institutional

credibility of NATO and

a

balance of power on the ground was

attained did the interests of its member states converge

sufficiently to bring peace to the Balkans.

When national

interests coalesced, NATO's institutional functions were

generally quite effective.

Principles, Norms, Rules, and Procedures

The desire to assist democrats in Central and Eastern

Europe via NATO's institutional activity was sincere.

The

NATO countries felt a strong moral obligation to help those
who endorsed principles of democracy and the peaceful

resolution of international and domestic disputes.

NATO

also sought to enhance norms of acceptable international

behavior by strengthening other institutions such as the
OSCE

.

Indeed, NATO's formal membership rules were

transformed from restricted to conditional to support these
objectives.

NATO decision-making procedures remained

fundamentally unchanged.

However, new NATO institutions,

the NACC and PFP, developed independent procedures of their

own addressing a range of direct and indirect NATO-related

activities

Capacity for Change
NATO's survival after the Cold War was dependent upon

capacity for change.

As an institution,
197

the evolution of

a

new tasks and institutional structures indicated a high

degree of change.

However, when the end of a war required

peacekeeping and NATO was put into formal military action
for the first time in its history,

it was only with strong

American leadership that it functioned.
ways,

Therefore in key

NATO had not adapted sufficiently to the changing

dynamics of European security.

Conclusion:

The Mixed Record of NATO Adaptation

The primary lesson of the early years of NATO's post-

Cold War adaptation was that the institution did not

function in the absence of US engagement.

The US placed a

high value on NATO but had no clear vital interests in

Bosnia-Herzegovina beyond containment of the conflict.
However, when NATO's inability to act began to undermine its

credibility and draw into question its very purpose, the US
intervened.

As President Clinton said addressing the US on

27 November 1995 on the NATO plans for peacekeeping:

"The

only force capable of getting this job done is NATO, the
powerful, military alliance of democracies that has

guaranteed our security for half

a

century now.

.

.And as

NATO's leader and the primary broker of the peace agreement
the United States must be an essential part of the

mission... If we're not there, NATO will not be there."

President Bill Clinton, Address to the Nation, 27
the Press Secretary.
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November

1995.

The White House,

3

"

Office

However,

Europe's security dependence on the US after the

Cold War would not be politically sustainable.

Keeping the

Americans in Europe would require Europeans to take more

responsibility for their own security

-

even though they had

performed so poorly in the Balkans prior to 1995.

Pressure

was also increasing on NATO from some PFP countries for

enlargement as a reward for participation in IFOR and as a
means of preventing a similar crisis from occurring in the
future.
a

Thus after Bosnia, European security would require

fundamentally new

-

and potentially conflicting

-

institutional processes of external enlargement and internal

restructuring

199

CHAPTER VI
NATO ENLARGEMENT:
SHAPING THE POST- COLD WAR EUROPEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Introduction and Overview

Chapter Six shows that the strategy of NATO enlargement
as adopted in January 1994 is primarily institutional in the

goals of rewarding political and economic reform in Central
and Eastern Europe.

However,

this well-intentioned

institutional strategy may actually decrease security in
Europe depending on the form that NATO enlargement takes.
This chapter traces the evolution of the NATO enlargement
policy,

surveys realist and institutional arguments for and

against enlargement, and outlines

a

course of action that

will allow enlargement to proceed in a way that increases

security in Europe.

Specifically,

it argues that NATO

enlargement primarily to build democracy and manage conflict
promotes a false promise.

NATO's Partnership for Peace and

other complementary institutions are the best means for

performing these tasks

.

The strongest argument for

enlarging NATO is to stabilize the countries on the eastern

German border to create a hedge, not against
threat, but between Germany and Russia.

a

Russian

However, NATO

enlargement is fraught with danger and the primary task of
NATO as an institution must be to adapt its institutional
form to ensure that no state views enlargement as decreasing
its security.
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NATO Enlargement:

Who.

Where. When,

and Why?

How,

The policy of NATO enlargement was approved by its

members at the January 1994 Brussels Summit.

Formally, NATO

enlargement (planned for April 1999) will be gradual,
transparent,

and contribute to a broad concept of European

security of which NATO is an important, but not sole,
element in a comprehensive security architecture.

351

While

this was a well - intended policy of stabilizing Central and

Eastern Europe and hedging against a renewed Russian threat,
it was not well implemented and at times seemed to cause

more problems than it solved.

NATO Enlargement and Russia:

Cooperation or Competition?

Russia has been steadfast in its opposition to NATO
enlargement.

President Boris Yeltsin has warned of the

flame of war spreading throughout Europe and his former

National Security Advisor Alexander Lebed once warned of

World War III if NATO enlarges.

352

Officials from the

Russian Ministry of Defense have signaled that Russia will

establish a new Warsaw Pact style defense alliance in the
FSU and may re-target nuclear weapons at new NATO members.

Pro-western Russian reformers are bewildered by the

Correspondence from a senior

US

State

Department

official. July 1995.

See Sean Kay,

Partnership
"American Strategies Towards the Enlargement of European Security Institutions:
Macmillan
(London:
Relationship
Transatlantic
The
or Cold Peace?," in Jarrod Wiener, ed..

Press, 1996) 42-65.

Atlantic

News 271

1

(20 April 1995).
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enlargement policy complaining that it feeds Russian
nationalism.

353

NATO has hoped to assuage Russia's concerns by claiming
that enlargement would be formally open to all interested

countries in the CSCE region
Privately,

-

including Russia.

354

few officials in NATO countries considered

Russian membership an option.

The requirements for

admission to NATO would be so high that if it qualified,
"Russia would be a very different place

democracy."

355

-

a true Western

Internal differences between the US and

Germany over how to approach Russia became public in
September 1994.

At a conference in Berlin, German Defense

Minister Volker Ruehe rejected Russian membership.

Ruehe

stated that it would "blow NATO apart, it would be like the

United Nations of Europe, it wouldn't work."

355

He added

that some former Warsaw Pact countries could join NATO

before the year 2000.

At the same meeting, US Secretary of

Defense William Perry indicated that he would not rule out

Russian membership in NATO but that it would not happen in
the foreseeable future.

353

For a survey of Russian views of

NATO enlargement

see Aleksandr Konovalov,

Audrey

This Concept Offers
Kortunov, and Sergey Oznobishchev, "The Bankruptcy of 'NATOmania':
Gazeta.
20 March 1996.
Nezavisimava
Positively New for Either Russia or the West."

Nothing
In

354

FBIS-SOV-96-086-S, 2 May 1996, 5-8.
to NATO membership open

Keeping the door

to Russia

was pushed strongest by

the

US and

Canada.
355

of Defense, November 994.
Interview with a senior official from the Office of the Secretary
number of Central and
high standards for membership would also likely exclude a
1

.

Setting

Eastern European
356
Reuters.

states.

9 September 1994.
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Wanting NATO to speak as one voice, the Clinton

Administration formulated

a

dual-track strategy in the

autumn of 1994 to accelerate an internal NATO dialogue over

enlargement while accommodating Russian concerns by

strengthening the CSCE
institution.

-

Russia's preferred security

The policy adapted American diplomacy to a

perceived frustration with the PFP in Central and Eastern
Europe.

The US proposed the creation of a NATO working

group to define criteria for expansion. 357

Department official insisted:

A State

"...this policy is not

designed to create an obstacle but to begin a process." 358
However,

the US supported enlargement while making it

difficult in practice.

According to US and NATO officials,

it was hoped that the study would allow NATO to defer the

hard decisions on enlargement by two years until after

scheduled Russian and American presidential elections.
By stressing the CSCE, the US hoped to demonstrate to

Russia that there are inclusive opportunities for security

cooperation other than NATO

-

and to signal a change in the

traditional American view toward the CSCE.

Administration official stated on
was

1

As a senior

December 1994, the US

:

According

to

US

Undersecretary of Defense Walter Slocombe:

"NATO

should only want new

members who have passed beyond ambitions toward the territory of their neighbors, who have
working democratic
accepted the rights of their minorities, and who have established real and
Assembly.
Presentation to the Defense and Security Committee of the North Atlantic
1994.
November
D.C.,
Washington
in
Meeting
Session
Annual
North Atlantic Assembly
Interview with a senior State Department official, November 1994.

systems."
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...making clear that NATO will expand, but
this is going to be part of a larger European
security structure that involves many different
institutions - the European Union and in
particular the CSCE...We consider, for the United
States, NATO still to be the number one
organization from our point of view, but we
certainly want to increase the role of CSCE
this
is a strategy that emphasizes our desire to have
an inclusive relationship between NATO and all the
Partners for Peace, that when NATO expansion
occurs, its not going to be directed against
Russia, but part of the broader policy of
integration.
CSCE fits into this larger .policy as
an institution where Russia is a member.
However, when NATO Secretary General Willy Claes met with

senior US officials at the State Department in November
the American participants said surprisingly little

1994,

about the CSCE linkage.

While the US did support

a change

of name to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in

Europe

-

OSCE.

The US appeared to want to create the

appearance of a strengthened OSCE without granting the

institution too much authority. 360

From Partnership to Cold Peace:

A New Approach

When Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev travelled
to Brussels in December 1994 to sign Russia's PFP/IPP, he

declined at the last minute.

Kozyrev declared shock and

surprise at NATO's discussion of expansion even though the
US had briefed Russia on its plans in advance.

America's

NATO allies were also uncomfortable with the US approach.
The US sought to complete the review of enlargement criteria

White House Information Service.

The US

1

December 1994.

did propose a "beefing up" of

OSCE

capabilities to include non-proliferation,

peacekeeping within the CIS, preventive mechanisms for addressing ethnic

development, and proposed involving the institution more

problems

in the Balkans.
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conflict,

economic

directly in the resolution of long-term

in the following spring but this was rejected by the

European members as moving too fast.

361

On 22 November 1994

German NATO Ambassador Hermann von Richthofen cabled his
foreign ministry complaining that:

"...the US

Administration is moving quickly to expand NATO without
consultations on the consequences for the Alliance." 362

Von

Richthofen concluded that without a clear sense of mission
and strategy,

"...the Alliance is divided and in crisis." 363

Intra-alliance differences were papered over on

1

December

when NATO foreign ministers stated that:
We expect and would welcome NATO enlargement
that would reach to democratic states to our East,
as part of an evolutionary process, taking into
account political and security developments in the
whole of Europe.
Enlargement, when it comes would
be part of a broad European security architecture
based on true cooperation throughout the whole of
Europe.
It would threaten no one and would
enhance 3(fjjt ability and security for all of
Europe

The ministers approved the US plan for a NATO working group
to review enlargement and to report to the NAC by the end of

They also endorsed the continued strengthening of

the year.

the CSCE.

On

5

December President Clinton attended the Budapest

CSCE Summit to advance the second track of US policy.

He

stated that

245.
John Borawski, "Partnership for Peace and Beyond." International Affairs 71:2 (1995)

Associated Press.

1

December 1994. Richthofen

specifically noted existing differences within

NATO over expansion that included Greece and Italy favoring Romania, Bulgaria, and possibly
Poland, Hungary, and
Malta while northern NATO countries wanted to prioritize admission of
the

Czech Republic.

Associated Press.

NATO

1

December 1994.

Office of information and Press.

1

December 1995.
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We must not allow the Iron Curtain to be
replaced by a veil of indifference. We must not
consign new democracies to a grey zone... We seek
to increase the security of all, to erase the old
lines without drawing arbitrary new ones, to
bolster emerging democracies and to integrate the
nations of Europe into a continent where democracy
and free markets know no borders but where every
nation's borders are secure.
Russian President Boris Yeltsin responded that:
...a system of blocks, that is to say
something we have left behind, is now coming back
the NATO bloc on the one hand - and Russia on
the other ... Without compromise on this issue
between NATO and Russia, there would be no point
in continuing a partnership ... Otherwise we will go
our own ways, and why have a partnership at all?

Yeltsin added that if NATO expands, it risks bringing
"Cold Peace" to Europe.

a

President Clinton was described by

aides as expressing "concern and a state of perplexity about
367

what the Russians were up to."

More rueful was the

Georgian leader, and former Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard
Shevardnadze who lamented that:
over ... Beware of the Peace."

"The Cold War is

38

Responding to Russian sensitivities, the formal US view
of enlargement was revised by US Assistant Secretary of

State Richard Holbrooke writing in Foreign Affairs in March
1995.
1.

Holbrooke wrote that:
The goal remains the defense of the Alliance's
vital interests and the promotion of European
NATO expansion must strengthen
stability.
security in the entire region, including
nations that are not members. The goal is to
promote security in Central Europe by

White House Information Service.
Reuters.

5

December 1994.

Reuters.

5

December 1994.

Reuters.

6 December 1994.

5

December 1994.

For a survey of the decisions made

at the

Budapest Summit

Organization for Security an
Victor-Yves Ghebali, "After the Budapest Conference: The
1995).
(March
Cooperation in Europe." NATO Review 43:2
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integrating countries that qualify into the
stabilizing framework of NATO.
2.

The rationale and process for NATO's
expansion, once decided, will be transparent,
not secret.
Both Warsaw and Moscow ... should
have access to all aspects of the alliance's
thinking in order to understand that NATO
should no longer be considered an anti-Russian
alliance

3.

There is no timetable or list of nations that
will be invited to join NATO.

4.

Each nation will be considered individually,
not as part of some grouping.

5.

The decisions as to who joins NATO and when
will be made exclusively by the Alliance.

6

Although criteria for membership have not been
determined, certain fundamental precepts
reflected in the original Washington treaty
remain as valid as they were in 1949: new
members must be democratic, have market
economies, be committed to responsible
security policies, and be able to contribute
to the Alliance.

7

.

.

Each new NATO member constitutes of the United
a
States the most solemn of all commitments:
bilateral defense treaty that extends the US
security umbrella to a new nation. This
requires ratif ication by two-thirds of the US
Senate
6S)

Holbrooke added that the US would make more vigorous use of
the OSCE's consultative and conflict prevention mechanisms.

Within this context he stressed that "...if the West is to
create an enduring and stable security framework for Europe,
it must solve the most enduring strategic problem of Europe

and integrate the nations of the former Soviet Union,

Holbrooke's reference
bilateral

document but

Holbrooke, "America,

to

NATO

as a bilateral treaty

rather a multilateral

A

was misleading. The

commitment

to self-help

NATO

and mutual

treaty

aid.

is

Rich;

45European Power," Foretell Affairs 74:2 (March/April 1995)
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especially Russia, into a stable European security
system.
.

,,370
11

Holbrooke also endorsed a proposal by former National
Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski that Moscow should be

offered a formal treaty of cooperation between NATO and
Russia.

371

Holbrooke noted that there would be numerous

difficulties but that the US was not ruling it out:

"...the

US government as well as its major allies have supported

development of this important new track (emphasis added) in
the European security framework."

372

In early in 1995,

Russia had quietly approached Washington indicating that it
might accept a slow and limited expansion of NATO under

certain circumstances.

Moscow sought a guarantee that the

process would not be rushed, that there would be no nuclear
weapons stationed on the territories of new members, that

Russia could be a member of NATO eventually, and that the
end result would be a forum for East-West cooperation on

security issues, and a NATO/Russia non-aggression pact.

373

US and NATO officials characterized the Russian

position as a substantial change in rhetoric though

it

remained unclear if Russia was seriously altering its stance

Holbrooke 46.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Plan

for Europe," Foreign Affairs 74:1 (January/February 1995).

such an arrangement would require negotiation over a
of other Russian NATObroad range of issues including the pace of NATO expansion, the state
into
a more useful
turned
been
has
OSCE
the
which
to
ties such as the PFP, the degree
Chechnya.
in
fighting
the
as
such
events
of
organization and the implications
Guarantees from NATO,"
R. Jeffrey Smith and Daniel Williams, "Russia Intends to Pursue

Holbrooke 5 1

.

Holbrooke suggested

that

Ik

Washington Post

,

11

March 1995, A21.
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on NATO enlargement or if it was using a softer tone as part
of its opposition strategy.

The US hoped to renew the

discussion of NATO expansion within the context of
Russian dialogue.

a NATO-

As Vice-President Al Gore said in Tallin,

Estonia on 14 March:
It is important to understand that the
process by which NATO expands is a process that
must take place at the same time the relationship
between NATO and Russia is deepened and clarified.
Both processes must take place simultaneously and
both processes must take place in full open,
public view74 with no surprises and no sudden
movements

Without detail, the Gore comments unintentionally obfuscated
the issue of NATO enlargement and NATO-Russian relations.

Nevertheless, the same week, EU foreign ministers meeting in
France agreed that NATO should "consider an agreement,

treaty or charter between the Atlantic Alliance and Russia
in parallel with the enlargement of NATO to show Russia that

we are not neglecting it",

said French Foreign Minister

Alain Juppe (summarizing the EU position)

.

It was necessary

in order to "find something to reassure Russia",

added

375

In fact,

not changed.

374
.

Juppe

the Russian position on NATO enlargement had

On 15 March Boris Yeltsin sent a directive to

March 1995. Vice-President Gore was invoking the language of Russian Foreign
insisting on first
Minister Kozyrev from June 1994 who agreed to sign the PFP while

Reuters.

13

relationship based on what he
negotiating a detailed cooperation program that would formalize a

called "no mutual vetoes or

375
Reuters.

18 and 19

March

no surprises."
Following

1995.

this

meeting British Foreign Secretary Douglas

agreement would be based

Hurd stressed that while Russia could not veto NATO policy, such an
more directly from Kozyrev's
on the principle of "no vetoes and no surprises" borrowing even
European members. France
language At this meeting differences were aired among the
pushed for a "charter" that would not
supported a formal NATO-Russia treaty while Germany
require ratification by

all

members and would be
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less legally binding.

Kozyrev castigating him for being weak on NATO and ordering
a

harder line.

Thus Kozyrev said in Paris on 20 March:

"Why rush things if we run the risk of creating new lines
of

division? 1,376

US Secretary of State Warren Christopher

asserted that Kozyrev seemed to believe that "...there had
been some change in the position of the United States or
NATO,

that we were going at a different pace than

bef ore

..

.That is not correct." 377

Nonetheless,

following a

meeting in Geneva on 23 March with Christopher, Kozyrev
"The honeymoon has come to an end." 378

declared:

,

The PFP and Russia:

Bringing Moscow In

Following a Moscow meeting with US Secretary of Defense
Perry on

3

April Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev

linked Russian compliance with the CFE treaty to NATO

expansion and insisted that:

"Countermeasures could be

taken... we might create necessary military groups in the

most threatening directions and set up closer cooperation

with other CIS countries."

379

The next day,

the speaker of

the upper house of the Russian parliament told Perry that
the parliament was unlikely to ratify the START- 2 treaty if

Reuters.

20 March 1995.

Reuters.

20 March 1995.

letter

At the meeting, Secretary Christopher delivered a personal
Boris Yeltsin outlining the US approach to NATO enlargement.

Conventional Forces

Treaty since early

Associated Press.

23 March 1995.

from President Clinton to
Reuters. 3 April 1995. The Russian military had been pushing
in

Europe

simply offered the Russian armed forces an excuse
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summer
to

push

1993.

for a renegotiation of the

The

their case.

NATO

linkage

may have

NATO expanded.

Russia's first Deputy Defense Minister

Andrei Kokoshin was quoted by Nevazismava Gazeta as saying
that the expansion of NATO would create instability in

Europe by removing the "semi-demilitarized zone which has
now emerged in Central and Eastern Europe" and that "it is

necessary to abandon the false impression that NATO
expansion is inevitable and unavoidable." 381
Russia's concerns were intensified by a series of
public statements from Visegrad and NATO countries

suggesting that the process of expansion was accelerating.
For example,

on

April Czech President Vaclav Havel said:

3

"There are a number of indications that we are seeing a new

momentum on the subject of future membership of the new
democracies in the North Atlantic alliance
NATO membership did not seem likely."

38

...

On

4

One year ago,

April

President Lech Walesa told the BBC that, as during World War
II,

Poland was being "let down by the West" and that Russia
The next day Polish Prime

threatened European security.

Minister Jozer Oleksy travelled to NATO Headquarters.
to his departure from Warsaw,

Oleksy told reporters that in

the debate over NATO expansion:

significance

...

Prior

"Russia has no

Poland defines its own aims and goals

...

Other

countries can have their opinions on the subject, but they
cannot have any influence."

Interfax

.

3 April 1995.

In

OMRI

Daily Digest, 4 April 1995.

Nezavismava Gazeta 4 April 1995.
,

Reuters.

Oleksy told NATO ambassadors

In

OMRI

3 April 1995.
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Daily Digest, 5 April 1995.

that:

"Our answer to the question when NATO should open up

to new members is

as soon as possible." 383

-

On 14 April

Robert Hunter, US Ambassador to NATO, said in Prague that
the decision to expand NATO "is made, now it's just a matter
of doing it right." 384

Though NATO's timetable had not changed, American
officials sought to clarify the situation.

On 24 April

Secretary of State Christopher said that:

"The processes of

NATO expansion has proceeded on precisely the same timetable
that we decided on last December

...

this timetable has not

been altered because of other events since that time...
a

deliberate timetable."

social club.

.

It

is

He added that "NATO is not a

.Any decision on enlargement will be taken with

great care and deliberation and precision."

385

In Brussels

two days later, NATO Secretary General Claes insisted that:
"The European security architecture is not possible without

Russia... It is not possible to give an answer on the timing
of expansion.

1,386

Nonetheless, the following week Russian

Foreign Minister Kosyrev warned that if NATO expands,

Associated Press.

5 April 1995.

Associated Press.

14 April 1995.

Ambassador Hunter

said that

NATO

rules

would be applied

NATO

join and contribute to the
strictly to each new member and that each would have to
You join the Alliance
integrated military command structure. "An ally is an ally is an ally
deployment on
accept
will
and you do what allies do... if necessary, countries joining
.

.

.

.

NATO

their territory of

"Enlargement:
42:1

(May

whatever

Part of

A

is

required for security", he added.

Strategy for Projecting Stability into Central Europe,"

1995).

Reuters. 24 April 1995.

Associated Press.

Also see Robert Hunter,

26 April 1995.
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NATO

Reviev

nationalists could devour him and that he would have to
write his memoirs "from the Gulag." 387
At a Moscow meeting between Presidents Clinton and

Yeltsin in May 1995 commemorating the 50th anniversary of
the end of World War II,

the US was prepared to assure

Russia that it could be a member of NATO and that it would
give written assurances to that effect and on the non-

deployment of nuclear weapons on the new member territory.

3

*

The US worked tirelessly to get Yeltsin to commit fully to
the PFP and attained a promise by Yeltsin to join it and

begin a special NATO-Russia dialogue.

On NATO expansion,

'

President Clinton said that:
I made it clear that I thought that anything
done with NATO had to meet two criteria. Number
one, it must advance the interests of all the
Partners for Peace, the security interests of all
of them, including Russia.
And number two, it
must advance the long-term goal of the United
States which I have articulated from the beginning
of my presidency, of an integrated Europe, which I
believe is very important, and I think Russia
shares both of those objectives.

Assurances by Clinton may not have been enough for the
As Sergei Karagonov, a Yeltsin advisor,

Russians.
11 May:

said on

"You cannot build up a special relationship with

Russia when you are talking about enlargement at the same
time."

390

To this Andrei Androsov, head of the Russian

27 April 1995. OMRI Daily Digest, 28 April 1995.
Michael Dobbs and R. Jeffrey Smith, "US Offers Assurances on

Izvestia

7

May

.

1995, Al.

Associated Press.
Reuters.

11

May

8

May

1995.

1995.
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NATO", The Washington

Post,

Foreign Ministry's NATO Department added:

"We need NATO to

change its attitude from expansion to real partnership
the same treatment continues,

affected.

"

I

... If

fear cooperation will be

391

At a 30-31 May NAC ministerial, NATO renewed its

commitment to enlarge and welcomed Russia's decision to
implement an IPP and begin a new NATO/Russia dialogue.

Addressing the NAC Kozyrev insisted that:
Russia's position regarding NATO expansion
has remained unchanged.
We continue to believe
that it does not meet either the interests of
Russia's national security or the interest of
European security as a whole. Furthermore, the
hasty resolution of the issue may threaten the
establishment of truly mutually advantageous and
constructive relations between Russia and NATO and
the usefulness of Russia's involvement in the PFP.
It will not create greater stability and security
either... we suggest to ha^t and think rather than
act hastily and blindly.
In a formal letter to the NAC,

Kozyrev was more blunt:

"A

decision about the enlargement of NATO to the East would
create for Russia the need for a corresponding correction of
its attitude toward the Partnership for Peace."

393

After the

ministerial, NATO officials suggested that following the

completion of the enlargement study the issue would be
placed on a back-burner.

Reuters.

NATO

11

May

"Something like this has to be

1995.

Office of Information and Press.

Associated Press.

30

May

defense official as saying

May

1995.

Also on 31 May, Secodnya quoted a high ranking Russian
"A set of measures have been approved that should prevent

1995.

that:

NATO expansion. The report stressed
on NATO not expanding. OMR1 Daily
"

31

that Russia's decision to join the

Digest,

214

1

June 1995.

PFP was

conditional

driven through and there is not much drive in NATO at the
moment",

said one NATO official. 394

Some American officials nonetheless sought to continue

momentum toward enlargement.

US Deputy Secretary of State

Strobe Talbott articulated a broad defense of enlargement on
the basis of NATO's institutional functions." 5

Talbott,

According to

candidates for NATO membership should be judged

according to the strength of their democratic institutions
and their ability to meet the obligations of membership.
The process would be transparent, open, and ongoing.

NATO

enlargement would promote reform in post -Communist Europe
through respect for democracy and international norms of

behavior and explicit preconditions for membership, so that
enlargement of NATO would be a force for the rule of law

both within Europe's new democracies and among them. 396

The

institution would impact domestic politics within potential

member states who would have full civilian control over the

military by establishing parliamentary oversight over

military affairs, and appoint civilians to senior defense
The policy would promote conflict or dispute

positions.

resolution by making convincing progress in resolving
disputes with their neighbors peacefully and show they are

committed to multi-ethnic democracy.

394
Reuters.

31

395'

May 1995.
"Why NATO

Strobe Talbott,

Should Grow," The

August 1995) 27-30.
396
Talbott 28.
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Finally,

New Yo rk Review

stability

of Books XLI1:13 (10

would be promoted via the extension of NATO's classic

mission

-

as a hedge against a resurgent Russian threat.

The NATO Enlargement Study
In September 1995 NATO completed its enlargement study

explaining the "how" and "why" of enlargement but not the
"who" and "when" or airing potential negative consequences.

NATO viewed the policy as:
1.

Encouraging and supporting democratic reforms,
including civilian and democratic control over
the military;

2

Fostering in
patterns and
consultation
characterize

.

3.

new members of the Alliance the
habits of cooperation,
and consensus building which
relations among current Allies;

Promoting good-neighbourly relations, which
would benefit all countries in the EuroAtlantic area, both members and non-members of
NATO
;

4.

Emphasizing common defense and extending its
benefits and increasing transparency in
defense planning and military budgets, thereby
reducing the likelihood of instability that
might be engendered by an exclusively national
approach to defense policies;

5

Reinforcing the tendency toward integration
and cooperation in Europe based on shared
democratic values and thereby curbing the
countervailing tendency towards disintegration
along ethnic and territorial lines,-

.

6.

Strengthening the Alliance's ability to
contribute to European and international
security, including through peacekeeping
activities under the responsibility of the
OSCE and peacekeeping operations under the
authority of the UN Security Council as well
as other new missions;
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Strengthening and broadening the TransAtlantic relationship.

7.

New members must conform to the "purposes and
principles of
the Charter of the United Nations, and the safeguarding
of

the freedom,

common heritage and civilization of all

Alliance members and their people, founded on the principles
of democracy,

individual liberty and the rule of law." 398

According to NATO, enlargement seeks to avoid drawing new
divisions in Europe after the Cold War.
the enlargement study stressed that:

In this context,

"A stronger NATO-

Russia relationship should form another cornerstone of
new,

a

inclusive and comprehensive security structure in

Europe

...

This further development of the NATO-Russia

relationship, and its possible eventual formalization,

should take place in rough parallel with NATO's own
enlargement, with the goal of further strengthening

stability and security in Europe. 399

"Study on

Study

NATO

Enlargement,"

New members

2.

NATO

NATO-Russia relations

Office of Information and Press (September 1996) 2.

will be expected to:

conform

to basic principles

embodied

in the

Washington Treaty: democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law; accept NATO as a
community of like-minded nations joined together for collective defense and the preservation of
peace and security, with each nation contributing to the security and defense from which

member

nations benefit;

all

be firmly committed to principles, objectives and undertakings

included in the Partnership for Peace Framework Document; commit themselves to good
efforts to build consensus within the Alliance

Alliance cohesion and decision-making;

at

SH APE/SACLANT;

serve on the International Staff and in

issues, since

political

establish a permanent representation at

military representation

all

consensus

is

faith

the basis of

undertake to participate fully in the Alliance

consultation and decision-making process on
Alliance;

on

NATO

and security issues of concern

NATO

HQ;

to the

establish an appropriate national

be prepared to nominate qualified candidates to

agencies;

provide qualified personnel

the International Military Staff and in the Integrated Military Structure

contribute to Alliance budgets, based on budget shares to be agreed;

if

to serve

on

and as appropriate;

participate, as appropriate,

exchange of Allied intelligence which is based entirely on national contributions; apply
NATO security rules and procedures; and accept the Documents which provide the basis for the

in the

existing policies of the Alliance.

Study

Study 24-25.

9.
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would reflect Russia's significance in European security and
be based on reciprocity, mutual respect and confidence, and
no "surprise" decisions by either side which could affect
the interests of the other. 400

While acknowledging that there are benefits from

stationing allied troops on a new member's territory, the
study underscored that the redeployment of existing Allied
forces from current locations or pre-positioning of

equipment would be expensive and potentially provocative.
Thus the presence of Allied conventional forces on a new

member territory might take a variety of forms in terms of
exercises, dual basing of air assets, or the prepositioning
of equipment and material.

Nonetheless for new members, the

peacetime stationing of other Allied forces on their
territory should neither be a condition of membership nor

foreclosed as an option.

New members should be prepared in

principle for such an event but there is no immediate

necessity for allied forces to be stationed on new member
territory.

The collective defense principles of Article

would be applied to all new members
defense planning and deterrence.
concludes that:

-

including nuclear

However the study also

"There is no a priori requirement for the

stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of new
members" and that there is no need to change current NATO

posture under existing circumstances.

400

5

Study 9-10.
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New members would

choose to accept the military consequences of membership
not
only in principle, but also in practice if the strategic

environment changes.

NATO walked a fine line by assuring

that it would not invite in states solely as consumers of

security while at the same time seeking to allay Russian
fears

Toward Enlargement?
Some partner countries welcomed NATO's discussion of
the modalities of enlargement.

Poland,

however,

remained

skeptical and claimed that NATO was buying time with

delaying tactics because of Russian opposition and American
indecisiveness

.

These concerns were heightened by the

formal NAC acceptance of the enlargement study in December
1995 which was coupled with a decision to begin a year long

consideration of the implications of enlargement via
briefings to interested parties and an invitation for
countries to signal their intention to apply for NATO
membership.

The best thing that Polish Deputy Foreign

Minister Andrzej Towpik could say about the study was:
am happy with this document for three reasons,
time... it is a very substantial document,

discussion into a new stage."

401

it is on

and it takes the

During the first week of

October 1995, NATO officials confirmed that the Alliance
would put enlargement "on the backburner" until after

Reuters.

28 September 1995.

"I

presidential elections in Russia scheduled for June and July
1996.

2

US National Security Advisor Anthony Lake was

reported to have suggested that NATO be "dull and boring" on

enlargement,403
1

However, by the spring of 1996 the US had made a firm

decision to move NATO toward enlargement.

Concerned that

the US was viewed as too deferential to Russia and hoping to

attract votes from Americans of East European descent,
senior US officials indicated that at a NATO heads of state

meeting in early 1997 "two, possibly three, states" would be
404
invited to initiate negotiations toward joining NATO.

message to Moscow was firm

-

NATO will enlarge,

The

it will do

so on its own terms and Russia should take advantage of the

opportunity to build a special NATO-Russia relationship.
In March 1996

405

(newly appointed) Russian Foreign

Minister Yevgenii Primakov suggested that Russia might be
open to a deal on enlargement if new members agreed not to

402

For further discussion see

"NATO

Seen Slowing

Down

Enlargement Process," Per Spiegel. 21

August 1995.
403
-

404

Interview with a senior European official, October 1995.

23
Interview with a senior National Security Council official, March 1996. There are some
Poles.
million
million Americans who trace their heritage to Eastern Europe including over 9

As

there are a dozen states

firm position in favor of

where Uiey constitute more than 5 percent of

NATO

"Enthusiasm for Wider Alliance
1995,

405

enlargement
is

is

the electorate, talcing a

a no-lose political decision.

See Michael Dobbs,

Marked by Contradictions," The Washington

Post, 7 July

A1,A6.

This view was put forward strongly

to the Central

and East European aspirants

to

NATO

in a

in Prague in March 1996. Christopher
of the special relationship with NATO
advantage
suggested that a failure by Moscow to take
Plan
of the late 1940s and that only Russia
Marshall
would be similar to the rejection of the
and Undivided Europe in Our
Democratic
could isolate itself. See Warren Christopher, "A
US Department of State,
1996.
March
Time," Cernin Palace, Prague, Czech Republic, 20

speech by

US

Secretary of State

Warren Christopher

Office of the Spokesman.
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station nuclear weapons on their territory and if
they only
join NATO's political structures without military
integration.

Primakov and his staff at the Russian foreign

intelligence services (where he was previously director)
had

decided that Moscow's hostile tone opposing NATO enlargement
was accelerating the drive by Central Europeans into the

NATO orbit.

Primakov concluded that the best way to slow

enlargement was to make friendly initiatives to the West

knowing that they would be unacceptable to some NATO members
and acceptable to others

thus dividing the Alliance. 406

-

Russia hoped to take the steam out of the enlargement
process as Western countries entered into more serious

discussions about the consequences and costs of the policy.
This shift in Russian rhetoric regarding NATO

enlargement combined with a Russian effort to lobby
individual NATO members against enlargement rather than

These views were

initially

Their report,

1995.

titled

drawn out

in a report

"Russia and

NATO:

by senior Russian

officials in April

and

May

Thesis of the Council for Foreign and Defense

Policy" was chaired by senior Yeltsin Advisor Sergei Karaganov. The report recommended that
the Russian

government not accept

NATO

enlargement as inevitable and argued

and reasonable policy can enable deferment or even cancellation of

The

report rejected seeking "compensation for

NATO

NATO's

that

an active

enlargement plans.

enlargement" as signaling consent. The

study also rejected threats of costly countermeasures to enlargement which would undermine the

Russian economy. The report stressed that supporters of enlargement are a minority

in the

but that they occupy key decision-making posts, and they are the most active group.

enlargement becomes a closer perspective, and

economic, military,

political

and cohesion-

numbers of opponents of enlargement might grow, with
opposition getting stronger... This development can be largely prompted by debates in

related costs
their

its

West

"As

political

become more obvious,

and academic

circles in

the

NATO

countries,

"We

first

of

Thus

help

avoid making a mistake dangerous for everyone,

it

to

Finally, the

the

group advised

group advised

that

that:

all in

Russia should tone

down

first

its

May

1995.
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of

all

for the

instead,

West

we

should

itself."

rhetoric and stress cooperation

thereby denying the West justification to enlarge the Alliance.

Foreign and Defense Policy,"

the United States...", the report

should not act against the West;

advised.

Thesis of the Council for

-

addressing their opposition directly at NATO.

For example,

earlier in the year President Yeltsin appealed several times
by telephone to German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to stop the

drive toward enlargement in the run-up to the June

presidential election.

Mr.

Kohl responded positively to

Yeltsin's appeal by urging NATO to be generally more
sensitive to Russian security concerns at a gathering of

NATO specialists meeting in Munich in February 1996.

Kohl's

shift was largely tactical but also showed that Germany was

increasingly worried about the impact the policy was having
on Russia.

Nevertheless at the same meeting, US Secretary

of Defense William Perry acknowledged that:

"NATO

enlargement is inevitable and if NATO enlargement is

a

carrot encouraging reforms, then we cannot keep that carrot

continually out of reach."

407

Endorsing this perspective and

hoping to appeal to voters of East European origins,
President Clinton used his one foreign policy speech of the
1996 general election to commit the US to support NATO

enlargement in 1999.

As NATO accelerated toward its planned

announcement of initial candidates for membership in 1997,
NATO undertook serious efforts to decrease Russian

opposition offering

a formal

NATO/Russia charter.

The

charter would reflect an ongoing process of building a
special NATO-Russia relationship and codify a variety of

Comments of Kohl and

Perry at the annual

Wherkunde meeting of defense

Germany, February 1996.
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specialists,

Munich.

institutional mechanisms enhancing a broad range of

consultation (such as institutionalizing the military-to-

military planning and cooperation attained in IFOR) to
provide Russia with a voice, but not a veto, within NATO. 40

The Great Debate:

Turning Theory on its Head

Major differences exist between, and within, realist
and institutionalist approaches to understanding NATO

enlargement.

Many analysts are skeptical about the

prospects for enlargement.

At a conference of senior

international security specialists held at Harvard

University in May 1995, an anonymous vote was reportedly
taken 29-1 opposing NATO enlargement.

As one senior State

Department official concedes, enlargement is not popular
among academics and the US and NATO have not done

good job of explaining what it is about.

40 "

a

very

Another

Administration official was more blunt complaining that
"...there is a very adverse trend in the conventional wisdom
on the part of the thoughtful elite."

410

Actually,

there are

some unlikely theoretical partnerships of realists and

institutional scholars favoring enlargement and realists and

institutionalists opposed.

perspectives have had

Interview with a senior

a

NATO

Many of these analytical

direct impact on the policy process.

official, Brassels,

Interview with a senior State Department
Reuters.

Belgium, September 1996.

official, April 1996.

28 June 1995.
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Realist Argume nts in Support of NATO Enlargement

Realists favoring NATO enlargement generally draw from

balance of power analysis which suggests that Europe is more
secure if there is two-power balancing.

Moving the Cold War

line farther East will increase security in Europe because

Russia remains a threat to the rest of Europe and it will
lessen the chance that a united Germany will find itself in

security competition with Russia.

Realists assert that

Russia may return to its great power status and pursue

traditional imperialist behavior.
realist perspective,

Thus,

according to this

it would be best to enlarge NATO

rapidly while Russia is incapable of mounting a major

preventive response thereby assuring NATO's future as an

anti-Russian alliance.
a group of

Moreover,

expanding NATO to include

willing countries with sizeable military assets

would add to the West's resources (including some 100

million consumers in Central and Eastern Europe)

,

defray

some of the deepening cuts in defense spending among NATO

countries,

and open up new arms markets for current NATO

member states
Peter Rodman, a former National Security Council staff
member,
terms,

argues for NATO enlargement in such geostrategic

suggesting that:

"The only potential great power

security problem in Central Europe is the lengthening shadow
of Russian strength,

and NATO has the job of counter

224

balancing it."

Henry Kissinger concludes that without

NATO enlargement, Central and Eastern Europe will again

become a vacuum in which German and Russian security

competition will develop. 412

Similarly,

Zbigniew Brzezinski

suggests that while NATO enlargement should not be viewed as

hostile toward Russia, it should replace the strategic

vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe. 413

Though Kissinger

and Brzezinski put it more diplomatically,

their view is

summarized by William Safire as seeing Russia as
"authoritarian at heart and expansionist by habit... The time
to push the protective line eastward is now, while Russia is

weak and preoccupied with its own revival, and not later,
when such a move would be an insufferable provocation to
superpower."

414

a

Moreover, as Jonathan Eyal maintains,

delaying enlargement until Moscow does something to warrant
a threat could provoke or escalate crises and thus it is
.

preferable to enlarge during a time of peace.

415

Some realists acknowledge that NATO enlargement will

draw new lines in Europe but that this will be a positive

development

Peter

.

Rodman,

Enlarging NATO to include Poland and the Czech

"4

More

for

NATO," The Washington

suggests that the question is "whether the

emerged

in Central

Europe

West

is

Post

,

31

December 1994. Rodman

prepared to consolidate the

in 1989, the present reality that the Central

new

status

European and

quo

that

Baltic

the
democracies are free and independent sovereign states that have opted to associate with
January
Post,
16
Washington
The
Moscow,"
West." Peter W. Rodman, "Understanding with

1996, A9.
Kissinger Diplomacy

,

823-825.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Plan for Europe...".
William Safire, "Strategic Dilemma", The New York Times
Jonathan Eyal, "Beware of Russians Bearing

NATO

20 April 1996, A6.
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Gifts,"

1

December 1994, A32.

The Wall

Street Journal

Europe

19.

Republic in particular would settle the question of the

Eastern frontier of Germany and remove a major historical
reason for German aspirations in the East.

O'Brien speculates:

As Conor Cruise

"A new wave of national pride

early in the new century

-

-

perhaps

might cause Germany to resent its

subordinate position within a NATO perceived as
dominated.

.

.by the United States,

France,

Germany might then withdraw from NATO

...

and set up its own

system of alliances in Central Europe." 416
that,

if the Visegrad states'

and Britain.

Kissinger adds

requests to join NATO are

rejected and the states bordering Germany are refused
protection,

"Germany will sooner or later seek to achieve

its security by national efforts,

encountering on the way

Russia pursuing the same policy from its side." 417

a

Stephen

Pelz maintains that inclusion of the Visegrad countries into

NATO would permanently settle Germany's eastern frontier,
bind Germany in the West, and reassure both the West and
Russia as to its growing economic and political power.

Pelz

suggests that this would provide a clear and defensible line

between the West and the disputes to the East with

a new

buffer zone comprised of Finland, the Baltics, Belarus and
Ukraine whose security would be respected by Russia and the
West if guaranteed in a treaty.

Conor Cruise O'Brien. "The Future of
1992/1993)

'the

418

West'," The National Interest 30 (Winter

9.

Kissinger "Expand..."

Stephen Pelz, "Enlarge

NATO

-

Now",

This approach would

draft.
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purposefully draw lines between East and West and recognize
spheres of influence which already exist informally.

Such a

"Yalta II" would bring clarity and predictability to

European security.

A similar argument has been suggested by the foreign
policy spokesman of the German Social Democratic Party
Karsten Voigt

.

Voigt believes that,

left alone,

"...the

countries of Central and Eastern Europe could fall victim
yet again to the rivalries and tensions that have plagued
the region from time immemorial;

only through integration

can we ensure that the 'old game' of competing spheres of

influence does not return." 419

Voigt stresses that:

so far as the Germans like happy neighbors,

"...in

they also think

that the presence of the United States is an insuring

element,

a

stabilizing component to prevent our neighbors

from perceiving that something might happen ... This is what

you objectively call a stabilizing factor... So it has not
only to do with an outside threat,

it's an internal

balancing element inside the European security structure as
,

such

420

Realist support for NATO enlargement also draws on

alliance theory.

Some Central and East European countries

may naturally want to associate with the winning side in the

Karsten Voigt,

"NATO

Enlargement:

Sustaining the

Momentum",

NATO

Review 2 (1996)

19.

Policy Spokesman, to the
Presentation by Karsten Voight, Social Democratic Party Foreign
1996.
February
Conference,
Research Service

Congressional

NATO
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Cold War.

By joining NATO,

they hope to share the benefits

of the West's relative gains
of victory" as Randall L.

-

sort of "sharing the spoils

Schweller puts it. 421

If NATO

rejects their requests for membership, these countries may

engage in destabilizing balancing behavior

-

by forming

regional alliances, establishing bilateral security

guarantees with countries from within NATO, or pursuing
expensive and provocative self-help national military
buildups

422
.

Realist Arguments Against NATO Enlargement
Some realists point to the absence of balancing

alliances among the Visegrad countries or the Baltics as
evidence that they do not really feel threatened.
at the facts on the ground,

Looking

these realists point to the

dissolution of the Russian armed forces and their dismal
performance in Chechnya, and the fact that there would be
considerable warning time of a renewed Russian threat to
Central and Eastern Europe.

To enlarge NATO in the absence

of a threat may cause renewed security competition among

states not included in NATO or provoke Russia to respond by

reintegrating parts of the former Soviet Union as
defensive act.

a

Rather than promoting stability, NATO

Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit:
International Security 19

(Summer 1994)

Bringing die Revisionist State Back In,"

79.

Joshua B. Spero and Frank Umbach, "NATO's Security Challenge to the East and the
16American-German Geo-Strategic Partnership in Europe," Bericht des BlOst NR. 39/1994,
17.
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enlargement would thus create instability which does not

currently exist.

Placed within the context of the rise and

decline of great powers, this relative gain by the West
could prompt hegemonic war in the worst case.

Some realists

add that NATO is the wrong institution for consolidating

democracy and with the US reducing its commitments abroad,
the security guarantee would be a false promise of security
for new members.

Alternatively, the EU would be better

suited for meeting new security challenges.

Michael Brown stresses that the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe need membership in the EU, and not NATO.
He notes that if the Central and East European countries

were really threatened they would be increasing their

defense capabilities.

In reality Poland,

the Czech

Republic, and Hungary have been reducing military
423
conscription and their mechanized and infantry forces.

Moreover, despite the suggestion of a "security vacuum" in

Central and Eastern Europe, the German government has urged

NATO to move slow on enlargement and to signal restraint
toward Russia.

424

Brown concludes that NATO should expand in

the event of serious Russian threats toward the West.

Poland, for example,

is

reducing

its

conscription time from 18 months to one year while

In August 1996
disbanding entire divisions and reducing the total number of its armed forces.
from
its existing
000
cut
10
major
of
the Czech Minister of Defense proposed a draft plan for a
plans
similar
Two
program.
000 troop levels combined with a costly force modernization

60
being too costly.
which had previously been presented to the Czech Parliament were rejected as
December 1994,
Post,
26
Washington
Michael Brown, "NATO Expansion: Wait and See," The
Survival
37:
Expansion",
A29. Also see Michael E. Brown, "The Flawed Logic of NATO
(Spring 1995) 34-48.
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However,

if NATO enlarges toward Russia's borders in the

absence of a threat,

its future will be assured for a long

time as it will have caused a new Cold War. 425

Ironically,

such a development would be good for the new members but

decrease the security of current members.
To Michael Mandelbaum, NATO enlargement represents a

significant shift in the European balance of power likely to
prompt balancing behavior by Russia.

Mandelbaum asserts

that Europe already has a functional security regime in the

shape of the CFE (and START) agreement which would be

seriously undermined by enlargement. 426

Mandelbaum notes

that "...the countries under active consideration (Visegrad)

are precisely those best placed to make a successful

transition to democracy and free markets without NATO
membership."

427

Theoretically,

if Russia is to be contained

it makes little sense to expand NATO only to the Visegrad

countries and thereby create a buffer-zone open to Russian
interference.

If NATO is to be a neo- containment mechanism

then it should include Ukraine and expand right up to

Russia's borders.

428

Betts warns that:

However,

even in this event, Richard

"Under realist norms,

Discussion with Michael Brown.

Cambridge,

See Michael Mandelbaum, The Dawn of Peace

K.

the West should

MA,
in

20 May 1995.
Europe (New York: The Twentieth Century

Fund, 1996).
Michael Mandelbaum, "Preserving the Peace: The Case Against
Affairs 74:3

Mandelbaum

(May 1995)

9-13.

"Preserving..." 10.
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NATO

Expansion," Forei g n

leave Ukraine to its fate

tragic for the Ukrainians, but

-

safer for everyone else." 429

John Mearsheimer has reservations about NATO

enlargement based on his assumption that institutions can do
little to promote or cause peace and security.

NATO

enlargement clouds a more concrete debate over whether NATO
should be maintained at all.

Mearsheimer concludes that

NATO is needed as an insurance policy against a new Russian
threat but that enlargement may bring about that threat in a

self-fulfilling prophecy.

Thus not only do institutions not

cause peace, but well-meaning institutionalists are

promoting policies that may decrease security.

Mearsheimer

views NATO as provocatively backing Russia, like a wounded
animal,

into a corner.

43 '

Moreover,

the only real security

guarantee that comes from NATO is the stationing of US
forces

(conventional or nuclear) on a members' territory.

Because new members are not likely to get this, enlargement
could encourage new members to exacerbate small crises in
order to get a firmer security guarantee.

George Kennan writes that:

In this vein,

"...it never pays... for one

great power to take advantage of the momentary weakness or

distraction of another great power in order to force upon

it

concessions it would never would have accepted in normal

circumstances

..

.Over the long run,

Richard K. Betts, in Snyder and Jervis 278.
Discussion with John Mearsheimer. Cambridge,
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it almost always revenges

MA,

20

May

1995.

itself."

To Kennan NATO enlargement is "...in the highest

degree deplorable." 431
Former National Security Council official Philip

Zelikow suggests that NATO enlargement can do little to

promote reform or resolve interstate conflicts because NATO
is a state dominated institution and merely a tool of the

member states.

Zelikow suggests that "...NATO membership

for Poland seems to confer few tangible benefits to Poland
or to current NATO members that cannot be achieved through

the Partnership for Peace." 432
as

"Citing other analogies,

such

'NATO membership helped stabilize democracy and stem

authoritarian backsliding in Portugal, Spain, Greece and
Turkey',

neither elaborates a chain of logic or applies that

reasoning to,

Poland or Hungary", Zelikow maintains. 433

say,

Fred Ikle,

Similarly,

former Undersecretary of Defense in

the Reagan Administration,

notes that for five years before

joining NATO, Greece and Turkey received considerable

American economic assistance which aided their transition
and that no such expenditure is likely to be forthcoming in
He also notes that if:

the East.

"Slovakia is a vacuum,

George Kennan, At Century's Ending: Reflections. 1982-1995 (New York:

Company,

Philip Zelikow, "The

Zelikow

War.

on a

Masque of

Similarly,

15.

Norton

&

Owen

Institutions," Survival 38:1 (Spring 1996) 14.

Harries, stresses that even the idea that a "western"
that the "West's" identity

is

threat

Owen

community

was based

based on a false premise. Arguing
from the East, the cohesiveness of the West will disintegrate after the Cold
(September/October
Harries, "The Collapse of the West," Foreign Affairs 72:4

can be expanded
largely

W.W.

1996) 330.

1993) 41-53.
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why not Slovenia;

if Slovenia,

why not Macedonia, Moldova

or Belarus?" 434

Charles L

.

Glaser stresses national interest in

security cooperation and maintains that NATO has an
important role to play in the future of Europe as currently
constituted.

Glaser asserts that NATO remains the best

mechanism for dealing with three major challenges to
contemporary European security:
the East,

resurgent Russia, war in

and improbable conflict in the Western community

and that there remains a strong case for realigning NATO

-

not as an expanded collective security mechanism, but rather
as a low-cost insurance policy.

435

The continued American

military presence in Germany should decrease any German
desire to attain nuclear weapons.

However,

the same policy

will not necessarily be duplicated for countries such as

Ukraine.

Thus Glaser makes a case for revamping NATO rather

than making it an expanded system of collective security.

Fred Ikle,

"How

to

Ruin

NATO," The New York Times

.

11

January 1995, A21.

Ikle has also

co-chaired a commission with Sergei Karagonov, an advisor to President Yeltsin, that included a
senior American and Russian national security specialists. They conclude that the US
and Russia share common security interests and that their policies should be harmonized. "Any
that would exclude Russia would be detrimental to the
eastward expansion of

number of

NATO

harmonization of

US

and Russian defense policies," the study concludes.

Sergei A. Karagonov (Co-Chairman), Harmonizing the Evolution of
Policies (Washington

study group

DC: Center

for Strategic

&

Fred C. Ikle and

US and

Russian Defense

International Studies, 1993).

Members of

the

Benjamin S.
included Alexei Arbatov, General John R. Garvin, Catherine Kelleher,
Steinbruner.
Meyer, Nikolai V. Mikhailov, Serge Rogov, John D.

Lambeth, General Edward

Dmitri Trenin, and Paul D. Wolfowitz.

Charles L. Glaser, "Future Security Arrangements for Europe:

George W. Downs, ed.. Collective Security Beyond
of Michigan Press, 1994).
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the

Why NATO

is Still

Best," in

Cold War (Ann Arbor: The University

These theoretical concerns entered the US policy debate
in the summer of 1995 when US Senator Sam Nunn announced

strong opposition to NATO enlargement.
no one had explained the "...why,

enlargement

.

Nunn suggested that

or at least why now" of

Nunn argued that NATO enlargement would

undermine reformers in Moscow and, because of Russia's
conventional weakness, Russia would be forced to respond by

deploying nuclear weapons
all Europeans.

-

thereby undermining security for

Nunn was concerned that enlargement was

creating the worst possible scenario of decreasing military
capabilities and increased political commitments.

The

senator charged that the policy was promoting a false

promise similar to that offered by the League of Nations
before World War II.

According to Nunn:

NATO is fundamentally a military alliance.
If you denigrate the military side of it, then it
becomes a political and psychological alliance,
The last thing
which is something very dif f erent
we need is a repeat of what happened before World
War II, when commitments were made that were not
.

.

.

backed up by3g military capabilities and
intentions
Nunn suggests that enlargement should be dependent upon

a

country first qualifying for EU membership and that it be
linked to Russian behavior.

If Russia were to make

aggressive moves against other states, violate arms control
accords,

or if democracy should collapse then NATO should

enlarge

Senator

Sam Nunn, "The

Future of

NATO

in

Seminar 95. 22 June 1995, Norfolk, VA.
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an Uncertain World," Speech

to the

SACLANT

Inst i tut ionalist Arguments in Support of NATO Enlargement

Institutionalists supporting NATO enlargement generally

maintain that the goal is to promote a united Europe and
expand a zone of democracy, stability, and peace.

As NATO

Secretary General Javier Solana suggests:
.what we are expanding is a European,
indeed Atlantic, civic space.
I deliberately
include our military arrangements into this
definition of "civic space"
The postwar
experience in Western Europe suggests that
political and economic progress and security
integration are closely linked. Once their
security is taken care of, countries can devote
themselves with more confidence to their longerterm evolution. And a responsible military,
firmly embedded in our democratic societies and
under civil control, is part and parcel of that
civic space, as are military structures th^t, are
transparent, defensive, and multinational.
.

.

.

Some institutionalists particularly feel that, once in NATO,

new members will not nationalize defense policies in the

pursuit of self-help because they will attain an important

psychological reassurance.

William

E.

Odom argues that the

best argument for NATO's expansion:
the concern of
...is found in its inception-.
its proponents with internal political and
economic affairs in Western Europe. While their
national motives were at odds - Germany seeking
early independence, France seeking to prevent a
new German military threat - leaders in both
countries realized that a US military presence
within an Atlantic alliance structure would create
the security and political context for economic
recovery and the building of new international
To play its role the United States had
relations.
it also had to
not only to be a military hegemon;
bring its political ideology to Europe. A purely
realist American approach to NATO would have

failed

4

Javier Solana, "Speech by the Secretary General

NATO

Athens, 20

May

William E.

Odom, "NATO's

1996.

at the

North Atlantic Assembly Meeting,"

Office of Information and Press.

Expansion:

Why

(Spring 1995) 45.
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the Critics are

Wrong," The National

Interest

Ron Asmus, Richard Kuglar, and
that

F.

Stephen Larrabbee add

East -Central Europe's democrats well
understand that democracy will succeed only if
their states belong to a secure European and
Western political, economic, and military
community.
The West, too previously understood
this link - as demonstrated with the case of West
Germany.
That nation might never have become a
stable Western democracy had it not been accepted
into NATO's fold.
Similarly, NATO membership
helped stabilize democracy and stem authoritarian
backsliding in Portugal, Spain, Greece and
Turkey

Among the advocates of NATO enlargement, this trio of RAND
analysts (Asmus, Kuglar, and Larrabbee) have had

considerable influence on US policy.
Jamie

Shea suggests that NATO enlargement should

P.

come before EU membership for the Visegrad countries based
on NATO's founding principles which created "...a climate of

confidence and stability which allowed governments not to

overspend on weapons or to shut themselves off from their
neighbors, but to use their scarce resources for

infrastructure renewal, for education, and for social
reform."

440

enlarging,

Though NATO may incorporate instability by
Shea maintains that it faces a dilemma of either

taking in these countries or dealing with them from the
One way or another these crisis will affect NATO

outside.

and are more easily managed within the institution.

Thus

"...if one is not actively spreading security,

Shea argues:

one is increasing one's own vulnerability to

Asmus
Jamie

(et al)

30.

P. Shea,

"Enlarging

NATO

Eastward?",

International Institutions after the Cold

in

War (New
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Marco Carnovale,
York:

St.

ed.,

European Security and

Martin's Press, 1995) 86.

insecurity.

.

.The situation cannot be frozen in a timeless
441

balance of calculable forces.

Shea stresses that the

most important guarantee granted in NATO is reassurance and
that NATO has always been:

...seen as providing political reassurance,
and if push came to shove, the Americans would
provide air support and logistics.
It was the
Korean War which produced US ground troops in
Western Europe, not the Washington Treaty. NATO's
security guarantee has always been much more a
question of day-to-day cooperation, joint
exercises, and military integration than of
binding obligations. The credible guarantee has
been the practice of 'doing' security together,
not the legal document.

For addressing Russia and Ukraine, Shea stresses the

importance of the PFP where "...facile notions like a
'security vacuum' only disguise the large-scale military

cooperation that is already taking place and that will give
Central and East European countries special consultative
rights vis-a-vis NATO through the PFP... This will convey a
special responsibility,

guarantee

...

if not a binding security

This is no minor privilege."

443

Some analysts conclude that the solution to potential

security competition caused by one institution (NATO) can be
offset by another institution (OSCE or EU)

.

The dual-track

strategy of strengthening the OSCE and institutionalizing
special relationship between NATO and Russia is a case in
point.

441
442
443
444

444

In January 1997,

Ron Asmus circulated a paper

Shea 87.

Shea 88.
Shea 94-95.
See Sean Kay,

"NATO

and the CSCE:

A

Partnership for the Future," Paradigms:

Journal of International Relations 7:2 (Winter 1993) 59-77.
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The Kent

a

among senior officials in the three Baltic countries

advancing a multi - institutional solution to the inevitable
sense of loss and insecurity that will result from the

Baltic states being left out of NATO. 445

Resolving this

issue would be central to NATO enlargement for as Asmus
writes:

"If mishandled,

the Baltic issue has the potential

to develop into the proverbial train wreck which could

potentially derail NATO enlargement as well as poison the
West's relations with Russia." 446

Asmus notes that, rightly

or wrongly, many in the West do not see the Baltic states as
an area of vital strategic interest;

moving NATO into the

Baltics would be completely unacceptable to Moscow;

there

are problems involving Russian minorities in some Baltic

countries;

the Baltics are largely indefensible in the

absence of a credible deterrent;

and the Russian enclave of

Kaliningrad being encircled would further add to Russia's

heightened concerns over enlargement.

As a senior Danish

official, who is a firm supporter of NATO enlargement to

include the Baltic countries,

insists-.

"...it is of

paramount importance that NATO enlargement does not decrease
the security of the Baltic states."

447

Asmus proposed that a multi-institutional strategy
First,

could resolve the Baltic security dilemma.

Also see Hans Beniiendijk and Jeffrey Simon, "Baltic Security and

Forum 57 (December 1995) 1-4.
Ron Asmus, "NATO Enlargement: An Alliance

NATO

the three

Enlargement".

Strategic

Strategy for the Baltic States," January 1996.

Personal correspondence from a senior Danish defense official,
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1

1

May

1996.

Baltic countries should institutionalize defense
cooperation
among themselves.

Second,

involvement of the Nordic

countries aiding and assisting Baltic hard and soft security
via a wide range of cooperative programs should increase.
The third (and central) pillar of the strategy would be

coordination of NATO and EU enlargement policies so that
"...the EU flag would go up in Estonia at the same time that
the NATO flag goes up in Warsaw." 448

Fourth,

the process of

NATO enlargement should be clearly open-ended.

Finally,

further institutional efforts should be made to modify

Moscow's concerns over NATO enlargement by including Russia
in the emerging web of institutional security cooperation

wherever possible and that the West should look for ways to
encourage constructive Russian-Baltic security interaction.
Because the Asmus draft advocated an "Estonia first" policy,
the proposal actually had the adverse effect of decreasing

Baltic cooperation as competition and jealously resulted in
Latvia and Lithuania.

More problematic, the proposal was

viewed by some senior Baltic officials as trying to deal
with the Baltic problem at the expense of their prospects
for joining NATO.

As a result,

all three Baltic countries

jointly and specifically rejected the Asmus proposal.

Asmus

EU

13.

Asmus

maintains that of the three Baltic countries, Estonia

is

the

449

most qualified

for

membership.

Defense,
Personal correspondence from a senior Estonian official at the Estonian Ministry of
Baltic
The
NATO,"
Up
March 1996. For further discussion see Einar Rull, "Russia Speeds

Times 28 March

-

3 April 1996, 21.
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Some advocates of NATO enlargement maintain that

membership should come before linkage policies promoting
reform.

For example, Jeffrey Simon maintains that setting

the criteria for civil -military relations too high may be an

obstacle that is impossible to overcome.

Effective civilian

control over the armed forces includes constitutional

provisions for a clearly-defined division of authority

between the president and government over the running of the

military in both peace and war.

Civilian control requires

parliamentary oversight of the military via effective
control over the defense budget with a civilian defense

ministry in control over the general staff and military
commanders,

and a general restoration of the prestige of

post -Communist militaries.

If NATO was to require all of

these as pre- requisites for membership,

countries would not qualify.

the Visegrad

Subsequently they would not be

rewarded for the considerable steps they have made since
1989.

450

Nevertheless,

some observers see value in the process

of promoting enlargement itself.

Adrian Karatnycky suggests

that the diplomacy of NATO enlargement has had a positive

impact on Russian behavior by focusing Moscow on its

relations with the West and constraining its capacity to do

Simon, Central European Civil-Military Relations and NAT O Expansion (Washington
DC: National Defense University Press, 1995) and Jeffrey Simon, NATO Enlargement and

Jeffrey

Central Europe:

A

Study in Civil-Military Relations (Washington, DC:

University Press, 1996).
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damage in its near abroad.

Karatnycky notes that after NATO

deferred enlargement in 1994,

"Russia proceeded with a

barrage of aggressive behavior in neighboring republics,

threatened Ukraine with economic blackmail, acted as
at international forums,

a

bully

wooed Iran and Iraq, tried to

topple Azerbaijan's president and launched a war against

Chechnya." 451

If

properly and carefully implemented in ways

that reassure the Russian public", Karatnycky writes,

"the

process of NATO's eastward expansion can have a salutary
effect on Russia's fundamental internal debate over its

foreign and defense policies.
Some observers are sympathetic to the "democratic

peace" theory which posits that democracies do not go to war

with each other and thus spreading the zone of democracy in
Europe is in NATO's interest.

452

For example,

Harlan

Cleveland suggests that NATO should be use to facilitate the
creation of an informal "Club of Democracies."

4

Allen Sens

maintains that the West's own principles are at stake and
enlargement would:

"...stand as a testament to the strength

of Western commitment to its own principles ... To refuse to

extend NATO membership to peaceful, democratic countries

Adrian Karatnycky, "Open

Up

the Club,"

The Washington Post

,

7 July 1995,

A21.

World
See Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War
Democratic Peace Be
(Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1993) and "Bruce Russett, "Can a
Built?"

International Interactions 18:3 (Spring 1993) 277-282, and

Bevond Containment: Reconstructing European Security (Boulder,

Kim Edward Spiezio.
CO: Lynne Reinner

Publishers, 1995).

Harlan Cleveland, Birth of
Francisco:

A New

World:

An Open Mom ent

Jossey-Bass Publishers. 1993) 204-220.
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tor International Leadership (San

asking for admittance, especially when such membership has

been openly suggested by Alliance leaders, would be an
affront to those principles." 454
Some supporters of NATO enlargement back its

transformation into a collective security institution like
the League of Nations.

In this context,

quickly and include Russia.

NATO should enlarge

Formally the US has pursued

this option as a carrot toward Russia knowing well that

Russian membership in NATO is not an option.

However,

former CIA director William Colby chaired a panel arguing
for rapid expansion of NATO to include Russia on the premise
of collective security.

455

Other observers sympathetic to

collective security see NATO stopping short of Russian

membership but support an expansion of its internal
This perspective claims that

collective security functions.

NATO does impact Greek-Turkish relations and this can be

duplicated by expanding NATO to include countries where
there are similar tensions such as Hungary and Romania.

August 1996 Hungary and Romania successfully completed

In
a

treaty (signed on 15 September 1996) that would lower

bilateral tensions over Transylvania which had been an

increasing source of distrust between the two countries,
because of the sizeable Hungarian minority population in the

Allen G. Sens, "Saying Yes to Expansion: The Future of

Changing Alliance,"

International Journal

Also see Coral

"Why

Bell,

an Expanded

NATO

and Canadian Interests

L (Autumn 1995) 684.
Must Include Russia,"

NATO

Studies 17 (December 1994) 27-41.
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in a

Journal of Strategic

region.

Because NATO had identified a need for a settlement

of outstanding regional disputes for entrance into
the

Alliance,

four years of delay over the treaty had begun

hindering both countries' prospects for NATO membership by
The pressure from American and NATO representatives

1996.

on these two countries linking their cooperation with

membership in NATO did have a positive impact moving them
toward the treaty.

However, US Ambassador to NATO Robert

Hunter may have overstated its importance when he proclaimed
in Budapest on 28 August that:

"It is now impossible for

Hungary and Romania to go to war." 456
Finally,

some analysts conclude that NATO enlargement

is necessary given that NATO has committed to it.

After its

leaders having said repeatedly that NATO will enlarge,

failure would damage NATO's credibility.

Thus NATO should

proceed with a limited enlargement that would do the least
harm

-

perhaps limited to the Czech Republic and Poland

while keeping the option open to enlargement in the
future.
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Others argue that perhaps NATO should enlarge

politically but not militarily.

Using Denmark and Norway,

or France and Spain as a model, NATO could bring in new

members without provocative military deployments or

integration into the NATO military command structures.

Reuters.

28 August 1996.

See James

W.

Morrison,

(Washington, DC:
See Lawrence

NATO
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S.

NATO

Expansion and Alternative Futu re Security Arrangements
Kay "American Strategies..."

National Defense University Press, 1995) and

Kaplan,

Enlargement:

"NATO

Enlargement:

Historical Aspects", in Jeffrey Simon, ed.,

Opinions and Options (Washington, DC:
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National Defense University,

Institutional st Arguments Against NATO Enlargement

Though some inst itut ionalists see value in maintaining
NATO after the Cold War, many are opposed to NATO
enlargement.

Making NATO function in the absence of

threat is difficult enough

-

a

enlarging NATO could weaken

consensus and decision-making in the institution.

If

it

took 16 NATO members over three years to agree to intervene

substantially in Bosnia, then it makes little sense to
enlarge soon.

Moreover,

a public debate over the costs of

enlargement could damage NATO as an institution.

Others

suggest that because NATO emphasizes military issues, the
quest for membership is distracting aspirants from advancing

economic reform.

Forced to increase their defense budgets

to become compatible with NATO standards,

these countries

will have to divert resources from precious social programs

already being cut.

In this view,

if NATO is to expand to

include countries that are full democracies, then how will
it decide when a stable or a market economy is flourishing

and is NATO the best institution to make that sort of

judgement?

Also,

how will NATO reconcile leaving some

countries that meet its standards out of enlargement because
of strategic concerns vis-a-vis Russia?

sort of institutional dilemma,

the EU,

Faced with this
the OSCE,

or the PFP

would best promote security for post-Cold War Europe.

1995) 21-42 and Condalezza Rice, "Now,

NATO

1996, A23.
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Should Grow," The

New York

Times, 8 July

Additionally, historical analogies which see NATO as the

primary source of stability in Europe tend to forget that,
at its origins,

NATO came complementary to a massive

infusion of US economic aid via the Marshall Plan.

As

neither the US or its European allies are prepared to

accompany enlargement with this kind of economic assistance,
sole reliance on NATO may offer a false promise artificially

raising expectations of what it can actually do for new

members
Some institutionalists assert that NATO and Europe

should have more urgent priorities than enlargement.

As

former EU chief Jacques Delors has complained, the US was
"overhasty" in pushing for NATO enlargement which is "a

premature initiative which was badly timed." 459
Kamp summarizes this dilemma for NATO:

".

.

Karl-Heinz

.what is not

needed now is a revived debate on a rapid expansion of NATO
to the East,

or even specific timetables for the admission

of particular Central and Eastern European countries ... This

would put unhealthy pressure on an alliance still in the
process of adjusting to new realities, and it would raise

expectations in Eastern Europe that the West cannot

realistically meet."

460

NATO enlargement may be a relative

gain for the West and an irresistible temptation.

Rick Atkinson and John Pomfret, "East Looks

Washington Post 6 July 1995, A 1,1 6.
Karl-Heinz Kamp, "The Folly of Rapid

to

NATO

to

Forge Links

to

West,"

Ik

.

NATO

116-129.
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Expansion," Foreign Policy 98 (Spring 1995)

Nonetheless, gains often have costs which may be to the

detriment of the institution.
Charles A. Kupchan asserts that enlargement would

destroy consensus and turn NATO into a talk shop while
drawing new dividing lines. 461

Kupchan agrees that NATO was

an important institution promoting internal collective

security during the Cold War.

However, he is skeptical as

to whether this can be duplicated in the absence of a

threat.

462

Making NATO too large would destroy any ability

of the Alliance to attain consensus in dealing with security

challenges as disparate interests would collide among the

member states.

This position is supported by former Deputy

Undersecretary of State Arnold

Horelick.

L.

Testifying

before the US Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on
Europe in April 1995, he asserted that enlargement without
first reconceptualizing the nature of the Alliance "displays
the same kind of logic that leads a couple in a deeply

troubled marriage to forgo marital therapy and have
baby instead."

463

a

new

Horelick was especially concerned than an

expanded NATO would make institutional "governance matters

Charles A. Kupchan, "Expand

NATO And
-

November 1994, Ell.
Kupchan describes NATO enlargement

Split

as a train

Europe," The

wreck waiting

New York
to

happen.

Times. 27

Either

it

wdl not

NATO itself, or it will
proceed thus damaging the hopes of Central and East European and also
go forward and auain divide Europe.
before the Senate Foreign
Testimony of former Deputy Undersecretary of State Arnold Horelick
Relations Subcommittee on Europe, 25 April 1995.
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worse" and thus it would be difficult to respond to

challenges in a larger NATO. 464
As an alternative to NATO enlargement, Kupchan calls
for the creation of an "Atlantic Union" that would subsume
the EU and NATO.

The Atlantic Union would replace NATO's

emphasis on territorial defense with a broad mandate to

preserve peace in the Atlantic area via collective security.
Such a move would not be based on an ant i -Russian premise
nor would it ask electorates in the West to extend new

defense commitments.

Kupchan writes that:

The elimination of NATO's Article V guarantee
would weaken the alliance's deterrent power, but
as along as Russia continues to pose no danger to
Western or Central Europe, the tradeoff makes
sense.
Western Europe enjoys a deep and stable
peace that would not be shaken by a more relaxed
American commitment, especially if US troops stay
put on the continent.
Indeed, although officials
on both sides of the Atlantic are reluctant to
admit it, the absence of a common threat has
already eroded the credibility of Article V. By
explicitly recognizing this change and seeking to
include Russia
a new Europe, the Atlantic Union
promises to make a pan-European community of
democracies a reality, not just rhetoric to
placate Moscow as Poland enters a NATO that_65
everyone knows will never go further East.

m

Kupchan concludes that:

"By sacrificing depth for breadth,

the Atlantic Union promises to lock-in the most profound

transformation of our century;

the creation of a community

of North Atlantic democracies among which war has become

unthinkable

"

466

.

Horelick Testimony.
Post. 18 April 1996,
Charles A. Kupchan, "A More Perfect Atlantic Union". The Washington
Union," Foreign Affairs
A25; and Charles A. Kupchan, "Reviving the West: For an Atlantic
75:3 (May/June 1996) 92-104.

Kupchan "A More

Perfect..."
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The Atlantic Union proposal did not gain serious

support in US elite academic or governmental circles.
However,

Charles and Clifford

A.

Kupchan's arguments in

favor of a new Concert of Europe have.

Kupchan and Kupchan

assert that as a military alliance, NATO's functional

utility is limited after the Cold War and that a new form of
collective security based on the Concert of Europe should
form the basis of a European security order. 467
view,

In this

NATO would aid in a period of transition but would not

be the dominant institution in the new order.

Kupchans have not specified

it,

the

5

Though the

Power Contact Group

consisting of the US, the United Kingdom, Germany, France,
and Russia meeting to promote peace in Bosnia represents

such an informal concert arrangement
Some institut ionalists who oppose enlargement question
the impact on economic and political reform in potential new

members.

If NATO

membership is a carrot promoting reform,

what incentive will new members have to continue reform once
in NATO?

Also, by

emphasizing the need to move toward NATO

military standards and NATO integrated command structures,
the wrong aspects of reform may become prioritized in some

Central and East European countries.

toward currency reform,

for example,

Instead of working
a state might be

tempted to purchase expensive F-16 fighter planes to show

and the Future of
Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security,
Europe," International Security 16:1 (Summer 1991) 114-161.
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their commitment to NATO.

Indeed,

in 1996 the Czech

Republic sought to purchase six F-16s from the US in order
to enhance its quest for NATO membership.

At a cost of $25

million per airplane, six F-16s would take up one fifth of
the entire Czech defense budget.

If the Czech Republic were

to actually replace its out-dated Soviet made Mig-21s,

would require 24, not

6

fighters.

it

Clinton Administration

officials responded by privately urging Czech officials to

dramatically increase defense spending.
Finally,

enlargement may enhance political and economic

reform in a new NATO member but hinder it in a state left
out.

For example,

a reform politician having strongly

advocated NATO membership as the primary foreign policy
objective could be punished by voters for not fulfilling a
promise.

Also a state like Romania, which has done nearly

everything that has been asked of

it,

could be left out of

NATO because of its history and geographic location
after having reduced tensions with Hungary.

-

even

Inclusion of

Hungary absent Romania, could push Romania into a defensive
arms race out of their historical fear of Hungary and the

issue of Hungarian minorities living in Transylvania.

Any

arms race in Romania would come at the expense of economic

reform there.

In Russia,

the most liberal and pro-Western

of Russian thinkers are bewildered at the policy which they

view as playing directly into the hands of nationalist and

anti-democratic forces in Russia.

249

Analysis

NATO enlargement remains a work in progress.

For the

project to succeed, NATO will have to adapt its

institutional form so that it does not decrease the security
of current,

packaged,

new,

or non-members.

enlargement moves the military responsibility of

the US and Germany
-

No matter how it is

-

Moscow's two twentieth century enemies

closer to Russia's borders.

Though not intended as such,

enlargement challenges Russia's pride, serves as

a

bruising

reminder that Moscow was on the losing side of the Cold War,
and leaves even moderate Russians feeling that they are

being punished for the sins of their Soviet forefathers.

If

enlargement proceeds in a way that appears threatening to
Russia,

it is not unreasonable to expect that Moscow might

redeploy dilapidated nuclear forces with weakened command
and control capabilities targeted at new NATO members and,
possibly,

current members.

Additionally, Russia may take

steps to de-stabilize states on its Western periphery in an

effort to create a new anti-NATO alliance including Belarus,

Ukraine and the Baltic countries if the threat is perceived
as high enough.

In sum,

if

handled poorly, NATO enlargement

risks decreasing security for nearly everyone involved.

NATO enlargement could damage the transatlantic

relationship on which European security is currently
dependent.

Specifically, the US Senate may balk at the

costs and the increased security commitments to regions that

have never been considered vital to US national security.
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Even the low end estimates of enlargement costs are

extremely high.

The RAND Corporation forecasts costs

between 20-110 billion dollars and the US Congressional
Budget Office between 61-125 billion dollars of which the US

would be required to pay 5-19 billion.

The wide range in

estimates reflects variations in institutional form

involving new NATO members.

For example,

the RAND estimates

assess three military scenarios for NATO enlargement to

include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.

A limited

military enlargement based on existing self-defense support
in the new members would cost $20 billion dollars of which

would be paid by new members, 33 percent by all

55 percent

of NATO,

and 12 percent by the key members

Britain,

and France)

(US,

Germany,

A strategy that would help prepare

.

new members for joint power projection (such as IFOR) would
cost $42 billion of which 25 percent would be paid by new

members,

members.

25

percent by full NATO, and

Finally,

50

percent by the key

a full forward presence based on a

containment model would cost $110 billion of which 20
percent would be paid by new members, 25 percent by full
NATO,

and 55 percent by the key members.

468

The US Congress will inevitably wonder why it should be

spending money to protect countries that are not threatened
while they are cutting US domestic spending.

468

Carla

Anne Robbins, "Devil

is

in Details of

Add Three New Members." The Wall

NATO

Street Journal
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Many observers

Expansion: Cost Questions Cloud Plans to
.

9 August, 1996.

of the Congress point out that the Republican
Contract with

America supported NATO enlargement as did legislation
introduced in the House of Representatives and by

presidential candidate Senator Robert Dole.

However,

was no substantial debate over the legislation.

there

While

voting non-binding legislation to enlarge NATO, Congress

passed formal legislation cutting the routine US payment for
NATO infrastructure from 229 million to 86 million dollars
Before departing the Senate to run for president,

in 1995.

Bob Dole proposed a fund of 61 million dollars to aid the

Visegrad countries in their efforts to join NATO.

Given the

estimated costs of enlargement, Dole's initiative was not
serious gesture. 469

a

A supporter of the Dole proposal,

Congressman Benjamin Gilman (Chairman of the House
International Relations Committee)

,

was clearly playing

election-year politics when he said that there was "...no
excuse for the unending delay that the Clinton

Administration orchestrated in expanding NATO."

It

was

especially unclear

where

the

money

for the

Dole

initiative

470

Actually

would come from. The 1997

Department budget request included $60 million Foreign Military Financing for the U.S.
government's Warsaw Initiative grant program which aids Central and Eastern European
countries for their participation in the PFP. A separate State Department program provides $7.8
State

million in loan subsidies to finance up to 72.5 million in loans to qualifying countries. Philip
Finnegan and Theresa Hitchens, "U.S. Budget Battle Brews Over Aid to Turkey, Greece,"

Defense

News

was unlikely

,

1

that

April 1996.

Given

the desire in Congress to cut State Department funding,

new money would be made
As the 60 million

available for the

Dole

it

initiative but rather

PFP programs appeared a likely
candidate, the Dole initiative potentially risked drawing its own lines in Europe by diverting
money away from countries most needing funding for their PFP activities and wealthier
countries already in line for the first wave of NATO membership. More likely, nothing would
redirected from other programs.

really

change

available to

Reuters.

at all as the

all

PFP

PFP money

for

already available might simply be renamed and remain

countries.

4 June 1996.
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the congressional action was dangerous to the candidate
states, promoting a false promise that could lure them to

believe that there would be automatic Senate approval for
enlargement.

Some NATO officials hope that when the time

for ratification of NATO enlargement comes,

the US Senate

will go first as it would pave the way for the remaining

parliaments.

Thus,

the US is in need of leadership and

education in a Congress that is increasingly losing its
institutional memory and reducing US commitments abroad.
NATO enlargement needed a Vandenberg- style resolution in

advance of negotiations on treaty accession

person sitting in Vandenberg'

s

-

and yet the

chair in 1996 was the most

virulent isolationist in the US Senate, Jessie Helms.

American public opinion is also
enlargement.

471

a constraint on NATO

According to a study by the Chicago Council on

Foreign Relations, 24 percent of the US public support NATO

membership for the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary.
However, when the issue of sending troops to resist a

Russian invasion of Poland is raised, 50 percent of the
public is opposed and only 32 percent in favor.

47

"

If

Americans are not willing to equate Warsaw with Wichita,
Prague with Pittsburgh, or Budapest with Boston, then NATO
cannot afford the loss of credibility that would come in the

see Jesse Helms. "Saving
For a moderate example of Helm's views of international institutions
2-7.
the U.N." Foreign Affairs 75:5 (September/October 1996)
(Spring 1995) 89.
John E. Rielly, "The Public Mood at Mid-Decade", Foreign Policy 98
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event of some

(unlikely)

attack on Poland or any other new

member
The third major problem with NATO enlargement is that,

while increasing stability is the formal goal of the policy,
the most likely new members are candidates primarily because

they are stable and are not threatened.

However,

the Baltic

countries are potentially unstable and threatened.

NATO

enlargement that does not include the Baltic countries
it will not

-

-

as

will consign them to a grey area of Russian

influence, possibly prompt serious Russian violations of the
CFE treaty,

and in a worst-case lead to overt or covert

action against Baltic sovereignty with Russia drawing
Cold War line at the Polish/Lithuanian border. 473

a new

When

Ukraine and Kaliningrad are added to the geostrategic
setting, NATO could face a potentially explosive situation
in the region.

Only NATO troops or nuclear weapons

stationed in the Baltic territories would provide for
credible Baltic defense and that is highly unlikely.
this context,

In

it is reasonable to question whether such

potential instability right at Polish borders

currently does not exist

-

-

which

would be in Warsaw's interests or

that of any other NATO member.

This possibility has raised serious concerns in Finland and Sweden

how

NATO

enlargement increases security

in the Baltic region.

countries have indicated that for their part, they do not want

continue to work within the PFP.
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who have

both questioned

Not comfortably assured, both

NATO

membership

but rather will

On 14 May 1996 Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev

warned that

(Poland and Lithuania's)

"...early entry into

NATO would create definite difficulties for Russia in

relation to the Kaliningrad region.

.

.We

would not want to be

cut off from the special defensive district of Kaliningrad

by NATO states," Grachev said. 474

In response,

Russia might

create defensive alliances with its former Soviet allies and

could not rule out preemptive military action by its armed
forces against states determined to join NATO. 475

The same

day that Grachev spoke, a Polish public opinion poll showed
that 47 percent of Poles believed that an alliance between

Russia and Belarus was a danger to their country's
Because the causal linkage accelerating Russian-

interests.

Byelorussian strategic cooperation was Poland's quest for
NATO membership, there appeared be a serious conflict

between what Poland wanted from NATO and the security and
stability that it thought it was getting.
In sum,

there are many legitimate reasons to have

serious concern about the potential impact of NATO

enlargement as both realists and institutionalists opposed
to enlargement warn.

Nevertheless, a strong case for

enlarging NATO to include Poland and the Czech Republic
combined with an intensive institutional adaptation can be
made.

Drawing from realism, NATO enlargement would enhance

Reuters.

14

May

1996.

Nezavisimava Gazeta

,

1

1

April 1996.

0MR1
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Daily Report, 12 April 1996.

NATO's traditional mission by keeping the Americans

in,

the

Germans constrained, and the Russians out by permanently
settling the border between Germany and its Eastern
neighbors.

Limited NATO enlargement can promote reassurance

in an area where uncertainty has led to catastrophic war

repeatedly in European history

-

not as a hedge against a

Russian threat, but rather, a hedge between Russia and

Germany

4 ""

The risks are extremely high in implementing

this strategy.

Therefore NATO's institutional form will

have to be adapted considerably to ensure Russia that

enlargement is not a threat to it and so that those
countries left out of NATO are not destabilized in the

process

Tasks
The primary institutional task of NATO enlargement will
be to promote reassurance for Russia and those countries

left out of NATO.
First,

Reassurance can come in three ways.

NATO and Russia can complete a charter specifying a

new consultative arrangement opening a wide array of

institutionalized NATO-Russia cooperation building on the
positive experience of Russia's involvement in IFOR and
stressing areas of shared interests.

Second, NATO should

leave enlargement open in principle but stop for a long

A

look at the

map

arrangement woulc
suggests that including Hungary and Slovenia in this

enlargement. However, under current
contribute to this geostrategic foundation of
countries.
circumstances, there is no need for haste in including these

NATO
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pause of five to ten years before additional members are
admitted.

If there is to be a "second wave"

of enlargement

to give aspirants a reason to continue to cooperate with

NATO (eg by contributing to peacekeeping)

invitations should

be limited to small countries not bordering the former

Soviet Union such as Slovenia or even non- traditionally

neutral countries like Ireland or Austria.

Third, NATO

should be very cautious, and as transparent as possible, in
how it expands its infrastructure in these countries.

The

primary focus of NATO activity for new members should be
training for non- traditional challenges such as
peacekeeping.

Nuclear deployments and stationing of foreign

troops should be explicitly ruled out unless defensive needs

mandate such activity.

Fourth,

and most importantly, NATO

must dramatically redesign its internal functions so that it
is clear to Russia

(and to the US Congress)

that the

Alliance has truly adapted to the post-Cold War security
environment

Organizational Capabilities
NATO's basic organizational capabilities need not
change with regard to its new members except to the extent
that headquarters installations will be required.

NATO will

remain a highly formal organization with low institutional
autonomy.

NATO's evolved rules for membership should remain

conditionally open with one caveat.

The new members must

agree that they will not block further NATO expansion.
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In

this sense, new members will have an interim period in which

they will not share fully in the decisions with regard to

further enlargement as

a

condition of their own joining.

Though NATO may never enlarge again, or only do so in

a

limited way, this option keeps the perspective towards

membership open for aspirant countries.

Principles, Norms, Rules, and Procedures

Expanding democracy and promoting economic reform
should be decoupled from NATO enlargement per se

NATO does

.

not have a credible history in this area aside from Spain

and there is no evidence that the Spanish experience is

especially relevant to that of the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe.

Likewise, NATO should not promise to

resolve all conflicts among new members though it can and

should continue to promote consultation and the peaceful

settlement of disputes when possible.

Linking NATO too

closely with internal crisis management may raise false
hopes that NATO can independently cause peace.

Indeed,

this

false promise may encourage NATO members to pursue dangerous

policies against other states thinking that NATO will come
to their aid if they get themselves into trouble.

NATO

should promote the norms and principles that its members

value

-

through an enhanced and strengthened Partnership for

Peace
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Capacity for Change
The entire success or failure of NATO enlargement to

enhance security will rest on the capacity of its members to
adapt NATO's institutional form to the post-Cold War

security environment.

This means implementing a major

internal restructuring of NATO based on a new burdensharing

arrangement.

For NATO to increase security,

it must move

from theory to practice in its institutional adaptation by

restructuring transatlantic security after the Cold War.

Conclusion:

Enlarge NATO, But Do No Harm

Placing NATO, and therefore US influence, as

a

hedge

between Germany and Russia can have a major effect on the
future of European security.

However,

it will only be

positive if democratic Russia understands that enlargement
is not an anti-Russian act.

The institutional form of

enlargement will have a major impact on whether or not

Russia is sufficiently reassured.

If NATO is

perceived as

an implicitly anti-Russian alliance taking advantage of a

weakened state with wounded pride and

a lot of

nuclear

weapons, history will not be kind to those who rushed the

expansion of NATO without a full airing of the potentially
negative consequences.

If NATO's institutional form is

adapted with a careful application of both realist and
institutional signposts of what might go wrong, then NATO

enlargement may enhance peace and security into the 21st
century.

Most importantly, enlargement must not distract
259

from an even more central issue confronting NATO and the
future of European security

-

internal restructuring.
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CHAPTER VII
INSTITUTIONAL REALIGNMENT:
RESTRUCTURING TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY AFTER THE COLD WAR

Introduction and Overview

Chapter Seven shows that, contrary to realist
predictions, European members of NATO are either unwilling
or unable to "go it alone" and scrap NATO in favor of an

independent European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)
It shows why efforts to build the EU,

a Franco-German Corps,

and the Western European Union were ineffective.

NATO has

established a framework for post-Cold War institutional
functions based on the Combined Joint Task Forces concept.
CJTF will bring the ESDI into NATO as an operational

burdensharing mechanism making NATO

a

standing institution

from which states that are willing, and have political
support from the other members, can draw from NATO assets to

manage European crises.

With this internal transformation,

France has gradually returned to NATO's military structures.
If successful,

internal restructuring will demonstrate the

value of NATO's institutional functions as the primary

peacetime activity of NATO will be based on Article

4

consultation and the procedures and infrastructure that NATO
has available for coalitions of willing states to take on

certain missions.

Nevertheless,

serious political and

operational obstacles draw into question NATO's capacity for
change.

For NATO to continue to function, a renewed
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transatlantic relationship which reflects the shared
interests of the US and Europe is needed.

Institutional Realignment
As NATO members contemplated enlargement,

they embarked

on an internal adaptation to make the institution better

reflect the changed dynamics in the transatlantic

relationship.

The end of the Soviet challenge, declining US

involvement in Europe, and

a

growing potential for the EU to

assume an independent security role were the major events

leading to this institutional change.

The process often

took the form of competition between the US and some of its

European allies who wanted a European Security and Defense
Identity (ESDI) to be created independent of NATO.

However,

this option was constrained by the existing institutional

framework which affected the means and approaches toward
national security that key West European states pursued.
Absent credible independent capabilities, an accord was

reached in 1996 that the ESDI would be formed within NATO.
This institutional realignment was dramatized by France's

military rapproachment to NATO military planning.

Contending National Views and Instituti on-Building
The Maastricht Treaty on European Union completed in
1991 sought to create a common foreign and security policy

via an ESDI built through a revitalized WEU.

The EU members

agreed that a community of 350 million citizens with two

nuclear powers should be able to exert influence in security
matters and take more responsibility for their own affairs
after the Cold War.

However,

the leading European states

split over the form an ESDI would take;

Britain wanted it

subordinated to NATO, France wanted it fully independent of
NATO,

and Germany sought to reconcile both views. 477

was most adamant in its support for an ESDI.

France

Paris hoped to

propel European integration and confine the united Germany

within an institutional framework France could dominate.
France also worried that the US presence in post-Cold War

Europe would decline and that Washington could no longer be
relied on.

Early signals from Washington suggested that the

Europeans had reason for concern about the US role in

European security.

The Bush Administration began cutting US

forces stationed in Europe dramatically and insisting that
the Europeans take responsibility for burdensharing and

management of the Balkan crisis while aggressively opposing
an ESDI.

478

President Bush let the Europeans take the lead

See United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, Statement of the Defence Estimates 1994 (London:
UK Ministry of Defence, 1994); French Ministry of Defence, Livre Blanc sur la Defense

French Ministry of Defence, 1994); and Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paner on
the Security of the Federal Reouhlic of Germany and the Situation and Future of the

(Paris:

Bundeswehr (Bonn: Federal Ministry of Defence,

1994).

Among

the smaller states, Portugal,

The remaining Continental powers
were (to varying degrees) sympathetic to the French position. Italy was sensitive to both views.
Under President Bush the US promised to retain some 150,000 US troops in Europe or available
Congress suggested
to the European theater. However, some proposals popular in the US
the Netherlands, and

Denmark supported

the British view.

force
25,000 would suffice while others counseled 50,000 - 70,000. For discussion of US
Security,"
European
to
Commitment
American
"The
Powell,
L.
levels in Europe see Colin
in Europe: How Low
Survival 34:2 (Summer 1992) 1 and Don M. Snider, "US Military Forces

Can

We

Go?", Survival 34:4 (Winter 1992-1993) 24-39. Snider maintains
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that a militarily

in the Balkans confident that efforts toward the
ESDI would

collapse there. 479

The Clinton Administration sent early

signals that reinforced Europe's concerns about America's

dependability.

In May 1993 a senior State Department

official said that economics would shape US foreign policy
and that the US would have to define the extent of its

commitments commensurate to this priority

suggesting a

-

shift in attention from Europe to Latin America and Asia. 480

Secretary of State Warren Christopher mused that the US had

been too Eurocentric in its foreign policy priorities. 481
1994,

In

Secretary of Defense Les Aspin suggested in an annual

report that:

"For their part, US allies must be sensitive

to the linkages between a sustained US commitment to their

security on the one hand, and their actions in such areas as
trade policy,

technology transfer, and participation in

multinational security operations on the other." 482
1994,

Also in

the US House of Representatives approved a proposal

(rejected by the Senate)

calling for Europe to reimburse 75

percent of the total costs of stationing US troops in

significant force

would have

75.000

to include

US ground

The Clinton Administration

forces.

has settled on the figure of 95,000.
Interview with a senior Pentagon official, Washington

view among
heightened

US

and

NATO

officials at

when Canada announced on

NATO

DC, March

1996.

headquarters in 1992.

5 February 1992 that

it

This was a

common

European concerns were

would withdraw

its

standing

forces in Europe because of overstretched commitments and costs.
Daniel Williams and John M. Goshko, "Reduced US World Role Outlined but Soon Altered,"

Washington Post 26 May 1993, Al. The
,

official

was widely recognized

to

be Undersecretary

of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff.
Stanley R. Sloan, "Transatlantic Relations in the

Wake

of the Brussels Summit,"

NATO

Review

42:2 (April 1994) 27-31.

Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report
D.C.:

Department of Defense, 1994)

9.
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to the President

and

th e

Congress (Washington

Europe.

The proposal would have provided for the withdrawal

of US troops if Europe did not agree.

Ongoing divisions between the US and its allies over
the Balkans,

troops,

especially American reluctance to commit ground

added to Europe's concerns.

For France,

this split

was a clear indication of the need for Europe have an

independent capability for handling crises.

As French

Foreign Minister Alain Juppe said in November 1994:

"...the

conflict in Bosnia has shown the necessity to move beyond

NATO and American guarantees to build a credible European

defense that could back up our common foreign policy
interests."

483

Conversely,

in the US view,

the futility of

European efforts reinforced the view that an ESDI was

unworkable
Despite such European frustration with the US, an
independent ESDI would be redundant to NATO (should the US

commitment remain credible), expensive, and could harm

European integration if EU members became worried about
supranational intrusions into their national security.

It

might also damage the transatlantic relationship, on which
Europe still depended,

if not carefully managed.

Thus the

EU approach to building the ESDI took two conflicting forms

promoting a gain for the EU while strengthening the
transatlantic relationship by demonstrating operational

William Drozdiak, "US and Europe

in Serious Rift

27 November 1994, Al.
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Over Bosnia War." The Washington

Post.

burdensharing.

Reconciling the desire to go independent

from NATO and strengthen NATO at the same time would

eventually prove insurmountable.

The Limits of European Union:

A False Promise of Security

The Bush Administration sent strong signals in 1991
that European initiatives creating an ESDI at NATO's expense

would be met with firm US resistance.

For example,

at the

November 1991 NAC ministerial session in Rome, French
President Francois Mitterand questioned the emphasis on NATO

characterizing the Alliance as:
not a Holy Alliance."

President Bush was terse in his

response insisting that:
mind,

"...a good one, but it is

"If you have something else in

if you want to go your own way,

any longer

-

say so."

484

if you don't need us

In compromise language,

the Rome

Summit endorsed the cost effective use of Alliance resources
and concluded that:

structures,

"Integrated and multinational European

as they are further developed in the context of

an emerging European defense identity, will also

increasingly have a similarly important role to play in

enhancing the Allies' ability to work together in the common
defense."

485

During the preparations for the Rome meeting,

the ESDI language was the most contentious issue in the

Krupnick, "Not What They Wanted: American Policy and the European
Antsis. eds.. Disconcert
Security and Defense Identity," in Alexander Moens and Christoph
130.
Press,
1995)
Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview

Quoted

Rome

in Charles

Declaration of Peace and Cooperation, 7-8

266

November

1991.

discussion of NATO's new strategic concept.

Some members

viewed the language as carte blanche support for an ESDI.
Others noted its placement, at the very end of the
communique,
Moreover,

showed the priority NATO put on the ESDI.

the language was clear

-

an ESDI would have to

strengthen NATO. 486
While NATO prepared for the Rome summit, Europe was

engaged in a parallel process drafting the Treaty on

European Union to be signed at Maastricht, the Netherlands,
in December.

Union

(EU)

The European leaders endowed the European

with a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

based on an evolutionary construction of an ESDI

.

There was

consensus among the Europeans on the need for an ESDI

Unable too speak or act with one voice during the 1990-1991
Persian Gulf War, Europe had shown an inability to protect
its vital interests on its own.

487

Thus many of the

countries gathered at Maastricht believed it was necessary
to build a European capability for defense and power

projection.

Nevertheless, major internal differences over

the form of an ESDI and its relationship to NATO hindered

the goal

Discussion with

J.

Michael Legge.

NATO

Assistant Secretary General and Chair of the Strategy

Review Group at the Belgian Royal Defence College, Brussels, 23 January 1992.
including
The Gulf War borrowed heavily from NATO assets and command and control Europe was
Nonetheless,
command.
US
under
forces
French
arrangements made for British and
reluctant to grant political credit to

the

Gulf while seeking

to

NATO

promote the

in
for aiding the mobilization and operation offerees

WEU

-
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even though the

latter

did very

little.

In December 1990 France and Germany proposed a formal

relationship between the EU and WEU so that the WEU would
"...in time become part of Political Union." 488

been dormant since the mid-1950s.

The WEU had

In October 1984 it was

reactivated to signal burdensharing intentions among the
Europeans and to enhance movement toward the Single European
Act (1986) which established the framework for political and

economic union in Europe to take place in 1992

Operationally the WEU was limited to minesweeping activities
during the Iran/Iraq war and coordination of European
efforts to enforce a naval embargo against Iraq and perform
mine- sweeping duties during the Persian Gulf War in 19901991.

Shortly after its reactivation, Portugal and Spain

joined the WEU.

The Franco-German initiative would have

signaled a major increase in the WEU profile.
The US responded to the Franco-German proposal with a

terse diplomatic demarche delivered to WEU members signaling

strong US opposition to the Franco-German proposal.

insisted that:

The US

all decisions to commit an ESDI to out-of-

area activity involve consultation with the US;

there

should be no WEU integrated command structure duplicating
that of NATO;

and there should be no "backdoor" security

commitment to Central and Eastern Europe via WEU enlargement

Agence Europe 5388 (10-11 December 1990)
1970s.
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3-4.

The

WEU

had been dormant during die

that implicitly extended the American commitment to NATO. 489

A compromise was broached by Britain and Italy on

October

4

endorsing an ESDI via the WEU which would be subordinated to
NATO.

The Anglo- I tal ian initiative would have reserved the

WEU for out-of-area operations with NATO retaining sole

responsibility for security within the European area.

mission-based burdensharing would be attained via

Such

Europe

a

Reaction Force consisting of forces separate from the NATO
structure.

However on 14 October, France and Germany

responded by insisting that the EU have clear ties to the
WEU,

that the EU promote an independent European armaments

agency,

and that Europe develop military units that would be

solely allocated to the WEU

490

The Maastricht Treaty reflected a compromise between

these competing views.

The EU members agreed that:

"The

common foreign and security policy shall include all

questions related to the security of the European Union,
including the eventual framing of a common defense policy,

which might in time lead to a common defense."

91

The

Maastricht accord did not create a formal tie between the EU
and WEU.

Instead it identified the WEU as an integral part

of the development of the Union and as its defense

"NATO's Outlook Clouded by French-German Plan," The Washington Post 19 October
1991, A20 and U.S. Wary of European Corps, Seeks Assurance on NATO Role," The New

See

.

York Times 20 October 1991,
,

A 12.

Kelleher 56-57.

Maastricht Treaty on European Union, J.4.
after receiving approval

1

The Treaty entered

.

from the 12 member

state parliaments.
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into force in

November 1993

component.

Non-WEU members of the EU were invited to join

or become observers.

European members of NATO not belonging

to the WEU were offered the same opportunity.

the WEU informally linked to the EU,

In keeping

the problem of neutral

countries such as Ireland using veto authority over WEU

activity was avoided.

Similarly Denmark, which is an EU

member in NATO, but not the WEU, could not obstruct its
development.
Norway,

In 1992,

Greece joined the WEU.

Iceland,

and Turkey have become associate members and

Denmark, Austria,

Sweden,

and Ireland observers.

The

members agreed that the EU may request the WEU to implement

decisions and actions taken by the EU which have defense
implications.

92

In a separate statement,

the

9

WEU

ministers at Maastricht affirmed the need for a genuine ESDI
and a greater European responsibility on defense matters.
Formally,

the WEU would be the defense arm of the EU and at

the same time strengthen the European pillar of NATO.

493

The Franco-German Corps

The Maastricht compromise produced a disparity between
the EU's foreign policy aspirations and its military

To compensate, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl

capabilities.

Treaty on European Union. Article
Declaration on

the Role of the

Union and with
members hoped

J. 4. 2.

Western European Union and

the Atlantic Alliance.

its

Relations with the European

Maastricht, the Netherlands, 10

December 1991. EU

would develop through an evolutionary process beginning with a
that the
NATO and eventually
loose contribution to the development of the EU complementary to
leading to a

WEU

common EU

defense.
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and French President Francois Mitterand announced the formal

establishment of a Franco-German Corps on 21 May 1992. 494
The Eurocorps, as it became known, enlarged the existing

Franco-German brigade to a corps-level unit of 35,000
troops.

France and Germany hoped to use the Eurocorps to

enable the WEU to act in accordance with the directives of
the EU by:

aiding in the defense of NATO territory;

assisting in peacekeeping activities outside the NATO area;
and assisting in humanitarian operations. 495

Operationally,

the corps is composed of the French 1st Armored Division
(based in Germany)

,

and the German 10th Panzergrenadier

Division which wears a dual -hat with NATO meaning that it is
available both to the Eurocorps and NATO for planning and
operational purposes.

The forces are largely stationed in

Germany with headquarters in Strasbourg, France.

In

peacetime the forces remain national with the only standing

multinational activity taking place at the staff level in
Strasbourg
France hoped that Germany would assign

Initially,

specific forces solely identified as Eurocorps assets.
However, Germany insisted that the Eurocorps be transparent

The

origins of

Franco-German

security cooperation

lie in

the Elysee Treaty of 1963 which

1987 France and Germany created a joint
outlined broad political
Defense and Security Council to
joint
a
established
they
In
1988
brigade of 4000 troops.
- including sharing information on
cooperation
for
areas
other
oversee the brigade and identify
European Defense and the Future
Steinberg,
B.
James
nuclear issues. See Scott A. Harris and
Corporation, 1993).
Rand
The
CA:
of Transatlantic Cooperation (Santa Monica,
European Defense," The
Toward
Step
as
Corps
William Drozdiak, "France, Germany Unveil

and defense cooperation.

Washington Post 23 May 1992,
,

A 15.
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In

and complementary to NATO command structures.

Wanting the

Eurocorps to provide momentum toward the ESDI, France was
left with little choice but to accept the German position

regarding NATO.

American and NATO planners were especially

concerned that the Eurocorps could contribute to instability
and uncertainty in a crisis if command and control

relationships were unclear.

Adhering to NATO's concerns,

Germany and France signed an agreement with SACEUR on

22

December 1992 to place the Eurocorps under NATO command in
the event of a crisis.

496

France was integrating its

military with Germany outside of NATO but allowing that the
assets be available to NATO in a crisis.

In theory,

was moving away from NATO to build an ESDI.

practice,

France

However,

in

Paris was actually moving closer to Allied

military planning.

497

Belgium, Luxembourg, and Spain joined the Eurocorps
However,

which became operational on 30 November 1995.

because the Eurocorps took three years to become
operational,

it was not a credible effort to deal with the

The EU participants were

immediate conflict in the Balkans.

using action within an institutional context as a guise for

According

to

one account, the

Eurocorps consisted of three

classified details of the

parts:

the Eurocorps

NATO and the
NATO command

agreement between

would be assigned

to

it

the

attack; under NATO command during crises and NATO-run
when the Eurocorps was not under NATO command, NATO's
peacetime,
in
and
operations;
command had the right to review its operations so as to determine its compatibility with
NATO's planning, training, and doctrine. Robert J. Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the

Alliance

peacekeeping

came under

United States and

NATO,"

Political Science Quarterly 111:1 (Spring 1996) 29.

This point was stressed by German military

officials

of the Eurocorps.
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who hoped

to

convince

NATO

of the value

crisis management.

As Peter Schmidt wrote:

"...France and

Germany tend to agree much more on institution building than
on hard-core security policies." 498

The Franco-German corps

did symbolize a fundamental reconciliation and unprecedented

cooperation between these two historical enemies. 499
However,

the popular refrain in NATO circles that the

Eurocorps is little more than a "parade army" continues to
ring true.

The Western European Union
The WEU faced similar constraints as the Eurocorps

though its members hoped to give it a greater operational
role.

Meeting at Petersberg near Bonn on 19 June 1992, the

WEU leadership agreed that while contributing to NATO's

Peter Schmidt, "ESDI:

A German

Analysis," in Charles Barry, ed., Reforming the Trans-

Atlantic Relationship (Washington D.C.:
after activation, the

National Defense University Press, 1996) 42.

Eurocorps began limited exercises including training maneuvers

French and Belgian Ardennes.

Additionally, the Eurocorps and

deployment of

forces.

complement

From

European Information Service, European Report,

Bit Player to

Major Actor

for

WEU,"

1

1

November

1995.

To

the Eurocorps, France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal have organized a land force

(EUROFOR)
Beyond

conducted a joint exercise
control, and eventual

Crisex took place in Brussels, Metz, and on the Canary Islands for each

respective element of the exercise.

"Defense/Security:

WEU

command and

called Crisex dealing with decision-making procedures,

Shortly

in the

and a maritime force

the corps, France and

(EUROMARFOR).

Germany were pursuing

further military cooperation including:

regular meetings of ministerial working and expert groups, the purpose of which is to further
develop common projects; an exchange of officers, including between staffs; intensification of
leadership and language training by means of officer and officer candidate exchanges;
cooperation in training and exercising, for instance by temporarily establishing Franco-German

exercise naval forces;

Army

use and development of training

Aviation training center in Rennes/France;

in the field

of air defense; promotion of friendly

furnishing of mutual support in humanitarian

Cambodia and Somalia, doing

ties

by way of over sixty

so at conceptual level by elaborating

affiliations;

common

common

operations in
airlift

plans for

medical training concept for

Federal Ministry of Defense White Paper 60.
,
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combined

conduct of analyses and studies, for instance,

operations, for instance, in the

providing humanitarian aid, and by devising a

humanitarian operations.

facilities, for instance, the

common defense in accordance with Article

Washington Treaty,

5

of the

"...military units of WEU member states

acting under the authority of WEU could be employed for

humanitarian and resource tasks;

humanitarian and rescue tasks;

could be employed for

peacekeeping tasks, tasks of

combat forces in crisis management,

peacemaking."

500

However,

including

the WEU also endorsed a proposal

forwarded by British Minister of Defense Malcom Rifkind

which assured that the WEU would not create its own
independent military command structure.

The WEU tasked its

military officials to identify a variety of assets (such as
the Eurocorps,

the new British-Dutch amphibious force,

or

the Multinational Airmobile Division) which could be made

available on a case-by-case basis.

501

This proposal was

designed to avoid overlap between WEU and NATO member state
institutional

As with the Eurocorps,

commitments.

limitations of the WEU forced France to compromise and reevaluate its security priorities.
Politically,

the WEU kept apace of the changing

institutional dynamics by reaching out to Central and

Western European Union Council of Ministers, "Petersberg Declaration," Bonn, 19 June 1992.
In accordance with these objectives, the

WEU

international secretariat (which

WEU

was moved from London

activated in October 1992 consisting of a forty

tasked

created a planning cell in Brussels as part of

member

to Brussels).

prepare recommendations

for the necessary

command,

its

was

coordinating group of military officials

prepare contingency plans for the employment of forces under

to:

The

cell

WEU

auspices;

control and communication arrangements,

and to keep
including standing operating procedures for headquarters which might be selected;
for
to the
an updated list of units and combinations of units which might be allocated

WEU

specific operations.

The British-Dutch amphibious
assigned to

NATO

are
force and the Multinational Airmobile Division (Central)

but could be

made

available to the
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WEU.

Eastern Europe.
a formal

Like NATO,

security guarantee.

the WEU was reluctant to expand

The Petersberg Declaration

created a "Forum for Consultation" to bring interested
countries from the former Warsaw Pact into a dialogue with

WEU countries.

Meeting in Luxembourg on

9

May 1994, the WEU

foreign ministers invited nine Central and East European

countries to join the WEU as "Associate Partners".

The WEU

now had four levels of participation including Members,

Associate Members, Associate Partners, and Observers.

The

new Associate Partners included Poland, Hungary, the Czech
Republic,

Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia,

and Estonia.

Associate Partners have no security guarantee

and cannot veto decisions taken by the WEU.

They can attend

alternative weekly sessions of WEU ambassadors in Brussels
where they can raise security concerns.

Associate Partners

could also contribute troops to WEU peacekeeping missions.
The Associate Partners proposal was intended to limit WEU

outreach to those Central and East Europeans most likely to

qualify for EU membership.

Some in the WEU hoped that this

limited approach could be more effective than NATO's PFP

-

in spite of the fact that the WEU had no independent

operational functions.

502

Despite this institutional activity, the WEU's outreach
to the East was not a major problem for NATO

Interview with a senior

WEU

official,

-

Washington DC, November 1994.
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or even

Russia.

503

By 1995 the WEU had not become a credible

institution for organizing the conduct of significant

military operations.

Recognizing its continued weakness,

the WEU foreign ministers met in Lisbon on 15 May 1995 and

took modest steps toward strengthening its operational role.
At Lisbon,

the WEU established a politico-military group to

support the WEU Council, and created Situation and

Intelligence Centers.

Additionally, the ministers accepted

an Anglo- Italian proposal to advance planning for a WEU

intervention force in humanitarian crises, but failed to
agree on procedures for financing such operations.

The WEU

also approved a White Paper which assessed security threats
including:

unresolved border disputes, terrorism, organized

crime, migration,

and proliferation of nuclear weapons and

Absent from the assessment was the sort

ballistic missiles.

of conflict immediately challenging European security

-

the

Balkans
Ultimately,

the WEU is a security institution without a

Like NATO, peacetime forces which

military infrastructure.

The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement calling the WEU decision an attempt to "create
mild language
a new model of military-political alliance in a limited space in Europe. " This was
compared to the vehement Russian opposition to NATO enlargement. ITAR-TASS. 12 May
December 1994 Russian Foreign
1994. In RFE/RL Daily Reports, 13 May 1994. On
1

Minister Kosyrev came close

to

endorsing the

"NATO, which was

WEU's

activities telling the

born in response

WEU

to the division

Parliamentary

of Europe, could

Assembly
new
promote partnership leading to European unity, if only the Alliance is not used to draw
the Unity of
of
care
take
should
WEU,
the
including
themselves,
dividing lines... Europeans
in Paris that:

Europe/'

Address by Andrei Kosyrev, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia,

Parliamentary Assembly, Paris,
increased cooperation with the

were being given "take

it,

1

December

WEU

or leave

1994.

as a potential

it"

proposals from the West.
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to the

WEU

Most Associate Partners appreciated the
link to the EU. However, some felt that

they

might be made available to the WEU remain national

including the Eurocorps

.

However, unlike NATO,

-

the WEU has

no peacetime supreme commander, no peacetime military

headquarters, and no standing command and control structure.

Without infrastructure, training, and major exercises, the

WEU has no capability to project power or promote stability
in the event of a crisis threatening its member states.

Moreover,

the absence of sufficient satellite,

transportation, and other logistical capabilities, common

language and compatible communication arrangements, the

incorporation of standardized and interoperational
equipment,

or exact location of equipment made the WEU

fundamentally weak.
Weaknesses in WEU satellite and intelligence
capabilities were exposed in the fall of 1994 when the US

announced it would no longer share intelligence with its
European allies enforcing the naval arms embargo of the
Balkans.

Responding to the US announcement, President of

the WEU Assembly,

Sir Dudley Smith stated that:

"The US

dominate the NATO command structure in the Adriatic area and
the withdrawal of US ships and aircraft would make a mockery
of the embargo operat ions ... This example also proves just

how much Europe needs to be autonomous where intelligence
gathering,

satellite reconnaissance and logistical support
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are concerned.

A week later, Smith qualified his remarks

to stress that it is "vital not to weaken NATO because of
its essential role in maintaining peace in Europe... any such

weakening cannot be allowed to happen." 505
An ESDI standing alone against a revitalized Russian

challenge at current force levels would prove

destabilizing imbalance.

a

At the conventional level the

relationship between Russia and the combined French, German,
and British forces is 4:1 for heavy tanks,
tanks,

2:1 for armored vehicles,

1.5:1 for light

3.75:1 for towed or self-

propelled guns, 7:1 for multiple-warhead rocket launchers,
and 2.6:1 for combat aircraft.

506

Building a credible

independent ESDI from scratch would thus prove very
expensive.

The lowest level of independent military

capability is estimated to cost $27 billion over 25 years
and would still require the aid of US systems to make it
The highest level of independent ESDI activity

function.

The higher level

would cost $95 billion over 25 years.

WEU
WEU
its

Press Release.
Satellite

1 1

November

1994.

Center was inaugurated

instructions from the

at

To compensate

for this technological weakness, a

Torrejon, Spain on 28 April 1993. The center receives

WEU permanent council and

is

responsible for intelligence gathering;

and
the verification of arms-control agreements; monitoring crises affecting European security;
which
France
for
priority
a
became
project
monitoring environmental hazards. The Torrejon

hoped

to give the

strategic
etc,.

and wartime

treaties, collection of

intelligence data, navigational assistance, electronic warfare capabilities,
have also begun a joint project to develop a new line of military spy

In July 1996 Italy joined the project.

thus a priority for the

On

advance warning supervision of disarmament

France and Germany

satellites.
is

WEU

Claude Carlier,

18

November

"NATO

is

well-funded

at $2.

1

billion

EU.

the record interview with Sir

Washington D.C.,

The program

Hugh Dudley Smith,

President of the

WEU

Assembly,

1994.

and the European Union,"
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in

Papacosma and Heiss

145.

and

would be more effective but still not equal the capabilities
available in the existing framework in NATO. 507

Another constraint is the general inability of the
European countries to form a European wide militaryindustrial base.

Article 223 of the founding Treaty of Rome

excludes the production of and trade in arms, munitions, and

war material from the normal rules of the common market when
essential security interests are involved and thus rather
than integrate a European arms industry,

continued to buy nationally.

states have

The EU and WEU have sought to

identify areas of potential cooperation by incorporating the
Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) into the WEU and

renaming it the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG)

Also within the WEU, the Political Division has created an

Armaments Secretariat.

In October 1993,

France and Germany

announced plans for the creation of a joint armaments agency
to focus on procurement for the Eurocorps but possibly to be

expanded in the future.

The purpose of the armaments agency

is to integrate national armaments responsibilities to the

extent possible in terms of organization, administration,
and implementation of projects.

508

Assuming these high costs and military responsibilities
would be very difficult given the steep decline in European

Morton

B.

Bennan,

Monica, CA: The

A

major

begun

initiative

in 1993.

within the

EU

et al,

RAND
under

The Independent European Force: Costs of Independence

(Santa

Corporation, 1993).

this

framework has been a

feasibility study for a Future

Additionally, an industrial consortium

(EUROFLAG)

projects.
to conduct other feasibility studies for joint
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Large

Am

has been established

defense spending.

By 1994,

reduced defense spending as
percent.

509

6

of the 16 NATO countries had

a

percentage of GNP to below

2

As former NATO Secretary General Willy Claes

said in a speech to NATO parliamentarians in November 1994:
"It is obvious that the sharp decline in most European

defense budgets makes it inconceivable that Europe could
create its own integrated military organization alongside
the one in NATO

anyway."

10

-

and it would be a useless waste of money

In an April 1996 speech in Washington D.C.,

German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe said that:

"...we

would be fools if we did not take advantage of the fact that
we already have a solid and functioning Alliance with

enormous capabilities
scratch."

511

...

we do not have to start from

Any habits of political and military

cooperation and practices in NATO had evolved over
period.

a 45

year

Even then, mobilizing NATO for the use of force in

Bosnia-Herzegovina proved extremely difficult.

Recreating

that same institutional culture within the WEU in the

absence of a threat and in the presence of an existing

Belgium

Two

1.8,

Denmark

1.9,

Germany

1.8,

Luxembourg

1.1, Portugal 1.6,

and Canada

1.7.

The average of
countries were just over 2 percent (Italy 2. 1 and the Netherlands 2.2).
Office
of Information
NATO
2.5.
to
from 3.6 (1980-1984 average)

NATO

Europe had dropped
NATO Handbook: Partnership and Cooperation (Brussels, North

and Press,

Atlantic Treaty

Organization, 1995) 358.

Willy Claes, "Address

to the Fortieth

Annual Session of the North Atlantic Assembly,

Washington D.C., 18 November 1994.
Lecture by Volker Ruehe at the Johns Hopkins School

New NATO", German

Information Center:

for

Advanced

International Studies,

The

Statements and Speeches XIX:7 (30 April 1996)
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3.

alternative in NATO would require a convergence of national
interests which Europe was far from attaining.

512

Combined Joint Task Forces
The failure of institutions to deal adequately with the

early years of the Balkan crisis prompted the US to

formulate a proposal to realign NATO in late 1993.

Recognizing that NATO could not survive if its sole purpose
was to deal with Article

missions and that there might be

5

occasions when the US might not necessarily participate

directly in a non-Article

NATO mission, the Clinton

5

Administration recommended

a

reorganization of NATO command

structures based on Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) that

would permit the creation of an ESDI that was separable but
not separate from NATO.

service,

A CJTF is a multinational, multi-

task- tailored force consisting of NATO and possibly

non-NATO forces capable of rapid deployment to conduct
limited duration peace operations beyond Alliance borders,

under the control of either NATO's integrated military
structure or the Western European Union.

513

Drawing on

a

practiced US tradition of combining assets from the three
services of the armed forces, CJTF would open up

multinational command and control outside of the traditional

Even

in

NATO,

capabilities

were being limited by a 60 percent cut

in infrastructure spending

between 1991 and 1995.
Charles Barry,

"NATO's Combined

Joint

Task Forces

(Spring 1996) 84.

281

in

Theory and Practice," Survival

38:

NATO structures so that coalitions of the willing could use
assets from the NATO command structure once a political

consensus was reached in the NAC
The US had made a major policy shift in its endorsement
of ESDI

.

As Secretary of Defense Les Aspin said in advance

of the Brussels Summit:

The European allies have had a long
desire... for a capacity for military action for
missions such as peacekeeping, humanitarian relief
and other things that could be undertaken without
American participation. They had the desire to
have a European pillar to the NATO Alliance.
In
fact, we don't object to that.

Addressing the NAC, President Clinton said that:

"We

support your effort to refurbish the Western European Union
so that it will assume a more vigorous role in keeping

Europe secure
security,

...

While NATO must remain the linchpin of our

all these efforts will show our people and our

legislatures a renewed purpose in European institutions and
a

better balance of responsibilities within the

transatlantic community."

515

NATO endorsed the strengthening of the European pillar
through the WEU and stated that NATO's organization and
resources will be adjusted to facilitate this.
Specifically, NATO agreed that:
We therefore stand ready to make collective
of
assets of the Alliance available, on the basisfor
Council,
Atlantic
North
the
in
consultations

Secretary of State Warren
Press Briefing by Secretary of the Treasury Lloyd Bensen,
House Office of the Press
Christopher, and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. The White

514

Secretary, 7 January 1994.

515
.

Remarks by

NATO

Headquarters,
Summit.
the President to the North Atlantic Council
1994.
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 10 January

Brussels, Belgium.
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WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies
in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security
Policy.
We support the development of separable
but not separate capabilities which could
to European requirements and contribute to respond
Alliance security.
The NATO leaders directed the NAC and the NATO military

authorities to study the development and adaptation of
NATO's political and military structures and procedures for

Alliance missions,

including peacekeeping, and to improve

cooperation with the WEU to reflect the emerging ESDI.
The institutional bridge between NATO and the ESDI/WEU

would be CJTF.

Since 1991 NATO had recognized the need for

smaller, more mobile and more rapidly deployed forces via

the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps

was designed for Article
defense)

.

5

(ARRC)

.

However,

the ARRC

contingencies (collective

As the crisis in Bosnia had shown, NATO would be

most effective by using Article

4

(institutional

consultative functions) to serve as a framework for

organizing non-Article

5

operations.

For Article

4

operations to succeed within the context of a shared

NATO/WEU operational framework, it would be necessary to
lower the transaction costs of building coalitions for peace
by institutionalizing command and control arrangements that

could be readily adapted to the specific needs of each

operation

North
Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the
NATO
1994.
10-11
January
Belgium.
Brussels,
Atlantic Council Held at NATO Headquarters.
Office of Information and Press.
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As Charles Barry observes,

the unique aspect of the

CJTF is an unprecedented development in military doctrine.
CJTF will

...institutionalize the task force concept, a
command and control arrangement normally employed
for crisis response by ad hoc coalitions.
In
fact, deploying CJTF's is intended to become the
primary modus operendi of NATO in peacetime. Task
forces are formed rapidly, employed for specific
short-term contingencies, and then disbanded.
With the CJTF concept, NATO's military hopes to
invent a unique, hybrid capability that combines
the best attributes of both coalition and alliance
forces:
that is, rapid crisis response by highly
ready multinational forces, backed by political
terms of reference, standardized procedures,
517
regular exercises and in-place infrastructure.
CJTF would give NATO flexibility to respond to new missions
in or around Europe,

facilitate the dual use of some NATO

command structures for NATO and/or WEU operations, and
permit PFP countries to integrate themselves into NATO run
operations.

518

This would be done by establishing

multinational, tri- service headquarters, based on deployable

self-contained elements in NATO common structures, but
adapted further, whenever necessary, to incorporate forces
from nations in and outside NATO that are not currently

within the integrated military command.

Through CJTF full NATO contributions to

a

NAC-mandated

of
or WEU-run operation would not be necessary as coalitions

nonthe willing could engage in peacekeeping or other

NATO
traditional activities while benefiting from existing
airlift, and
structures including areas such as logistics,

517
51f

\

in Barry RefonninMhe Transatlannc 77.
Charles Barry, "ESDI: Toward a Bi-Polar Alliance?",
(CJTF) and New Missions for NATO," CRS
Stanley R. Sloan, "Combined Joint Task Forces

Re port

tor

Congress 94-249 S (17 March 1994) 2-3.
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airborne surveillance.

The Clinton Administration saw CJTF

as a means of enhancing the PFP by using NATO commands to

integrate partner countries which might participate in non-

Article

5

NATO or WEU operations.

Washington also hoped

through the CJTF, France might be brought closer to

that,

NATO military planning.

Most important for the US, CJTF

would be a pragmatic means of ensuring that NATO remains the
core security institution in Europe while Europeans assume

greater responsibility for their own security. 519
principle,

Thus in

the policy could bring together what had been

quite disparate national perspectives toward the future

institutional form of transatlantic security cooperation.

Obstacles to Implementing the CJTF Concept
Failed attempts to implement the CJTF initiative

demonstrated that the underlying tensions which had blocked
the restructuring of West European security had not gone
away.

As Simon Lunn, Deputy Secretary General of the North

Atlantic Assembly, asserts:
the

(Brussels)

"The general perception that

Summit reconciled differing attitudes among

the Allies towards an ESDI did not happen.

.

.unfortunately

that obstacles to creating a workable ESDI have been removed
is far from true."

519
.

This assessment of

°.

CJTF and

Though it initially appeared that

the

ESDI was developed

in a series

a

of interviews with senior

US

See Sean
from two European defense ministries in November 1994.
13-15.
1994)
(December
Brief
2:3
European
Kay, "Common Defence, Common Burden."
of the North Atlantic
On the record interview with Simon Lunn, Deputy Secretary General

officials

52

520

and senior

officials

Assembly, Washington DC, 18 November 1994.
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major compromise on the ESDI had been reached, the CJTF
quickly stalled.

NATO and WEU military officials were able

to complete planning early but without further political

guidance, military planning could only proceed so far. 521

The US was particularly concerned that NATO's

infrastructure for Article
no duplication take place.

5

missions remain intact and that
Additionally,

that while formulated under an Article

4

the US worried

mission such as

humanitarian relief, natural disasters, or peacekeeping

a

CJTF could come under attack and possibly involve Article
of the NATO treaty.

5

Washington wanted assurances that CJTF,

especially those used by the WEU, would not drag the US into
conflicts where it had no desire or interests in
intervening.

for nearly a year France insisted on

Moreover,

a separate command structure for non-Article

5

NATO missions

such as those which do not involve existing command
structures.

The French position raised serious questions

about the continued relevance of the NATO integrated

military command and why the US should remain
given that Article

4

a part of it

missions were those most likely to be

carried out by NATO or the ESDI

By March 1994.

SACEUR

completed a draft operational concept for

CJTF command and

NATO a detailed analysis of operational requirements for a
control. On 28 June the WEU
to the NATO Military Committee in September 1994.
presented
CJTF. Follow-on studies were
commanders in
Differences on the WEU role emerged over defining the support role of NATO
sent

WEU -led CJTF operations;
(including national

WEU's

access to

the potential for the

commands

WEU

to select their

own

headquarters

the
or in the Eurocorps headquarters) to function as a CJTF; and

NATO assets.

Barry "ESDI:...", in Barry 77.
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Also because it did not participate in NATO
military
planning, France sought to increase political
oversight of
CJTFs.

In the US view,

CJTFs,

once mandated by the NAC,

would answer directly to the immediate field commander
with
command support from SACEUR.

Increasing political oversight

over CJTFs was viewed by the US (and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in particular) as an unwarranted intrusion on the

ability to carry out effective military operations.

France

also wanted one form of CJTF to be "national" meaning that a
state acting alone could take on an independent mission with

NATO assets or possibly head up a multilateral operation

with its own command structures but drawing from NATO
assets.

This was rejected by Washington as a dangerous

infringement on multinational military planning.
The US was sending conflicting signals in its

endorsement of the ESDI.

Since the debacle of US

involvement in Somalia in 1993, the US military and US

Congress were insisting that the US maintain clear command
and control of its operations and assets.

Moreover,

the

political leverage that the US gains in Europe stems not
only from its overall capabilities and command structures,
but also from its actual troop presence.

The absence of

direct US involvement in a ground operation,

for example,

would make it very difficult for the US to wield influence
over its allies as the Bosnian experience prior to IFOR
showed.

For its part,

France was internally divided as much

of the posturing towards CJTF was related to forthcoming
287

presidential elections in 1995 and neo-Gaullist pressures to
ensure France's distance from NATO.

This political concern

about the rapproachment to NATO was reflected in the fact
that most of the problems with CJTF were raised by the quai-

d'Orsay rather than the Ministry of Defense.
By summer 1995, with the West floundering in Bosnia and
the future of CJTF unresolved,

some NATO planners expressed

exasperation that the prospects for making the concept
operational were slim.
complained:

As one senior NATO planner

"France insists on a special relationship and

will likely continue to use the threat of its veto power to

prevent such NATO operations from proceeding, if Frances'
direct participation is not required."

5

""

Some military

planners at SACLANT gave up on CJTF and proposed reforming
NATO command structures based on functional responsibilities
and new sub- commands to coordinate regional operations.

523

These planners proposed a NATO realignment which would

redesign existing commands to allow NATO to act outside its

geographical boundaries and even conduct offensive
operations to meet future threats such as a ballistic

Interview with a senior

This internal

commands

NATO
and

logistics.

Additionally, the

simulation and training system to help

September 1996 the

command

at the top,

would include regional coordinating of

with specific tasks including transportation;

intelligence;

tier

Washington D.C., November 1994.

NATO official,

military adaptation

NATO

SACLANT

NATO

proposal would develop a

did agree to advise the

on current divisions between the
reorganization being done largely at lower
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NATO

control, communications and

common

militaries coordinate high technology warfare.

Military Committee

structure based

with the

command,

NAC

Atlantic and
levels.

on creating

In

a three-

European commands

missile attack on a member state or Persian Gulf style
crisis

524
.

American representatives at SHAPE also expressed
reservations about command and control in the event of a
deal on C JTF

.

SHAPE stressed that non-Article

CJTF

5

activity could become large-scale operations requiring NATO
to have complete command and control.

This position left

some Europeans feeling that SHAPE was insisting on a veto

over any European operation not involving the US.
1996,

525

By

the NATO Military Committee had agreed to six main

principles which CJTF must meet:
integrated military structure;

1.)

2.)

preserve the
provide for separable

but not separate forces in support of the ESDI;

maintain a single command structure for Article
Article

5

and non-

retain the role of the Military

missions;

5

3.)

Committee in advising and transmitting strategic guidance
from the NAC to NATO Military Authorities (including the

Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, SACEUR, and
SACLANT)

and

avoid ad hoc participation in NATO bodies;

;

preserve the ability of Major NATO Commands to do timely

contingency planning.

526

Theresa Hitchens and Robert Holzer, "Commanders:
Missions," Defense

News

Daniel

Assembly Defence and Security

W.

Christman,

NATO

to

Address

New

(26 June) 4,50.

NATO," Draft General Report
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Bringing the ESDI into NATO
Several factors contributed to a resolution of the

disputes over CJTF leading to a deal codified at the Berlin

meeting of NATO foreign ministers in June 1996. 527

Concern

was growing in NATO that the one year time limit to the IFOR

mission in Bosnia could bring about renewed war after its
scheduled withdrawal in December 1996.

NATO officials

believed that it was important that IFOR meet its one year
commitment so that the conduct of future Article

would not be impeded.

4

missions

The US and its allies thus needed a

political means of reducing the US presence in Bosnia while

keeping a meaningful force in place

-

possibly via a CJTF.

CJTFs were used in IFOR though they were not formally placed

within the conceptual debate in NATO or the ESDI

.

In order

to accommodate force contributions and staff from non-NATO

and non-European countries, AFSOUTH had been transformed
into a CJTF headquarters.

However,

the European members

insisted that without a US role after IFOR, they would also
leave Bosnia-Herzegovina.

As one senior European diplomat

commented on 26 February 1996:
We are now
IFOR will not be extended.
will
anything,
if
what,
discuss
starting to
European troops on the ground without
replace it.
But we're
any US involvement is not a good idea.
aware of the dangers of a vacuum... If Combined
Joint Task Forces opened up - - and we are aiming
for an agreement^in Berlin... I would expect that
to play a role.
senior official from
of the information in this section was gathered in interviews with a
senior officials from the National Security
the French Ministry of Defense in February 1996 and
1996.
March
in
D.C.,
Council and the Pentagon in Washington

Much

Reuters.

29 February 1996.
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A senior French official stressed:

"The need to do

something quickly for the European pillar of NATO because of
a

possible premature American departure from Bosnia is

plausible

But we do not want to discuss that idea

...

publicly." 529

Another European official said that:

exit strategy is complete lunacy,

term success of the mission." 530

"The

it is hindering the long-

In the view of many

Europeans, with their forces accounting for 2/3 of the IFOR

ground forces, burdensharing in NATO had arrived and the US
had to continue its role if the Europeans were to stay.

France's return to NATO military planning also

facilitated a deal on CJTF (see below)

.

Additionally, NATO

recognized that before it could enlarge to include new
it needed to get its house in order.

members,

As Czech

President Vaclav Havel said in a speech at SHAPE

headquarters on 27 April 1995, NATO must redefine its aims
and purpose before admitting new members.

"The expansion of

NATO should be preceded by something even more important,
that is a new formulation of its own meaning, mission, and

identity," said Havel.

531

By spending most of 1996 focusing

on internal reforms designed to promote peace and stability,

Reuters.

29 February 1996. After a

visit to

Washington

in early

May,

EU

External Affairs

had found "widespread support" for the
Commissioner Hans van den Broek
in Bosnia after IFOR. Enraged by v
responsibility
need for Europe to be prepared for a new
de Charette said: "It was irresponsit
Herve
den Broek's comments, French Foreign Minister
indicated that he

for people to talk of

the

cows

Reuters.

OMRI

IFOR

being replaced by the

will take care of themselves."

12

Reuters.

March 1996.

Daily Digest, 28 April 1995.
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WEU.
7

May

Everyone should
1996.

stick to his job.

.tl
.

NATO could downplay its plans for enlargement during the

Russian presidential elections held that summer.

NATO hoped

to show Russia in advance of its June/July 1996 presidential

elections that the Alliance which was enlarging was a

transformed NATO.
In late February 1996 John Kornblum (Assistant

Secretary of State for US and Canada) and Alexander Vershbow
(Director of the European Directorate at the US National

Security Council) traveled to Paris to broker a deal on
CJTF

.

The agreement reinforced the principle that future

European peacekeeping operations could draw on NATO force
structures,

equipment and logistical support even if US

forces were not involved.

France acknowledged that the ESDI

must occur within NATO and the US accepted the possibility
that NATO assets could be used for WEU operations in which
the US would not participate.

532

Any WEU command arrangement

would have to meet NATO standards, use equipment completely
compatible with that of the Alliance and receive the prior
approval of the NAC
This Franco-American rapproachment paved the way for

NATO to make the CJTF concept operational.

Europe had not

entirely reassured the US that they will not use NATO assets
in a way that might draw the US into military conflicts that
it does not have interests in.

Paris also dropped a request for a form of

However,

CJTF

to

a stress on

be organized around

NATO

headquarters

commands. See "Way
where France had assigned officers and another based on national
1996.
March
Weekly.
27
Cleared for Joint European Forces," lane's Defense
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is

procedures in the NAC mandating the establishment
and use of
a CJTF headquarters would allow the US to
exert influence
over this possibility.

Moreover,

the continued weakness of

the WEU meant that it was unlikely that the US would
allow
it to act if the challenge were serious.

As one US official

participating in the Paris talks asserted:

"There's not

going to be a separate WEU ... There 11 be one defense pot
1

organized around NATO, with forces separable from NATO
the Europeans want to do something." 533

if

For the short-term,

it was not necessary for the US to decide how far it might

allow CJTF to go into WEU control because it was hard to
imagine any situation serious enough to involve NATO assets
in which the US would not lead.

The Berlin Accord:

Political Guidance for CJTF

Meeting at Berlin on

3

June 1996,

the NATO foreign

ministers approved the CJTF compromise.

Endorsing the

development of the ESDI within NATO, the ministers welcomed
the completion of the CJTF concept, directed the Military

Committee to make recommendations for its implementation,
and established a Policy Coordination Group (PCG) to link

political oversight from the NAC to the military viewpoints

developed in the Military Committee.

Craig R. Whitney.

Times

.

3

"NATO

Looks

to

534

NATO established

Peacekeeping by Europeans on their Own," The

New York

March 1996, A6.

Within the International Military
aid the Military

Committee

Staff, a "Capabilities

in providing planning

Coordination Cell" will be established

guidance to the Major

aid in the Military Committee's providing advice to the
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NAC.

to

NATO Commander and

three principles to guide its adaptation including:

performing its traditional mission of collective defense and
adopting flexible and agreed procedures to undertake new
roles in changing circumstances;

transatlantic link;

preserving the

and the development of the ESDI within

NATO.

NATO stressed the need to be able to mount non-Article
5

operations based on one integrated command structure that

can perform multiple functions in a cost-effective manner.

What had traditionally been ad-hoc task force arrangements

would be institutionalized via the placement of CJTF
headquarters "nuclei" permanently placed in selected NATO
headquarters.

The CJTF command nuclei would be the minimum

personnel necessary around which a complete headquarters
could be built once the NAC had a approved a NATO or non-

NATO CJTF operation.

The nuclei would provide the basic

elements of necessary military experts for the

implementation of multinational, multiservice military
functions.

To avoid duplication and reduce costs, nuclei

command personnel would be dual -hatted to the parent

institution (NATO or WEU)
the NAC,

.

Once a CJTF had been approved by

the CJTF nuclei would be reinforced with "modules"

which are additional staff elements to be assigned based on
the particular political and military needs at the time.

CJTF headquarters would have to meet a number of basic

elements including:

supporting the three main objectives of

responding to new
the NATO transformation process including
294

missions; be adaptable for new members and non-members
alike;

and provide support for the WEU's operational needs;

ensure that collective defense requirements can take

priority if they arise;

preserve both the transatlantic

nature of NATO and a single integrated military structure;
and be done with minimum added costs.

535

The ESDI would develop within NATO via full

implementation of the CJTF concept grounded on "sound

military principles and supported by appropriate military
planning and permit the creation of militarily coherent and
effective forces capable of operating under the political
control and strategic direction of the WEU.

1,536

NATO

committed to prepare, within a transparent and complementary
process,

for WEU- led operations including planning and

exercising of command elements and forces.

537

Additionally,

NATO endorsed the development of the ESDI within NATO by:

"conducting at the request of and in coordination with the
WEU,

military planning and exercises for illustrative WEU

53
.

536
.

Barry

"NATO's Combined...".

86.

Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. Berlin. Germany, 3 June 1996.
within the Alliance,
the final communique this would be based on: identification,

According

to

assets, as well as, in
of the types of separable but not separate capabilities, assets and support
elements and
order to prepare for WEU-led operations, separable but not separate, HQs, JQ
operations and
WEU-led
command positions, that would be required to command and conduct

of appropriate
which could be made available, subject to decision by die NAC; and elaboration
consistent with and taking full
multinational European command arrangements within NATO,
the WEU-led
concept, able to prepare, support, command and conduct
command
within the
operations. This implies double-hatting appropriate personnel
command arrangements should be
structure to perform these functions. Such European
rapid
should be sufficiently well articulated to permit the

advantage of the

CJTF

NATO

and the arrangements
operational force.
constitution of a militarily coherent and effective
identifiable
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missions identified by the WEU." 538

The release of NATO

assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations would be

authorized by the NAC

.

The NAC would then keep itself

informed on the use of NATO assets through monitoring with
the advice of the NATO Military Authorities and through

regular consultations with the WEU Council. 539

Remaining issues to be settled by NATO included:
ensuring that CJTF development complements any revision of
NATO's command structure;

taking account of the WEU via

full development of "separable but not separate"

capabilities;

providing for the possible involvement of

non-NATO nations in a CJTF;

and maximizing cost-

effectiveness and avoiding duplication.

Additionally,

considerable demands may be placed on CJTFs as they may need
to be able to deploy at short notice, move at short notice,

and take advantage of the most technologically sophisticated

military systems.

540

Specific deployment strategies, the

sharing of communications and intelligence, specifications
for deployment time,

Berlin

and which of NATO's eight existing

Communique. Such planning would

at a

minimum: prepare

objectives, scope and participation for illustrative

WEU

missions;

relevant information

on

identify requirements for

planning and exercising of command elements and forces for illustrative WEU-led operations;
for review and
and NAC to the
develop appropriate plans for submission through the

WEU

MC

approval.

The

Berlin

communique

also expressed satisfaction with the

growing

ties

NATO and
NATO and the

between

new agreement between
classified information and expressed a
shared
of
protection
for
the
measures
on security
NATO-WEU Council meetings and
joint
on
based
mechanisms
consultative
desire to build on
the

WEU. The

ministers endorsed the completion of a

WEU

those between the

Anthony Cragg,

WEU

NATO

Task Force Concept:

Permanent Council and

SACEUR.

Assistant Secretary General for Defense Planning, "The

A Key Component

of the Alliance's Adaptation,"

(July 1996) 7-10.
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NATO

Combined

Join

Review 44:4

Major Subordinate Commands would become CJTF headquarters
also remained to be settled by NATO military planners.

Most importantly, the planning and conduct of exercises

utilizing CJTF would help move the concept from theory to
reality,

incorporate lessons from IFOR, and help identify

areas for further development.

As Charles Barry notes,

formulating a substantial program of CJTF exercises is
essential to its success.

Regular CJTF exercises, such as

the large annual maneuvers that NATO undertook during the

Cold War, will "gradually yield a valuable reservoir of
staffs, units and service members experienced in new

operations and procedures for NATO."

This is especially

important as it is "one thing to develop contingency plans,

operational concepts and doctrine for one nation;

it is

quite another to harmonize the rapid deployment of forces by
16 or more nations."

541

Central to the conduct of large scale exercise will be
a realignment of the NATO integrated military command

structure to increase the European role but preserve key US
commands.

A proposed reform popular in US planning circles

would have SACEUR and SACLANT remain US officers and their
deputies be Europeans.

However,

the Deputy SACEUR and

Deputy SACLANT could be nominated by the members of the WEU
or the EU and then approved by the NAC as part of an

interlocking process.

Barry

"NATO's Combined...",

The Deputies could also be the most

82-83.
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senior military officers in the WEU defense structure.

Should the NAC decide on a mainly European CJTF operation

with only a supporting NATO role, the Deputy SACEUR (or

Deputy SACLANT) would assume control of the operation, with
full access to the assets of the integrated command

structure.
run CJTF,

Alternatively,

should the NAC decide on a WEU-

the Deputy SACEUR (or Deputy SACLANT) would shift

to his European

(WEU or EU)

command function and run the

operation independent of US or NATO support. 542
In mid- 1996 the theoretical debate over CJTF took on a

sense of urgency in NATO planning for a post -IFOR

peacekeeping force in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

While the

military tasks provided for by NATO were very successful,
the civilian side of the Dayton accords had fallen behind

and some sort of substantial military presence was required
to maintain the fragile peace.

Having committed to a one

year mission in IFOR, the US was under considerable pressure
to find a functional alternative through which it could

reduce its commitment.

A follow-on force might be a perfect

opportunity for the Europeans to take responsibility for
their own affairs backed by an American reassurance force in
a

nearby country such as Hungary or Croatia.

In theory the

US would be out of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Europeans

This position was
Service.

initially

advanced by Stanley R. Sloan of the

See Stanley R. Sloan,

"NATO's

Future:

Beyond

(September 1995 30-32 and Stanley R. Sloan, "Negotiating a
NATO Review 44:2 (March 1996) 19-23.
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US

Congressional Research

Collective Defense,"

New

CRS

Report

Transatlantic Bargain,"

would implement an ESDI under a NATO command via CJTF

-

after all, why have an ESDI if it can not be effectively
used?

This plan was popular among US military planners but

diplomats could not reconcile the pressure from European
members of NATO who were unwilling to take this

responsibility and who thus insisted that "we went in as
allies,

we go out as allies."

Thus this gradual exit

strategy took on more long-term planning over the 18 month

period of SFOR.

The French Return to NATO

An important impetus for the institutionalization of
the CJTF concept was the return of France to NATO military

structures.

The Balkan crisis forced France toward a

gradual return to the Alliance out of concern that it would
be left out of military decisions that could impact its

forces there.

Bosnia had also shown the futility of the

development of an independent ESDI and thus a deal with NATO
that preserved the principle of the ESDI was in France's

interest.

The high costs of building an independent ESDI

(estimated to be 27 to 95 billion dollars over 25 years)

also collided with France's commitment to the EU and its

monetary union (EMU) requiring domestic austerity programs
in a climate of 12 percent unemployment and massive public

strikes.

As part of its belt- tightening,

and to meet new

strategic demands, French President Jacques Chirac (elected
in May 1995)

introduced dramatic armed forces reductions and
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an end to conscription.

basic conditions:

The French return to NATO had two

that NATO will continue to adapt its

internal structures and that the ESDI should be visible and

operational.

543

Contradictory institutional commitments and

the political economy of European security had forced France
to do what the Soviet threat could not

-

move Paris back

into NATO

France's movement toward NATO military structures began
in 1993 with the agreement to place the Eurocorps under a

NATO command in the event of an emergency.
1994,

In September

French Minister of Defense Francois Leotard

participated in a meeting of NATO defense ministers in
Seville,

Spain.

This was the first visit by a French

Minister of Defense to a NATO meeting since 1966.

To

accommodate French sensitivities, the meeting was labelled
an "informal" discussion.

French officials from the

Ministry of Defense insisted that Leotard's attendance was
not a change in doctrine.

Rather they intended to

participate on a case-by-case basis to coordinate activities
in the Balkans and to discuss Mediterranean security.

See "Allocution de Monsieur Charles Million, Ministre de
lors

du colloque organise par

la

defense,

544

Le 19 decembre 1995,

fondation pour les etudes de defense," Defense rationale (April

la

1996) 12-13 and Charles Million, "Vers une defense nouvelle," Defense rationale (14 July
1996) 13-19.
Interview with an official from the French Ministry of Defense, Washington
1994.

Leotard had pushed to attend the

December 1993 (where the
vetoed his participation.
the

Similarly

NATO Military Committee
NATO summit in 1994

when

initially presented)

at

Travemunde, Germany,

where

the French Chief of Staff sought to attend a meeting of
Mitterand again refused. Nevertheless, at the

France had informed

issues that

in

but President Mitterand

in April 1994,

Brussels

military meetings

NATO defense ministerial

PFP and CJTF were

DC, November

its allies that it

would attend

might affect French forces were on the agenda.
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NATO
France

President Chirac indicated in his campaign that he was

prepared to seek closer ties to NATO.

By summer 1995,

he

had made a firm commitment to deepen France's NATO ties.
In September,

545

France hosted the first NATO military exercise

on French territory since 1966.

546

strengthen ties with Britain.

On 31 October Chirac and

Chirac next moved to

British Prime Minister John Major initiated a "global
partnership" committing both sides to exchange classified

nuclear weapons data with a long-term objective of

coordinating nuclear policy and doctrine. 547
On

5

December 1995 French Foreign Minister Herve de

Charette announced that in order to strengthen French-NATO

cooperation in Bosnia and aid the development of the

European pillar of NATO,

would not cross

"France has decided to become more

the line of reintegration into the military structure.

signalled Paris' view that

NATO's

Europe was evolving.

role in

(unsuccessful) bilateral discussions between Leotard and

US

Leotard had, nevertheless,

In fact, a key element of

Secretary of Defense William Perry

make CJTF work. Interview with a senior official
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington DC, October 1994. Also see William
T. Johnsen and Thomas-Durell young, French Policy Toward NATO: Enhance Selectivity,
at the Seville

meeting was

to explore

ways

to

Vice Rapproachment (Carlisle Barracks, PA:
See Robert P. Grant, "France's

New

US Army War College, 1994).
NATO," Survival 38:

Relationship with

1

(Spring 1996)

65.

The

exercise included 60 aircraft and 1000 personnel in a four day Tactical Air Meet over

Eastern France, with headquarters
reflect

NATO

at

a French air base in Toul.

The

exercise

was designed

to

air strikes in Bosnia focusing on suppressing "enemy" air defense systems,

practicing air-to-air refuelling and electronic warfare, and coordinating different aircraft types

with ground air defenses.
Chirac and Major also agreed to pursue joint development and procurement of military

equipment and

to increase joint training.

The

respective naval chiefs were instructed to draft a

of intent to promote naval cooperation by intensifying an existing program of military
exchanges. They also initiated a Franco-British Euro Air Group at the headquarters of the Royal
letter

Chirac described the Air Group as a "symbol of a new credible
European defense that must be based on a strong transatlantic relationship." Charles Mdler,
"France, U.K. Strike Defense Pact," Defense News 15 (6-12 November 1995) 4.

Air Force Strike

Command.
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involved in NATO's various organizational bodies." 548

Though

the extent of its long-term participation remained

uncertain,

France immediately took its seat on the NATO

Defense Planning Committee and the Military Committee.

NATO

officials were elated with de Charette's announcement as it
meant a return to NATO similar to that of Spain's. 549

The

announcement effectively acknowledged NATO's central role in
Europe and the need to reconsider the institutional form of
the ESDI.

As Dominique Moisi, Deputy Director of the French

Institute for International Relations, told The New York
Times:

"The fact is that, militarily, we have depended on

NATO and our margin of independence has been

negligible

...

But our margin of political influence on NATO

was also negligible before today... This was absurd." 550

When President Chirac travelled to Washington in early
February he told a joint session of Congress that the

activity of US and European troops in IFOR signalled "...the
need for the Alliance to adapt itself to a universe that is
no longer that in which it was born."

News From France

On

95. 19 (8

December 1995)

16 January the French Ambassador to

Charles Millon would

now

551

The Franco-American

3.

NATO

told his counterparts that Defense Minister

take part in formal meetings of the Defence Planning Committee

(with the provision that matters relating to the integrated military structure are not raised) and
diat the French Chief of Staff would return to the Military Committee. He indicated that France

was considering closer
nuclear policy.

NATO

relations with

SHAPE

and

SACEUR

France would also participate fully in the

Situation Center.

and

NATO

that

it

was willing

to discuss

Defense Colleges and

in the

Interview with an official from the French Ministry of Defense,

News From France (3 May 1996) 4 and Mariano Aguirre, "L'OTAN au
service de quelle securite," Le Monde Diplomatique April 1996.
Roger Cohen, "France to Rejoin Military Command of NATO Alliance," The New York Times,
March 1996. Also

see

,

6 December 1995, Al.

Address

to a Joint Session of

Congress by French President Jacque Chirac,
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1

February 1996.

compromise on implementing the CJTF concept indicated the

sincerity of France's position and the profound nature of
the change underlying French NATO policy.

5S2

As a North

Atlantic Assembly report concluded, beyond practical reasons
related to military planning in Bosnia:

bottom line:

"...there is a

France's will to engage in a real renovation

of the Atlantic Alliance,

true European pillar

...

including the development of a

what is new is that France has

declared its will that this European pillar must be built
from within NATO, a stand that has been essential in

clarifying France's position and giving reassurance to

Americans and other Allies who had expressed concern on
French intentions." 553

Chirac's plan to restructure and reduce the French
armed forces was central to the change in Paris' view toward
As part of its commitment to attain European Monetary

NATO.

Union (EMU) by 2000, France needed to reduce its $59.3

billion budget deficit.

554

With high unemployment and the

country paralyzed by strikes protesting government spending
cuts,

reducing the size of the French military was a partial

solution.

555

Thus on 22 February President Chirac announced

Interview with a senior National Security Council official, March 1996.

Estrella(1996) 10.

The
of

requirements in the Maastricht Treaty require states to have budget deficits below 3%
that the public ratio of debt to GDP be less than 60%, and that inflation be no higher

EMU

GDP,

than 1.5% above the average of the three lowest inflation countries in the EU. By 1996 France
had a budged deficit of 3.7%; a debt of 56. 9 % as a percentage of GDP. and 1.3% inflation.

OECD

Economic Outlook June 1996.
,

See Arthur Paecht, "La defense:

Le temps des choix," Defense rationale (February 1996) 7-16.
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sweeping reductions in the French armed forces to be

accompanied by a new strategic doctrine which would save an
estimated $1.2 billion a year. 556

In July 1996 Chirac

announced a streamlining of the armed forces beginning with
a

disbanding of 38 regiments, closing barracks, army

hospitals,

and airbases, and retiring one of two French

aircraft carriers.

Central to Chirac's overall plan was a

decision to end conscription and move to volunteer armed
forces.

With France's national defense capabilities being

reduced to meet the pressures of one institution (the

EU)

Paris had little choice but to advance its national security

interests by pooling its defense resources with its allies
in NATO while negotiating the best deal it could get for its

return to NATO.

Under the Chirac plan, France intends to reduce its
total armed forces from 573,000-437,000

(400,000

-

250,000

when paramilitary forces are excluded) while retaining the
capacity for rapid deployment of some 50,000-60,000 troops
abroad.

Some of its European allies worried that France

would rely more heavily on its nuclear deterrent

-

a

view

hardened during France's undersea nuclear testing in the
Pacific in 1995-1996.
in particular,

With an eye toward reassuring Germany

Chirac announced that 15 short-range Hades

(about $37 bffli
Spending on defense research and equipment is to be cut by 18% annually
defense wi
1997-2002 - $4 billion less annually than had been established in 1994). Total
military pensions. The
up to 3. % of GDP (a 2 percent reduction from 1994) including
Economist 2 March 1996, 45.
1

.
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missile launchers which can only strike targets in Germany,
would be eliminated.

Additionally, Chirac stressed that

France's contribution (15,000) to the Eurocorps would not be

affected by the reductions.

However, privately some German

officials indicated that French troops in Germany would
likely drop to around 3000.

557

The US endorsement of the ESDI made this rapproachment

toward NATO more palatable for Paris.

There was, however,

some internal opposition to Chirac's plans.

There will

likely be a ten-year process of retiring all of the
Gaullist,

anti-NATO military officials, in France.

Some

French officials wanted the Inter-Governmental Conference
(IGC)

review of the Maastricht treaty in 1996 to promote the

formation of a standing European army.

For example

President Chirac's former Prime Minister Alain Juppe wants
an integrated European army of 350,000 that would be

subordinated to the EU for rapid deployments.

See Craig R. Whitney, "Cold

War

558

Over, France Plans a Slim, Volunteer Military," The

New

York Times 23 February 1996, A3 and The Economist 2 March 1996, 45-46. Restructuring
the armed forces also stemmed from difficulty Paris had in putting together a rapid deployment
force during the Persian Gulf conflict. As the conservative parliamentarian and defense expert
Pierre La Lellouche told The New York Times (23 February): "We had to beg, borrow and
,

.

from 47 separate regiments to put together a 15,000-man intervention force during the war
in the Persian Gulf... At the same time, the British army, which is less than half the size of the
French Army now, managed to deploy more than 30,000 soldiers to the same theater of
operations. Movement toward such national rapidly deployable forces has become common
steal

practice in national military planning with

Germany developing

a crisis reaction force of 55,000

announced the formation of a new Joint Rapid
deployable in 1999. On 1 August
army, navy, marines, and air force. The
the
Deployment Force (JRDF), to be drawn from
a reinforced
British force will have some units on 24 hour standby and quickly deployable at
1996, Britain

brigade strength of 6000

-

8000 men.

In September" 1996, Juppe did provide a strong endorsement for the

Juppe suggested

in a speech to the

because of the realignment of

French

NATO,

Institute

NATO/ESDI

relationship.

for Higher National Defense Studies

he expected France to integrate fully into the
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that

NATO

In American military circles there is also some

skepticism of France's ambitions.

Some feel France returned

to NATO so that it can have the greatest impact on European

security
CJTF.

-

especially when the US chooses not to lead in

a

For example, during the Bosnian crisis of summer 1995

while the US was reformulating its policy toward the
Balkans,

France was able to exercise considerable political

guidance over NATO affairs.

Thus CJTF could open up the way

for France to work within NATO to limit the US role in

Europe.

This view was confirmed when France began insisting

on a European general heading NATO's Southern Command.

France suggested that failure on the US to hand over this

traditional American command,
Fleet)

(which includes the US 6th

would cause Paris to halt its return to NATO.

The

subject led to an ineffective exchange of personal letters

between presidents Chirac and Clinton with diplomats hoping
at best to "kick the ball down the road" a few years so that

more urgent issues could be addressed in NATO.
of 1996,

By the end

Franco-American relations had deteriorated to the

point that the French foreign minister walked out of a

military

command

structures.

opposition to merging the

Meanwhile,

WEU

into the

in the

EU

IGC

Britain continued to signal strong

while France and Germany suggested that states

might opt out of decisions on military or peacekeeping actions through a policy of "constructive
abstention". A country might not participate in an EU military action, but would agree not to
block its implementation if others wanted to do so. This was problematic as it would harm the
consensus principle within the EU. Thus the most likely product of the IGC would be continued
support for the

WEU as a medium-term effort

contain a political solidarity clause.

Going

to build

into the

an ESDI to enhance the

CFSP

and

IGC, there was broad support for the

creation of a special planning and analysis team and of a senior post to represent the EU
internationally. "The IGC: Committed to Creating a Common Foreign Capability," Janets

Defence Weekly 27 March 1996.
,
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proposed toast by the NATO Secretary General Solana in honor
of retiring US Secretary of State Warren Christopher at a

lunch during the December 1996 NAC ministerial.
The change in French foreign policy is, nonetheless,

substantial and the rapproachment toward NATO appears
sincere

-

in spite of the political bargaining over its role

in the command structure.

In fact,

France was left little

choice but to move closer to NATO because of its commitments
to another institution

-

the European Union and its EMU.

Weary after four years of futility in Bosnia and unable to
construct an independent ESDI, France was forced to change
its national security priorities.

an EU (but non-NATO)

As a senior official from

country observed:

The European Union will not within the
foreseeable future develop into an independent,
credible defense alliance. Therefore the U.S.
contribution as a guarantor of European security
Europe's own security
remains vitally important.
policy interests may best be ensured within a NATO
framework in cooperation with the United States.
this
Without NATO Europe cann^ be stabilized:
has been seen in Bosnia.

Institutions and their changing role
internal realignment of NATO

-

-

especially the

had a profound impact on both

the goals and the means of promoting French national

security policy.

559

Annual Meeting of
Informal comments of a high level Scandinavian official addressing die
Finland. 6 May
Helsinki,
Maanpuolustuskurssiyhdistys (Society of Civil Defense Courses).
1996.

307

Analysis
The institutional approaches toward European security

during the first half of the 1990s were largely theoretical
and designed for long term implementation.

The crisis in

the Balkans reduced the US and its European allies into

"making it up as we go along", as one US official described
the process.

560

CJTF was a major institutional adaptation

which could prevent future Bosnia-style conflicts from

getting out of hand.

Yet the CJTF is a means to an end

-

the broader objective being the vitality of the

transatlantic relationship.

If agreement could not be

reached on a crisis in Europe's own backyard for four years
in the Balkans,

then disputes over Iran,

Iraq,

Cuba,

international terrorism, and international trade might pull
Europe and North America apart

.

The internal fabric of the

Western community is challenged by the possibility of war

between Greece and Turkey, Mediterranean concerns about
North Africa and the rise of Muslim fundamentalism, and
North European worries over the Baltic countries and

environmental issues.

561

These diverging interests are

Drew,

"NATO

NATO
NATO

Secretary General Solana has proposed the creation of a crisis management center

from Berlin..."

11.
at

headquarters so that information can be exchanged between Greece and Turkey and
hopefully prevent small disputes from escalating into war. Addressing his personal frustration
with Greek-Turkish disputes. President Clinton said on 12 June 1996 that: "As to Greece and

Turkey

I

Europe's

can

tell

allies

you

am very concerned about it... Both those nations are our allies and
NATO, and believe that the future of the region which they both

that

through

I

I

occupy would be immeasurably brighter if they can resolve their problems and are immeasurably
Prime
darker if they cannot. " Joint Press Conference by US President Bill Clinton and Italian
Minister

Romano

policy toward the

White House Information Service, 12 June 1996. Turkey's internal
Kurdish minority has also provoked disputes with its European allies. In

Prodi.
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likely to increase absent the Soviet threat.

Thus NATO's

institutional form must not only be adapted to show it is
not a threat to Russia

-

it must be fundamentally

transformed if NATO is to remain viable in the future of
European security.

Successful internal realignment will

best be served with the following institutional form.

Tasks
The fundamental goal of an institutional adaptation of

NATO must be to attain an operational burdenshar ing

arrangement to make the US commitment to European security

politically sustainable.

Implementation of the CJTF/ESDI

concept is the best means to this end

-

perhaps implemented

in the follow-on to SFOR in Bosnia in 1998/1999 if not

sooner.

Successful adaption of NATO based on CJTF will

demonstrate that preparing and training for Article

4

style

missions will become the primary peacetime institutional
function of NATO.

The US will be reassured vis-a-vis

burdensharing and the European goal of implementing the ESDI
can be met.

This is not to say that making NATO a pool from

which allies draw on to support coalitions of the willing

1995, Turkey called an Article 4 consultation at

NATO over the

Netherlands decision to

that the Dutch decision was an
recognize and host a Kurdish parliament in exile.
threat to Turkey.
security
infringement on Turkish sovereignty and it thus represented a

Turkey argued

Additionally in August 1996 Turkey angered Washington by proceeding with

at

$23 billion gas

deal with Iran in defiance of a new US law which penalizes companies investing in energy
Turkey's
projects in Libya or Iran. Washington's response was constrained by the fact that
Turkey's
in
shortfall
major
compliance with US-led sanctions against Iraq had been causing a
that not
fact
the
by
energy reserves. The US policy on dealing with these states is compounded

only Turkey trades heavily with these states but so does the entire EU.
has a combined amount of annual trade with Iran of $893 million.
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For example, the

EU

will always work.

The states that are undertaking a mission

will have to get the political support of the NAC

.

The

important factor will be NATO's capacity to provide standing

mechanisms so that when a consensus exists to utilize CJTF,
it will be done rapidly and effectively.

Organizational Capabilities
The main physical change in NATO will be a

restructuring of its regional and sub-regional command
headquarters which will be adapted to accommodate CJTF
planning.

If

for Article

4

non-members can contribute to CJTF planning
missions,

they should be able to join these

standing headquarters via the PFP

.

NATO will remain highly

formal with little autonomy but regional integrated

headquarters will allow rapid and effective responses to
crises

As PFP countries work within the CJTF framework and

.

Article

4

missions come to be the main focus of peacetime

NATO activity, the debate over whether a state actually
joins NATO or not will blur as expanded multinational

planning promotes practical solutions to real security
problems.

Collective defense will remain the linchpin of

NATO but it will be held in reserve, through which NATO's

traditional alliance functions can flow if some unforeseen

major threat to Europe does appear.
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Princip les, Norms, Rules, and Procedures.
In the case of CJTF,

institutional procedures take on

an increased role with a greater opportunity for

international socialization than previously existed in NATO
-

especially if CJTF headquarters are opened to PFP

countries that are able to contribute.

The procedures in

NATO vis-a-vis the ESDI will remain largely unchanged
consensus must exist in the NAC

However,

.

-

a

consensus need

not necessarily mean a commitment by all countries to

participate in an operation.

The principles and norms

present in NATO will be enhanced because in order to use
NATO assets via a CJTF, a state must meet the approval of
all the members of the NAC.

A state in gross violation of

institutional principles and norms might form international
coalitions for a particular objective

-

but it will be

harder to do than in the absence of the institution as

it

will not be able to draw from standing NATO assets.

Capacity for Change
Absent a credible threat, NATO's future hinges on

implementation of the CJTF concept and its internal
If it does not have the capacity for this

restructuring.

sort of fundamental change after the Cold War, NATO may well

go the way of most alliances.
for adaptation

However,

-

NATO has shown a potential

particularly in its planning for CJTF.

CJTF remains a concept that has yet to be

implemented.

If the

member states can agree to its
311

implementation then NATO will have an important role to play
in the future of European security

will be institutional.

-

and its primary role

NATO will avoid hierarchy but serve

as a standing institution from which states might call on

for expertise and assistance when a crisis occurs.

Beyond NATO:

The Future of the Transatlantic Relationship

NATO is not a panacea and its future is in not
guaranteed.

If NATO is to continue to contribute to

national security in Europe it will require a deepening and

widening of the transatlantic relationship between the US,
Canada,

A new transatlantic institution

and Europe.

established through a US/Canada/EU charter that creates
procedures for political and economic cooperation would
insulate NATO from non- security disputes spilling over into
the Alliance.

This would make NATO work more effectively as

it carries out new tasks in the 21st century.

If the only

tie that binds the US directly to Europe is NATO,

then the

transatlantic relationship and the future effectiveness of
NATO are in danger.

Thus,

North America and Europe must

build upon the political, economic, and security ties that
bind based on shared interests.
Politically,

the transatlantic relationship symbolizes

the promise of stable democratic societies working together
to promote common interests.

Democracy itself does not

cause peace in international relations.

Fragile democracies

rights or
that have not fully developed respect for minority

peaceful resolution of disputes may experience high

instability and even civil war that can become
internationalized.

Democracies suffering economic

catastrophes can also fall to nationalism and/or

dictatorship with expansionist goals.

democracy

is,

in the long term,

Nevertheless

the most stable system of

government because of its basis on popular legitimacy and
the rule of law.

Moreover, open societies enhance

transparency in military planning so that the possibility of

uncertainty leading to instability in international
relations is lowered.

Thus the members of NATO have a

unique responsibility and opportunity to serve as a model of
international cooperation in military planning so that the

possibility of uncertainty leading to instability in
international relations is lowered.
Economically, the US and Europe are deeply

interdependent with about $1.5 trillion in annual shared
economic activities. Europe has more of the Gross World
Product than any other region with 35 percent at market

exchange rates and 27 percent at purchasing power parity
exchange rates.

Europe was America's second- largest

customer in 1993 with 31 percent of US exports of goods and
services; America's second- largest supplier in 1993,

providing

29

percent of US imports of goods and services,-

and Europe provides the US with relatively balanced trade,

with a $7 billion US merchandise trade deficit in 1993
(compared to 115 billion for Asia)
313

.

Nearly 50 percent of

U!

direct investment abroad is in Europe, and over 60 percent
of foreign direct investment in the US comes from Europe

(about $260 billion)

which provides an important source of

capital to offset low national savings rates.

investment flows account for nearly
the US and

5

percent in Europe.

7

Some

These

percent of all jobs in
3

million American

citizens are employed in the US by European- owned business
and 1.5 million are supported by goods and services that the
US exports to Europe.

Combined,

the US-European trade

relationship accounts for about 14 million jobs on both
sides of the Atlantic.

relative of Europe.

Culturally,

the US remains a strong

According to the 1990 US census, some

142.5 million Americans

(about 56.9 percent)

have sole or

primary European ancestry or ethnic origins. 562
Despite this political and economic transatlantic
interdependence,

the greatest challenge to European security

in the 21st century will be the maintenance of the

institutionalized security cooperation developed between the
US and Europe since World War II.

Though the successful US

interventions in Haiti and Bosnia have shown that Americans
can be rallied to support risky military engagement, their

willingness to continually come to the aid of others with
sufficient means to act on their own can only be tested so

Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic

Transition (Washington D.C.:

Assessment 1995:

U.S. Security Challenges in

National Defense University Press, 1995) 42.

Also see Norbert

Wieczorek (Federal Republic of Germany), General Rapporteur, "Europe and North America:
Partners and Competitors," Draft General Report. The North Atlantic Assembly Economic

Committee EC (96) 7 (May, 1996).
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often.

Domestic constraints on the American commitment to

repeated international interventions is especially true in
Europe where Americans often see wealthy Europeans with
strong governmental safety nets built under the US security
guarantee.

This sense of frustration has strong voices in

each major American political party and is more active in
the Congress today than it was in the Cold War.
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Leaders in the US and Europe have expressed concern
about growing trends toward American isolationism.

In March

1995 President Clinton told a bipartisan audience at the

Nixon Center in Washington DC that
The new isolationists are wrong.
They would
have us face the future alone.
Their approach
would weaken this country, and we must not let the
ripple of isolationism tQ&t has been generated
build into a tidal wave.
In his address to the US Congress in February 1996,

French

President Chirac lectured the members on the benefits of
foreign aid and chastised them for deep cuts in US aid

programs

The speech was poorly attended by members and

.

many seats were filled with congressional research
assistants and pages.

The declining interest in foreign

affairs in the US Congress has combined with the lowering of

US House of Representatives passed a bill
amount the US pays for peacekeeping operations.

In February 1995, the
to the

UN

in the

American

the

Interests

Abroad Act of 1995 introduced

May 1995. President Clinton described
the US international role in the last fifty

to

deduct from regular

US

dues

Similar language was included

House of Representatives on 23
most serious isolationist threat to

in the

this legislation as the

White House Information Service, 23 May
Lawrence Eagleburger described it in a 24 May

years.

Former Republican Secretary of State
1995 interview with National Public Radio as "immature."
Remarks by the President to the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom Policy Conference. The
1994.

Mayflower Hotel, Washington, DC,

1

March 1995.
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its institutional memory with the retirement of Senators Sam

Nunn,

Howell Heflin, Bill Bradley, William Cohen, and Nancy

Kassenbaum.

This diminution of internationalist members of

congress has especially worried German Chancellor Kohl.

While receiving an award from the Atlantic Bridge Group in

Berlin for fostering ties between Germany and the US on
June 1996,

Kohl said that:

18

"The US elections in the autumn

will see a series of senators and members of Congress drop
out who know Germany and Europe and are bound to us in a

special way

.

.

.

I

do not for now see that the 'old guard' of

senators and congressmen is being replaced with successors
who approach Europe and Germany with the same intensity." 565

A restructuring of NATO can provide a means of keeping
the transatlantic security partnership vibrant in the

future.

However,

it must proceed beyond theoretical

applications into full implementation via CJTF

.

This may

require a leap of faith on the part of the US and its

European allies

-

and it may also require that European

members of NATO spend more money on defense.

If anything

has been gained from nearly fifty years of cooperation in
NATO,

then now is the time to take practical steps to

maintain the institutional security relationship between the
US and Europe.

A renewed transatlantic partnership

institutionalized through

a

US/Canada/EU charter can focus

on non-traditional security challenges such as trade

Reuters.

18 June 1996.
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disputes policing nuclear proliferation, environmental
challenges,
disputes,

migration.

technology transfer, negotiating border

international terrorism, organized crime and
In December 1995 the US and EU completed the New

Transatlantic Agenda.

Later,

in September 1996,

US

Secretary of State Warren Christopher called for a "New

Atlantic Community" in a major speech in Germany.

These

were important first steps reflecting shared interests that
are the basis of the transatlantic relationship.

form the new transatlantic partnership takes,

Whatever

its objective

must be to ensure that disputes not immediately pertinent to

national security do not damage the institutions which can
affect the peace and stability of Europe into the 21st

century
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CHAPTER VIII

TOWARD A BROADER RESEARCH AGENDA:

COMPLEMENTARY INSTITUTIONS

From Theory to Practice in European Security
While more research is needed on the question of

whether institutions cause security, this project has shown
that variations in institutional form can affect the degree
of security in post-Cold War Europe.

While NATO's

institutional form has been primarily dependent upon the
structure of the international system, it has evolved since
the end of the Cold War.

In its outreach to Central and

Eastern Europe and in the planning for IFOR, NATO has

enhanced security.

However, NATO has yet to transform

sufficiently to meet the needs of Europe in the future.

If

NATO is to promote security, it must move from theory to

practice in its institutional adaptation.

In particular,

the degree of security in Europe's future may be

dramatically affected, positively or negatively, by the form
that NATO enlargement takes

Early advocates of NATO enlargement oversold what NATO
could do for new members and raised their hopes too high

only to be dashed upon the rocks of geostrategic reality.

These countries, particularly the Baltics, have suffered too

much to deserve this kind of treatment from the West.
Having raised false hopes among Central and East Europeans
and risked a cooperative dialogue with Russia which appeared
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at the end of the Cold War,

NATO members have a

responsibility to shape NATO's institutional form to ensure
that it enhances security for the many and not only the few.

NATO's first attempt at adaptation was to promote
mutual gain in European security through the amalgamated

collective security of interlocking institutions.

This

failure to construct a new European security architecture

confirms the realist critique of institutions and their

capacity to independently affect peace.

As the bloodshed

grew in the Balkans, the multiple institutions tasked by
states to resolve the conflict

NATO

-

-

the EU,

CSCE,

UN,

WEU,

and

all failed to convince the warring parties to cease

their violence.

Even ethnic cleansing bordering on genocide

could not mobilize member states to authorize institutions
to respond effectively.

Without shared national interests

or independent capabilities,

institutions promoted a false

sense of security as Europe witnessed its worst violence
since World War II.
its member states,
1995.

Paralyzed by the diverging interests of
NATO was on the brink of collapse by mid-

NATO could not exist in a vacuum and if it was to

have any relevance after the Cold War,
a role in resolving the Balkan crisis.

it would have to play

By late 1995, a

combination of power, diplomacy, and institutions caused

a

cease-fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina which led to a potentially
stable peace.

NATO's institutional attributes enhanced that

peace in two key ways
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First,

NATO planning substantially lowered the

transaction costs of forming and maintaining a peacekeeping
coalition to facilitate the agreed separation of the warring
parties.

The Dayton accords reached during the autumn of

1995 depended on a rapid deployment of peacekeeping forces

which only NATO could adequately supply.

This immediate

intervention was possible because of two years of
institutional planning and it was essential to the

reassurance that each party needed to commit to peace.

By

organizing 60,000 troops for IFOR, NATO demonstrated that

it

had evolved to become more flexible and adaptive in its

missions.

NATO could field new and creative command

structures,

and facilitate the use of power.

While still

fundamentally an instrument of policy, NATO made the

implementation of a collective decision easier to attain
than it would have been in the absence of the institution.
Second,

through the NACC and the PFP information

exchanges, NATO integrated non-member countries into its

military planning for peacekeeping operations based on
Article

4

consultation.

A better understanding of the

capabilities available for multinational peacekeeping
lowered the transaction costs of planning and reduced the

danger that command and control confusion could harm this

multinational coalition.

NATO's coordination of IFOR

included 10,000 personnel from PFP countries
took on very dangerous missions.

-

some of whom

The provision of non-NATO

forces was politically significant as domestic constraints
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limited the amount of forces the US was willing to commit to
IFOR.

NATO's new institutional characteristics thus helped

make it possible for its leading member to provide only onethird of the forces.

Additionally,

IFOR would feed back on

the PFP process as operational experience helped Partners

better define their security needs in relation to NATO.
Despite these successes, NATO's institutional capacity
to help Bosnia-Herzegovina move from a situation of peace to

one of lasting security was confined.

Though IFOR provided

considerable infrastructure assistance in rebuilding the
country,

its limited tenure left the future of post-IFOR

Bosnia very unclear.

The removal of NATO from the region

after one year would have once more exposed the weakness of
other institutions such as the EU, WEU, and OSCE.

Thus the

scheduled end of IFOR prompted an ongoing discussion over
what would best maintain peace in the Balkans

-

and renewed

debate over the relevance of institutions in aiding

reconciliation versus the less ideal but perhaps more stable

partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The most important lesson of NATO's contribution to

peace in the Balkans was that NATO only worked when the US
was fully engaged and leading its traditional alliance

functions.

NATO could conduct planning for peacekeeping,

but it was not effective in the absence of US leadership.

The US has a vital interest in European stability and its

presence and influence provides it.

However,

a failure of

Europe to assume responsibility for immediate security

challenges in its own backyard, could drive the US away from
Europe and thereby damage the insurance that the American

presence provides against great power conflict.

While US

involvement in Europe is central to American and European

long-term interests, it will only be politically sustainable
with a major adaptation of NATO's institutional form via

implementation of the CJTF initiative.

Why Variations in Institutional Form Matter

NATO remains insufficiently adapted to the post-Cold
War security environment to justify optimism for its longterm survival.

NATO did link membership with principles by

adapting its membership rules from restricted to
conditional.

However,

the policy of NATO enlargement was

driven through, decided, and instigated without a full
airing of the potential false promises that it promoted.
For example,

those analysts and policymakers who linked NATO

and democracy were confusing cause and effect and those who

implied that NATO had kept peace between Greece and Turkey
had not read their history.
succeed,

For NATO enlargement to

it must be based on the premise of promoting

stability and proceed at the same pace as the Alliance's
internal adaptation.
The strongest case for enlarging NATO is to include

Poland and the Czech Republic, not as a hedge against
Russia, but as a hedge between Russia and Germany.

If

Germany has no ambitions outside its territory, as its
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behavior since unification suggests, then it should not have
problems with this expansion of internal containment.
Additionally, making NATO a hedge between Russia and Germany
is probably the only argument that Moscow can accept for

enlargement as it too has a shared interest in seeing this
region stabilized.

The US also has a long-term interest in

promoting such regional stability via the reassurance that
it provides Europe in NATO.

America has lost too many

soldiers this century to wars prompted by security

competition over the region between Germany and Russia.
Additionally,

the US did not spend trillions of dollars

fighting the Cold War only to see Europe destabilized in
peace.

It is true that the current security environment

does not merit such pessimism.

However,

that is all the

more reason to carefully lock in the peace and make it

lasting as Europe moves into the next century.
It

would be preferable for Russia to feel at ease with

the geostrategic goals of NATO enlargement.

NATO

enlargement that merely moves the Cold War line East should
be considered nothing but a failure and enlarging NATO as an

explicitly anti-Russian act in the absence of Russian

behavior that merits such
mistake.

a

response would be a tragic

By institutionalizing the NATO-Russia cooperation

that has developed in IFOR and SFOR in the Balkans, NATO can

show Russia that its intentions are peaceful and that the

objective is to promote stability and not encircle Russia.
A NATO-Russia charter can define this process.

However,

unless there is a mutual gain from such a charter,
have little relevance.

it will

NATO members tend to view

consultation with Russia as informing Moscow of what NATO is
doing while Russia views consultation as a right to veto

Alliance activity.

If enlargement is linked to sound

geostrategic foundations and combined with a fundamental

adaptation of NATO's institutional form, Russia and NATO
will have a more solid basis for institutionalizing a

consultative arrangement for the future of European
security.

So long as Russia is not a threat, NATO should

demonstrate to Russia its peaceful intentions by

transparently limiting the activity of new members to
Article

4

planning and operations that will become the

primary day to day activity of NATO.

If

member states are

threatened, NATO can revitalize its Article

collective defense alliance.
circumstances,

However,

5

functions as a

in current

there is no need for NATO to spread its

infrastructure on new member territories in a way that
decreases the security of any state.
To reduce the potential for false promises to new and

aspirant members, NATO should be clear on what it can and
NATO can provide an

can not do to promote democracy.

institutional forum for political and military socialization
among new and old members but NATO per se is not an

institution for building democracy.

particularly the European Union

-

Other institutions

-

must take primary

responsibility for building the substructure that lends to
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stable democratic societies throughout Central and Eastern
Europe.

Overemphasizing what NATO can do to help

democracies may actually create a sense among the European

Union members that they do not need to enlarge into the
places the EU should if it is to be consistent with the

principles and norms that it promotes.

NATO should play a

complementary role consistent with its principles in

promoting democracy and stability in Europe

-

and the PFP,

not NATO enlargement, must become the principal means to

that end
PFP can aid non-members of NATO in four important
ways.

First,

it opens NATO structures from which they can

gain technical expertise that will help them enhance

territorial national security as they see fit.

Second,

PFP

can help states promote stability in their immediate

regions.

Integrated into CJTFs, PFP participants can more

effectively address non- traditional challenges such as
environmental catastrophes, natural disasters, and

humanitarian crises.

Third,

at a general European level,

PFP can contribute to stability as it has in the case of
IFOR.

Fourth,

as the PFP countries join Article

4

related

NATO structures and participate in other NATO programs and

planning they will have the opportunity to continue to
socialize within the principles, norms, rules and procedures
of western political and military traditions.

There is a

danger that, given the high costs of integrating two or
three new members into NATO, that the PFP will go wayside.
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Thus,

if NATO states are willing to invest in new members

they must also be willing to ensure that enlargement

corresponds to an increase in PFP funding and activities.
This is especially true because the states that will become

NATO members are stable and not threatened.

However, by

enlarging, NATO will spread its area of responsibility up to
some very unstable areas.

A broadened and enhanced PFP can

help ease this dilemma.

A Broader Research Agenda:

Complementary Institutions

As institutions become more active in Europe,

institutional form will be increasingly important so that
they do not decrease security.

Thus the task of the student

of international security in Europe should be to draw from

realist and institutionalist schools of international

relations to help guide the process of designing

institutions so that they can do what they do best and not
create false promises.

NATO is at the center of a growing

web of institutional security cooperation in Europe.
However, NATO can not act alone and, unless it is

fundamentally transformed internally, its future is not

guaranteed
Collective security in the form of interlocking
institutions is not the path to a secure Europe.

Europe is

best viewed as a place with complementary institutions in

which institutions perform clear tasks and are designed so
that each can do what it does best.
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Just as this project

has taken a historical view toward NATO and the evolution of
its institutional form,

a

broader research agenda can

incorporate similar analyses of the EU, WEU, and the
CSCE/OSCE.

Complementary and mutually reinforcing

institutions can form the basis of a growing institutional

framework in Europe while institutional boundaries are made
clear so that each can work most effectively.
To better understand how to avoid the pitfalls of

interlocking institutions, a broader research agenda should
include detailed study of collective security and why it has
not worked.

Historical analysis of the Concert of Europe

and the League of Nations in particular can help aid the

process of enhancing complementary institutions in a

positive manner.

Also as one studies NATO, it is always

worth remembering that its presence means the failure of
Europe to become a more peaceful place.

The long-term

purpose of studying European security is not necessarily the

preservation of an institution such as NATO.

The goal is to

promote the circumstances in which NATO will no longer be
needed

-

as far off as that ideal may seem.

Thus,

the

relationship between institutions and security communities
should be central to a broader research agenda.

Finally,

after the concept of complementary institutions is fully

explored in Europe, it is worth looking at other regions of
the world and assessing whether formal institutions might

increase security,

for example,

Asia
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in places such as Africa and

Conclusion

NATO remains essential to European security after the
Cold War.

While its independent capabilities are

restricted, NATO has the potential to enhance European

security if sufficiently adapted.

To date,

such an

adaptation has not occurred and it is up to its members to
provide the leadership for successful NATO reform.

The

stakes are high because the degree of security in the future
of Europe can be positively or negatively affected by the

institutional form that NATO takes.
designed,

When NATO was first

individuals with creative vision assessed their

short-term national interests in the context of long-term
goals and mutual gains from security cooperation.

Such

vision and leadership is required again as Europe moves
toward the 21st century.

If it is forthcoming,

NATO may

have a strong and positive impact on the future of European

security
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